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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

******
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

vs.
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (ICRMP),
Defendant/Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Docket No. 44722
Franklin Co. Case No. CV-2016-195

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District
of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Franklin
Honorable MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge

APPEARANCES:
Counsel for Appellants:

Counsel for Respondent:

Blake S. Atkin
ATKIN LAW OFFICE
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, ID 83228
batkin@atkinlawoffices.net

Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLC
POB 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
pcollaer@ihlaw.com
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Date: 2/21/2017

Sixth Judicial District Court - Franklin County

Time: 10:23 AM

ROA Report

Page 1 of 3

User: HAMPTON

Case: CV-2016-0000195 Current Judge: Mitchell W. Brown
Val D Westover vs. Idaho Counties Risk Management Program

Val D Westover vs. Idaho Counties Risk Management Program
Date

Code

User

6/3/2016

NCOC
SMIS

HAMPTON
HAMPTON
HAMPTON

APER

6/24/2016

CERT

6/27/2016

Judge
New Case Filed - Other Claims

Mitchell W. Brown

Summons Issued

Mitchell W. Brown

Plaintiff: Westover, Val D Appearance Blake S.
Atkin

Mitchell W. Brown

HAMPTON

Mitchell W. Brown
Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District
Court of any type not listed in categories E, F and
H(1) Paid by: Atkin, Blake S. (attorney for
Westover, Val D) Receipt number: 0001289
Dated: 6/3/2016 Amount: $221.00 (Check) For:
Westover, Val D (plaintiff)

HAMPTON
HAMPTON

Certificate of Service-Atkin

Mitchell W. Brown

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by:
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLP Receipt
number: 0001504 Dated: 6/27/2016 Amount:
$136.00 (Check) For: Idaho Counties Risk
Management Program, (defendant)

Mitchell W. Brown

APER

HAMPTON

Defendant: Idaho Counties Risk Management
Program, Appearance Phillip J. Collaer

Mitchell W. Brown

ANSW

HAMPTON

Answer filed and Notice of Appearance by Phillip
J. Collaer

Mitchell W. Brown

RETN

Return of Service Summons and Complaint

Mitchell W. Brown

Affidavit of Service

Mitchell W. Brown

Order for Submission of Information for
Scheduling Order

Mitchell W. Brown

6/28/2016

ORDR

HAMPTON
HAMPTON
HAMPTON

7/13/2016

STIP

HAMPTON

Stipulation-Atkin

Mitchell W. Brown

7/19/2016

MISC
MOTN
MEMO

HAMPTON
HAMPTON
HAMPTON

Joint Statement-Atkin

Mitchell W. Brown

Defendant's Motion for Protective Order-Collaer

Mitchell W. Brown

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion
for Protective Order-Collaer

Mitchell W. Brown

NOTC
MISC
HRSC

HAMPTON
HAMPTON
HAMPTON

Notice of Service-Collaer

Mitchell W. Brown

Joint Statement-Atkin

Mitchell W. Brown

HRSC

HAMPTON

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 11/13/2017 09:00 Mitchell W. Brown
AM) 2nd setting

7/22/2016

ORDR

HAMPTON

Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and
Initial Pretrial Order

Mitchell W. Brown

8/22/2016

MOTN
MEMO

HAMPTON
HAMPTON

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

Mitchell W. Brown

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment-Collaer

Mitchell W. Brown

AFFD

HAMPTON

Affidavit of Phillip J. Collaer in Support of
Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment-Collaer

Mitchell W. Brown

AFFD

7/21/2016

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/31/2017 09:00 Mitchell W. Brown
AM) 1st setting
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Val D Westover vs. Idaho Counties Risk Management Program
Date

Code

User

8/22/2016

AFFD

HAMPTON

Affidavit of Jeff Boice in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment-Collaer

Mitchell W. Brown

NOTC

Notice of Hearing-Collaer

Mitchell W. Brown

HRSC

HAMPTON
HAMPTON

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 09/29/2016 02:00 PM)

Mitchell W. Brown

9/14/2016

MEMO

HAMPTON

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel
and in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment-Atkin

Mitchell W. Brown

9/19/2016

STIP

Stipulation-Atkin

Mitchell W. Brown

Notice of Hearing-Atkin

Mitchell W. Brown

HRSC

HAMPTON
HAMPTON
HAMPTON

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
09/29/2016 02:00 PM)

Mitchell W. Brown

REPL

HAMPTON

Reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment-Collaer

Mitchell W. Brown

MEMO

HAMPTON

Response Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Reply in Support of
Motion for Protective Order-Collaer

Mitchell W. Brown

DCHH

HAMPTON

Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled
Mitchell W. Brown
on 09/29/2016 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Rodney Felshaw
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

DCHH

HAMPTON

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Mitchell W. Brown
scheduled on 09/29/2016 02:00 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Rodney Felshaw
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

MOTN

Motion to Compel

NOTC

9/26/2016

9/29/2016

Judge

10/1/2016

MINE

KARENV
HAMPTON

11/1/2016

ORDR

HAMPTON

Order Re Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment

Mitchell W. Brown

11/14/2016

MDEC

HAMPTON

Memorandum Decision and Order on ICRMP'S
Motion for Summary Judgment

Mitchell W. Brown

STAT

Case Status Changed: closed

Mitchell W. Brown

Civil Disposition

Mitchell W. Brown

Judgment

Mitchell W. Brown

Defendant ICRMPT's Motion for Attorneys' Fees
and Costs-Collaer

Mitchell W. Brown

Mitchell W. Brown

Minute Entry & Order for hearing held on Sept 29, Mitchell W. Brown
2016

11/15/2016

JDMT

11/28/2016

MOTN

HAMPTON
HAMPTON
HAMPTON
HAMPTON

MEMO

HAMPTON

Defendant ICRMP's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs-Collaer

Mitchell W. Brown

MEMO

HAMPTON

Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys'
Fees-Collaer

Mitchell W. Brown

CDIS
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Val D Westover vs. Idaho Counties Risk Management Program
Date

Code

User

12/12/2016

OPPO

HAMPTON

Opposition to ICRMP's Motion for Attorney's Fees Mitchell W. Brown
and Costs-Atkin

DANAL

Filing: L3 - Appeal or petition for judicial review or Mitchell W. Brown
cross appeal or cross-petition from commission,
board, or body to district court Paid by: Atkin,
Blake S. (attorney for Westover, Val D) Receipt
number: 0003037 Dated: 12/13/2016 Amount:
$221.00 (Check) For: Westover, Val D (plaintiff)

APSC

HAMPTON

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Mitchell W. Brown

STAT

HAMPTON

Case Status Changed: Inactive

Mitchell W. Brown

12/20/2016

BNDC

HAMPTON

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 3096 Dated
12/20/2016 for 100.00)

Mitchell W. Brown

12/21/2016

MEMO

HAMPTON

ICRMP'S Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs-Collaer

Mitchell W. Brown

12/23/2016

CLCERT

HAMPTON

Clerk's Certificate of Appeal

Mitchell W. Brown

12/29/2016

HRSC

HAMPTON

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Attorney fees and Mitchell W. Brown
Costs 01/26/2017 02:30 PM) ICRMP Motion

1/3/2017

NOTC

HAMPTON

Notice of Telephonic Hearing RE Defendants'
Motion for Attonreys Fees and Costs-Collaer

Mitchell W. Brown

1/26/2017

DCHH

HAMPTON

Hearing result for Motion for Attorney fees and
Costs scheduled on 01/26/2017 02:30 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Rodney Felshaw
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages ICRMP Motion

Mitchell W. Brown

2/2/2017

MEOR

HAMPTON

Minute Entry And Order held January 26, 2017

Mitchell W. Brown

12/13/2016

Judge
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Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380

16 JUH - 3 AH 11 : 34

D!.PUT

t'

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
Val D Westover,
)
Plaintiff
)
COMPLAINT
)
(Jury Trial Demanded)
)
V.
)
Case No.
)
Idaho Counties Risk Management Program )
(ICRMP),
)
Judge: Mitchell W.
Judge _ _ _ _ _ __
)
Defendant.
)

CV-JOflf-t"/5
Brown

Plaintiff complains of Defendant as follows:

PARTIES

1. Plaintiff is a citizen of this state and a resident of Franklin County, State ofldaho who
has been aggrieved by the existence and unlawful actions of the Defendant in this
matter.
2. Defendant, Idaho Counties Management Program (ICRMP) is an entity purportedly
organized pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 67-2326 through 67-2333 that purports to
exercise the authority of its local government members to conduct litigation brought
against its local government members and to pay judgments on behalf of those
members.
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FACTS

1.

On April 20, 2015, Plaintiff granted an easement to the power company over property
owned by the Plaintiff as part of an agreement to obtain service to his property.

2. Without authority to do so the Franklin County Assessor wrote a letter to the power
company asserting that Plaintiff did not own the property, thus slandering Plaintiffs title
to the property.
3. On July 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Franklin County Assessor because
the Assessor had illegally slandered Plaintiffs title to property owned by him in Franklin
County.
4.

On January 15, 2016, the parties met in court-ordered mediation.

5. The focus of that mediation was how much the county assessor would pay in attorney
fees to the Plaintiff because the county assessor had retracted its slanderous letter before
the mediation.
6. The Franklin County Assessor announced during the mediation that he could not offer
anything in way of settlement of Plaintiffs claims for attorney fees because he had no
authority from ICRMP to offer anything in settlement.
7. Plaintiff was then informed that ICRMP controlled the litigation, provided the lawyers
who were defending the Franklin County Assessor, would ultimately be responsible to
pay any judgment Plaintiff might obtain against the county assessor for attorney fees, and
asserted the right to control the negotiations at the mediation.

CAUSE OF ACTION

(Declaratory Judgment pursuant to Idaho Code Section 10-1202)
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8. Idaho Code Section 12-117 in order to promote some modicum of accountability on the
part of local government entities for their conduct provides that where a state agency or a
political subdivision is in litigation with a private citizen and has acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law, the court "shall" award attorney's fees to the prevailing
party.
9. But the legislature went further. The brunt of the attorney fees award occasioned by the
wrongful conduct of a political subdivision is to be felt locally. Idaho Code Section 12117 (3) specifically states that "Expenses awarded against a state agency or political
subdivision pursuant to this section shall be paid from funds in the regular operating
budget of the state agency or political subdivision."
10. ICRMP is an entity whose purpose is to eliminate the ameliorative purpose of Section 12117(3) by shifting the burden of attorney fees occasioned by the wrongful conduct of
local government officials from their operating budget to the ICRMP risk management
pool.
11. ICRMP thus flies in the face of the clear legislative policy set out in Idaho Code Section
12-11 7(3) that local officials who act without a reasonable basis in fact or law feel the
consequences of their actions at the local level, thus promoting responsible governmental
action.
12. By taking over the litigation of local governments who are accused of acting unlawfully,
and by agreement to indemnify them with funds other than funds from their regular
operating budget, ICRMP is itself acting illegally.
13. While there may be considerable doubt whether an insurance arrangement such as
ICRMP is at all authorized by Idaho Code Sections 67-2326 through 67-2329, those
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sections make it clear that joint action authorized under those provisions cannot be used
to thwart other legislative purposes.
14. For instance, Section 67-2328( a) specifically limits the power of such a joint action
entity:
Any power, privilege or authority, authorized by the Idaho Constitution, statute or
charter, held by the state of Idaho or a public agency of said state, may be
exercised and enjoyed jointly with the state of Idaho or any other public agency of
this state having the same powers, privilege or authority; but never beyond the
limitation of such powers, privileges or authority; (emphasis added)

15. By purporting to pay judgments for attorney fees from a source other than the regular
operating budget of the agency being sued, ICRMP has acted "beyond the limitation of
the powers, privileges and authority of Franklin County that is required by statute to pay
those fees out of the county assessor's regular operating budget.
16. The consequence of the illegal operation of ICRMP is that local government bears little
direct responsibility for their illegal conduct contrary to the public policy sought to be
achieved by the legislature through enactment of Idaho Code Section 12-117(3).
17. Those consequences are illustrated by the facts in this case in which the county assessor
showed up at court-ordered mediation with no authority to pay anything in settlement of
Plaintiffs claims for attorney fees because any ultimate judgment would be paid, not
from the regular operating budget of the county assessor, but by the ICRMP insurance
pool.
18. Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment that ICRMP is an illegal entity, not
authorized by Idaho law and/or that its conduct in controlling litigation between citizens
and their local government by providing the defense and indemnifying for attorney fees
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undermines principles of good governance as adopted by the legislature in Idaho Code
Section 12-117(3) is illegal.

Wherefore, Plaintiff prays for judgment against ICRMP:
1. For a declaration that ICRMP is an illegal entity, not authorized by Idaho law.
2. That the conduct of ICRMP in controlling litigation between citizens and their local
government by providing the defense and indemnifying for attorney fees undermines
principles of good governance as adopted by the legislature in Idaho Code Section 12117(3) and is therefore illegal.
3. For costs of Court and reasonable attorney fees.
Dated this_ day of June, 2016.
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.

4k~
Blake S. Atkin
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
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Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
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Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
Val D Westover,
)
)
SUMMONS
Plaintiff
)
)
V.
)
)
Idaho Counties Risk Management Program )
(ICRMP),
)
Judge: MitcheII
)
Judge
)
Defendant.

W. Brown

NOTICE: YOU HA VE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF: THE
COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE
UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW.

To:

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (ICRMP)
3100 VISTA AVENUE, SUITE 300
BOISE, IDAHO 83705

You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written
response must be filed with the above designated court within 20 days after service of this
Summons on you. If you fail to so respond the court may enter judgment against you as
demanded by the Plaintiffs in the Complaint.
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A copy of the Complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the advice of
or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written
response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected.
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule 10(a)(1) and other Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include:
1.

The title and number of this case.

2.

If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions or

denials of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses you may claim.
3.

Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the signature, mailing

address and telephone number of your attorney.
4.

Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to Plaintiffs attorney, as

designated above.
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with you response, contact the Clerk of the
above-named court.
DATED this

3

day of June, 2016.
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

;#{Ma Ha t.1f)h~

Deputy Clerk
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PAGE

ATKIN LAW OFFICES

Blake S. Atkin #6903
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
7579 North West Side Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Email: batkin@atkinlawoffices.net
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXIB JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D WESTOVER,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Plaintiff
Case No. CV-2016-195

V.

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANGEMENT PROGRAM (ICRMP),

Judge: Brown

Defendant.

The undersigned certjfies that she caused to be served a true and correct copy of the following

document as indicated below:
1. Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Admission to Defendant
2. Plaintiffs First Set of Document Requests to Defendant
3. Plaintiffs First Set oflntenogatories to Defendant

Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C.W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 7426

X U.S. Mail X E-mail

_Facsimile

Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Facsimile: (208) 334-5510

Email: pcollaer@aihlaw.com
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B2/B3

05/24/2015

15:41

2087473283

PAGE

ATKIN LAW OFFICES

Hon. Mitchell W. Brown
159 South Main
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Facsimile: (208) 547-2147
(Certificate of Service Only)

U.S. Mail

E-mail

X FacsimHe

Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263

U.S. Mail

E-mail

X Facsimile

Facsimile: (208) 852-2926

(Certificate of Service Only)
Dated this 24th day of June, 2016.
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Phillip J. Collaer - ISB No. #3447
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
E-Mail:
pcollaer@ajhlaw.com

: i

l -

c

~
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Attorneys for Defendant, IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(ICRMP)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D. WESTOVER,

c9.0lb- lqS-

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 2014 71 C

vs.
ANSWER
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)
Defendants.

Fee Category: 1(1 )(a)
Fee: $136.00

COMES NOW, the above-entitled defendant, Idaho Counties Risk Management
Program (ICRMP) (the "answering defendant"), by and through its attorneys of record,
Anderson, Julian & Hull LLP, answers the Plaintiff's Complaint as follows:

FIRST DEFENSE
The plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim against this answering defendant
upon which relief can be granted.

ANSWER-1

OR\G\NAL
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SECOND DEFENSE

I.
This answering defendant denies each and every allegation of the Complaint not
herein expressly and specifically admitted.

II.
Based upon information and belief, this answering defendant admits the
allegations contained in ,I4 of the Complaint as it relates to this answering defendant.
Ill.
With respect to the allegations contained in PARTIES, ,i1 of the Complaint, this
answering defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth or falsity of the allegations relating to the plaintiff's citizenship, his residency
and, therefore, denies the same.

This answering defendant denies the remaining

allegations in ,I1.
IV.

With respect to the allegations contained in PARTIES, ,I2 of the Complaint, this
answering defendant admits that ICRMP is an Idaho Corporation and joint powers entity
with its principle place of business in Boise, Idaho. It was, at all times relevant, duly
authorized by the State of Idaho to conduct business relating to the sale of insurance to
its members within the State of Idaho. Defendant denies all other factual allegations or
inferences contained in PARTIES, ,12.
V.

This answering defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in ,i,i 1 and 2 and, therefore,
denies the same.
ANSWER-2
15 of 272

VI.

With respect to the allegations contained in 113, this answering defendant states
that the lawsuit referenced therein speaks for itself and, denies any allegations in 113
that are inconsistent with the allegations in the lawsuit or, the responses by Franklin
County in said lawsuit.
VII.

This answering defendant denies the allegations contained in 11115-7 as they
relate to this answering defendant.
VIII.

This answering defendant states that the allegations contained in 11118-18 of the
Complaint assert legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent 11118-

18 state facts, those facts are denied as to this answering defendant.
THIRD DEFENSE

Plaintiff's demand for equitable relief is improper as, the plaintiff has an adequate
remedy at law.
FOURTH DEFENSE

Plaintiff lacks standing to seek the declaratory relief claimed in the Complaint.
FIFTH DEFENSE

Plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by virtue of Title VI, Chapter IX
Idaho Code.
WHEREFORE, this answering defendant prays that plaintiff takes nothing by his
Complaint, that the same be dismissed, and that this answering defendant be awarded

ANSWER-3
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its costs of suit and attorney fees, and such other and further relief as the Court deems
just.

DATED this

;l~

day of June, 2016.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL

LLP

By~~-~
Phillip J. Collaer, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant

ANSWER-4
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ,3 day of June, 2016, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER by delivering the same to each of the following
attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Attorney for Plaintiff

[\(]
[ ]
[ ]
[v]
[ \]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (801) 533-0380
Email:

~ - . J . uOOa ...
Phillip J. Collaer

ANSWER-5
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15:34
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6/17/2016

· , ... ),, ........ , .,: i' CLEKK

Val D Westover,
Plaintiff
V.

Idaho Counties Risk Management Program
(ICRM:P),
Defendant.

FRANKLIN COUNTY - 6TH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT

CV2016195

SHERIFF'S RETURN OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT
SHERIFF'S NUMBER: 1608796
RECEIVED BY SHERIFF ON 6/7/2016
I CERTIFY TiiAT DEPUTY JARROD PIRNIE #4200 PERSONALLY SERVED THE A TT ACHED:
SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT (Jury Trial Demanded) .

TO:

02/09

IDAHO COUNTIES RJSK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (ICRMP)
%MARY KUMMER
3100 VISTA STE 3QQ
BOISE, ID 83705

ON: 6/16/2016 AT 13:20 HOURS

I RETURN THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT SERVED, AND ASSESS MY FEES AT: $55.00 PAID BY ADVANCE FEES
...

STEPHEN BARTLETT, SHERJFF
ADA COUNTY, IDAHO

BYSWLluyrr
DEPUTY SHERRI WYATT 4254

ATKIN LAW OFFICE

BLAKE S ATKIN
7579 NORTH WESTSIDE HIGHWAY
CLIFTON, ID 83228
20/4254/4254
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06/27/2016

15:34

2087473283

ATKIN LAW OFFICES

PAGE

03/09

ADA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

CIVIL SECTION

I 6 JWi 27 PH J: 34
·· · ~· .: ,, ,- / CL[RK

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
Val D Westover,
Plaintiff

v.
Idaho Counties Risk Management Program
(ICRMP),
Defendant.

FRANKLIN COUNTY - 6TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT CASE NO:
CV2016195
SHERIFF'S CASE NO 1608796
SERVE TO:
ADDRESS:

I,

Idaho Counties Risk Management Program (ICRMP)
3100 VISTA AVENUE STE 300 BOISE, ID 83705

~

l7/Zi.,/1(£"

,CERTIFYTHATIPERSONALLY

(DEPUTY'S PRINTED NAME)

SERVED A COPY OF THE
• SUMMONS
• CO1\1PLAINT (Jury Trial Demanded)

TO: (NA~~Etrou~~~CUMENTS)
AT:

~/00 Wfl!l

_$~

J2ZJ 1 ·tdJ/ft;

(ADDRESS)

'

&,,((_,~/t-

ON:

/?Z{J

(DATE

(TIME)

---+-------#-~-=-"'~_____.,_~-""""'=:;___---ADA#:

(SIGNA

Notary Public fo Idaho
Residing at Boise, Ada County

\_ l O

/..t"'?{J)

I°""'--~-----O'l,f

My Commission Expires_ _ _4-+-·,-1---

lJ
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 1THE "
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKL_IN
____

CLERK

-l\~uu,JL
fH PHT r'

VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,

vs
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP),
Defendants.
-----------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2016-195

ORDER FOR SUBMISSION
OF INFORMATION FOR
SCHEDULING ORDER

A Complaint was filed in this matter on June 3, 2016. The Defendants have now appeared
and/or answered and the case is at issue.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16, that the parties, through their counsel
(or the parties themselves if self-represented), confer and submit to the Court, within fourteen (14)
days of the date of this Order, a joint statement containing the following information:
1. Whether this matter is to be tried to the Court or to a jury.
2. Whether any service is still needed upon any unserved parties.
3. Whether motions to add new parties or otherwise amend the pleadings are contemplated.
4. Whether the parties currently contemplate or anticipate any pre-trial motions.
5. Whether the case presents any unusual time requirements for trial preparation.
6. The number of trial days required for trial.
7. Whether the case presents any unusual times requirements for discovery.
8. Whether any party requests court-ordered mediation.
9. Two (2) TRIAL DATES, that comply with the requirements listed below. The trial date
for the case will be the earliest date submitted by agreement of the parties. The reason
the Court asks for two (2) trial dates is so that an optional backup trial date is available
and calendared in the event the first trial date has to be continued by Motion and Order
of the Court. In the event an order continuing the trial setting becomes necessary, the
additional trial date avoids the need to vacate the trial setting for up to a year. Thus, the
parties should plan to try the case on the first date submitted. Therefore, do not submit
less than the two (2) trial dates.
ORDER FOR SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION FOR SCHEDULING ORDER - 1
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•

The two dates must be AGREED to by the parties and must be the specific day upon
which the trial will begin.

•

Each date submitted must be a MONDAY unless the Monday of that week is a holiday,
then the date submitted must be a TUESDAY.

•

The first agreed trial date must be a specific day no less than nine (9) months and no more
than twelve (12) months from the date of this Order.

•

The second agreed trial date must be a specific day no less than twelve (12) months and no
more than fifteen (15) months from the date of this Order.
If the parties agree that unusual factors may justify a trial setting schedule which varies in
any way from the requirements of this Order, the parties are encouraged to contact the Court
and arrange for a conference to explain the reasons to deviate from this Order. Unless
otherwise permitted by the Court the parties must still submit two agreed trial dates that
comply with this Order.
10. Whether there are other matters conducive to determination of the action that the parties
agree should be brought to the attention of the Court prior to entering a Scheduling
Order.
The parties shall agree as to which party shall make the joint submission but, if they cannot

agree, Plaintiff shall be responsible to make the submission.
Upon receipt of this joint submission, the Court will issue an Order setting the matter for
trial with appropriate dates for discovery, disclosure of witnesses, etc.
The submissions requested in the Order are deemed by the Court to constitute the
scheduling conference required by IRCP 16(a). However, if either party wishes a more formal
scheduling conference, please contact the Court's clerk, Linda Hampton at 852-0877 and one will
be scheduled.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the parties do not file the stipulation required herein,
within the fourteen (14) days set forth, the Court will set this matter for trial on the first date
available to the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that unless the Court receives written notification to the
contrary, all future documents sent by the Court to counsel will be delivered electronically. Counsel
is hereby instructed to provide the Court with an email address they wish to have documents
delivered to. This email shall be included in the parties' response to this Order of Submission.

ORDER FOR SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION FOR SCHEDULING ORDER - 2
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Counsel will also have the continuing obligation to notify the Court upon any change to the email
address submitted.
Dated this 28th day of June, 2016.

MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 28th day of June, 2016, I mailed/served a true copy of the
foregoing Order for Submission of Information for Scheduling Order on the attomey(s)/person(s)
listed below by the method indicated:
Attorney{s)/Person(s):

Method of Service:

Blake S. Atkin
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, ID 83228

FAXED: (801) 533-0380

Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
PO Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

FAXED: (208) 344-5510

By: Linda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

ORDER FOR SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION FOR SCHEDULING ORDER - 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC±l\o~'tkt~ SOUNT y CLERK

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRAN~IN

\

Ok2

Of.~IH-Y

)
)
)

VALD. WESTOVER,

Plaintiff,

vs

IDAHO COUNTIES RlSK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP),

Defendants.
----------====-=----

Case No: CV-2016-195

)
)

)
)
)

ORDER FOR SUBl\IlSSION
OF INFORMATION FOR
SCHEDULING ORDER

)

)
)

A Complaint was filed in this matter on June 3, 2016. The Defendants have now appeared
and/or answered and the case is at issue.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16, that the parties, through their counsel
(or the parties themselves if self-represented), confer and submit to the Court, within fourteen (I 4)
days of the date of this Order, a joint statement containing the following information:
1. Whether this matter is to be tried to the Court orto a jury.
2. 'Whether any service is still needed upon any unserved parties.
3. %ether motions to add new parties or otherwise amend the pleadings are contemplated.

4. Whether the parties currently contemplate or anticipate any pre-trial motions.

5. Whether the case presents any musual time requirements for trial preparation.
6. The number of trial days required for trial.
7. "Whether the case presents any unusual times requirements for discovery.
8. Whether any party requests court-ordered mediation.
9. Two (2) TRIAL DATES, that comply with the requirements listed below. The trial date
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for the case will be the earliest date submitted by agreement of the parties. The reason
the Court asks for two (2) trial dates is so that an optional backup trial date is available
.
..
-·

16 JUL I 3 AM 8: I 2
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (80 I) 533-0380

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
)
Val D Westover,
)
)

Plaintiff

)

STIPULATION

)
)

~

)

Case No. CV-2016-195

)
Idaho Counties Risk Management Program )

(ICRMP),

)

Judge Brown

)

Defendant.

)

The parties through their undersigned counsel hereby stipulate that the Joint Statement
will be submitted to the Court on July 19, 20 l 6, as Mr. Atkin is out of town.

DATED this 8th day of July, 2016.
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.

Blake S. Atkin
Attorneys for the Plaintiff

Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP

Phillip J. Collaer
Attorneys for the Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 12th day of July, 2016, I caused to be served, by the method(s)
indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:

Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

X U.S. Mail X E-mail

_Facsimile

C.W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Facsimile: (208) 334-5510
Email: pcollaer@ajhlaw.com

Hon. Mitchell W. Brown

U.S. Mail

E-mail

X Facsimile

U.S. Mail

E-mail

X Facsimile

159 South Main
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Facsimile: (208) 547-2147
Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263
Facsimile: (208) 852-2926

Dated this 12th day of July, 2016.
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Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Bl~ s, A,tldn ISB# 6903
7579 North Westsiqe Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
.
Telephone; (208) 147-~414 .
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
~acsimile: (801) 533-0380

•.

--~

.

Attorneyfor PliJ.intiff

1N THE SlXrn'.JUDIOAiDISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

FRANKLIN CODNT\r;·SlATlt OFlDAB:0
)

Val D Westover,

I

)
)
)
)

PWntjff

v.

JOINTSTATEMENI'

)

)
)
Idaho Counties Rlsk Management Program, )
(ICRMP),

)

Cue No. CV-2016-195

!udgeBrown

)

-·

D~dant. · .

·

.

)

Both pattil!IA, thrOUgh. their aounsel, do agree upon and subm.ittbe following joint stat~t:

...

'

Some issues will ~ tried to the Qourt, but there are some i~ues anbj~t ~ jury trial and
the l)Arii•e have' dema~ded ffld ~tmd _to p~e lhek ri$ht.& to juey t,:1~ on all isa116s
tria.b~ to aj'\JO',

.

No.
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3_ Whether motions to edd new partlos or otb.eJ'Wise l!ltn.end the pli,adings are Qon~lated. ·

4. Wht,tb.ex the parties gur,rently cont~mplate or anticipa~ any pre--trial motions.

Yes.
S. Whether the case pre!!~ any unusual time requiremems for trial preparation.

No.
6. '.The agreed am~Ubt of time reg~d for trial.
Fiv~ (:5) dllys,
7. Whether 1he case presents any unusual time requlremen~ for ~scovery.
No.
S. "Whether any party requests court-ordetfid n,.e!diadon..

No.
s,_ Two stipulated trial~ OIJ.e no less than nine (9) iponths and.no more than twelve (11)
mon~ from the date of this Order, and a second no [t1ss than t,v-elve (12) mont.h!I and no

more than fifoolm (I 5) months from tbe ·date of this Ordet.
July 19-21, 2017; No~er 8-10, 2017 ·
10. Whether there are other ~ n conducive to detemtination ofthe action that the partiee
.

.

agree should be brought to the ~tt=tion of the Court prior to entering a Scheduling Ordct.

No.

DATED this 1th day of July, 2016.
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ATKIN LAW OFFICES

,

PAGE 04/05
---------

Atkhi Law Offices, P.C.

,Blm S. Atkin .

Attorneys for the Plaintiff

Anderson, Julian & Hull. Lll

·. Phillip J. Co!lair
Attom~ys for the Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the l~ day of July, 2016, I caused to be served. by the inethod(s)
indicated below. a irue and correct copy of die foregoiftg upon:
Phillip J. Collaer

X ti.s, Mail X E-mail

_facsimile

U.S. Mail _ E-mail

X Facsimile

:&mail

· X Facsimile

ANDBRSON1 IDUAN &IWLL LLP

C.W.Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Sqeet, Suite 700
P.O. Box: 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
:l'J'1iunile: (208) 334-S510
Email: pooll&er@)ajhlaw:com
Hon. Mitchell W. Brown
159 South Main

SodaSprings,10 83276
Facsimile: ·(208) 547-2147
Ftankliil County Court
39 We!.t. Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263

-

-0.S. Mail

.

Facsimile: (208) 852-2926
J;)em,d this 19th day of July. 2016.
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Phillip J. Collaer - ISB No. #3447
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
E-Mail:
pcollaer@ajhlaw.com
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Attorneys for Defendant, IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(ICRMP)
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2016-195

vs.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)
Defendants.
COMES NOW the Defendant, IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM ("ICRMP"), by and through its attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull
LLP, and files this its Motion for Protective Order in relation to Plaintiff's First Set of
Document Requests to Defendant, Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Admission to
Defendant, and Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories to Defendant, each served June
24, 2016. This Motion is supported by a separately-filed Memorandum in Support.
DATED this

\C\ ~day of July, 2016.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL

LLP

D~'J- ~

By

se w1>1 .sa

~illip J. Collaer, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER- 1

31 of 272

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \O\~day of July, 2016, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER by
delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated
below, addressed as follows:
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Attorney for Plaintiff

[~
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (801) 533-0380
Email:

CL~-~~~,,5~
~

Phillip J. Collaer

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER- 2
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Phillip J. Collaer- lSB No. #3447
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-551 O
E-Mail:
pcollaer@ajhlaw.com
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Attorneys for Defendant, IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(ICRMP)
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2016-195

vs.
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendant, IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM ("ICRMP"), by and through its attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull
LLP, and files this its Memorandum in support of Motion for Protective Order in relation
to Plaintiffs First Set of Document Requests to Defendant, Plaintiffs First Set of
Requests for Admission to Defendant, and Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories to
Defendant. In support of its Motion for Protective Order, Defendant states:
ARGUMENT

Plaintiff, Val D. Westover ("Plaintiff') has filed an action for declaratory judgment,
asking for a declaration that ICRMP is an illegal entity which is not authorized by Idaho
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER-1
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law, and that_ the conduct of ICRMP in providing a defense to Franklin County, Idaho in
an underlying slander of title action "undermines the principles of good governance ... "
In sum, Plaintiff is alleging that ICRMP has violated state law by providing
insurance coverage to governmental entities-such as Franklin County-that are
members of its program. The Idaho Tort Claims Act ("ITCA") envisions governmental
entities such as Franklin County will purchase casualty insurance. At I.C. § 6-923 the
Act provides:
Authority of political subdivisions to purchase insurance. All
political subdivisions of the state shall have the authority to
purchase the necessary liability insurance for themselves
and their employees.
Franklin County was empowered to purchase insurance from ICRMP or any
other insurance company. This is a purely legal issue which can be resolved by the
Court on summary judgment, and does not require the exchange of discovery.
In addition, the Plaintiff does not have standing to bring her lawsuit. As a thirdparty claimant, Plaintiff is not entitled to bring a direct action against another party'sFranklin County's-insurance company, ICRMP. See, e.g., Pocatello Indus. Park Co.

v. Steel W., Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 791, 621 P.2d 399, 407 (1980) ("It is well established
that absent a contractual or statutory provision authorizing the action, an insurance
carrier cannot be sued directly and cannot be joined as a party defendant ... We are
aware of no direct action statute in Idaho."). See also Hartman v. United Heritage

Prop. & Cas. Co., 141 Idaho 193, 199, 108 P.3d 340, 346 (2005) (reiterating "no-directaction rule");
The issue of standing is also a purely legal issue that may be resolved on
summary judgment. See Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER-2
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488, 491 (2002) (holding that summary judgment was a proper method for dismissing a
case based on a lack of standing). Thus the case hinges on legal, not factual, issues,
and factual discovery is unnecessary and should not be allowed. This Court may issue
a protective order forbidding the discovery sought, specifying the terms for the
disclosure of the discovery, or forbidding inquiry into certain matters/limiting the scope
of discovery to certain matters. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides
(c) Protective Orders.
(1) In General. A party or any person from whom discovery
is sought may move for a protective order in the court where
the action is pending, or as an alternative on matters relating
to a deposition, in the court where the deposition will be
taken. The motion must include a certification that the
movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer
with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute
without court action. The court may, for good cause, issue
an order to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,
including one or more of the following:
(A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery;
(B) specifying terms, including time and place, for the
disclosure or discovery;
(C) prescribing a discovery method other than the one
selected by the party seeking discovery;
(D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the
scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters ...
Since the case raises purely legal issues-as noted above-the Court may, and
should, suspend discovery without allowing "a complicated foray into the facts." See
Serv. Employees Int'/ Union, Local 6 v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 106 Idaho

756, 761, 683 P.2d 404, 409 (1984) ("there was no error in the trial court's suspension
of discovery since the motion to dismiss raised purely legal issues which were capable
of resolution without a complicated foray into the facts"). This Court should issue an

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER- 3
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order of protection in relation to the Plaintiffs document requests, requests for
admission, and interrogatories, and ordering that Defendant need not respond to same.
CERTIFICATION
Defendant certifies that its counsel has, in good faith, conferred or attempted to
confer with Plaintiffs counsel in an effort to resolve the motion for protective order
without court action.
~~

DATED this _'\_ day of July, 2016.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL

LLP

B y ~ ~ - ~-se.#'/'15=<
~hillip J. Collaer, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER-4
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by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of the office as indicated
below:

Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Attorney for Plaintiff

[v('
[ ]
[ ]

[ ]
[ ]

~

NOTICE OF SERVICE - 2

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (801) 533-0380
Email:

*·

~Btt~kS"~Phillip J. Collaer

37 of 272

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \'\~ day of July, 2016, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER by delivering the same to each of the following
attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Attorney for Plaintiff

[
[
[
[
[

~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
]
]
]
]

Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (801) 533-0380
Email:

~hillip J. Collaer

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER-5
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Phillip J. Collaer- lSB No. #3447
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
E-Mail:
pcollaer@ajhlaw.com

!L

:~~
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Attorneys for Defendant, IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(ICRMP)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2016-195

vs.
NOTICE OF SERVICE
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)
Defendants.

TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 19th day of July, 2016.,

Defendant, by and through its counsel of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull

LLP,

served a

copy of DEFENDANT IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (ICRMP)
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION,

together with a copy of this Notice, upon counsel for the Plaintiffs, by first-class mail,
postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or

NOTICE OF SERVICE - 1
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Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Telephone: {801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT lN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO

)
)

Val D Westover,

)

Plaintiff

)

JOINT STATEMENT

)

v.

)
)

Case No. CV-2016-195

)
Idaho Counties Risk Management Program )

(ICRMP),

)
Defendant.

Judge Brown

)
)

Both parties, through their counsel, do agree upon and submit the following joint statement:
l. Whether this matter is to be tried to the Court or to a jury.

Some issues

wm be tried to the Court, but there are some issues subject to jury trial and

the parties have demanded and intend to preserve their rights to jury trial on all issues
triable to ajury,
2. Whether any service is still needed upon l!l11Y unserved parties.

No.
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ATKIN LAW OFFICES

PAGE

3. Whether motions to add new parties or otherwise amend the pleadings are contemplated.
Yes.
4. Whether the parties currently contemplate or anticipate any pre-trial motions.

Yes.
5. Whether the case presents any unusual time requirements for trial preparation.
No.

6. The agreed amount of time required for trial.
Five (5) days.
7. Whether the case presents any unusual time requirements for discovery.
No.

8. Whether any party requests court-ordered mediation.
No.

9. Two stipulated trial dates, one no less than nine (9) months and no more than twelve (12)
months from the date of this Order, and a second no less than twelve (12) months and no
more than fifteen (15) months from the date of this Order.
July 30-Aug. 5, 2017; November 12M18, 2017
10. Whether there are other matters conducive to determination of the action that the parties
agree should be brought to the attention of the Court prior to entering a Scheduliog Order.
No.

DATED this 20th day of July, 2016.
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Atkin Law Offices, P.C.

Blake S. Atkin
Attorneys for the Plaintiff

Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP

~~~-=-\ ..

~

Phillip J. Collaer
Attorneys for the Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 20 11i·fiy of July, 2016, I caused to be served, by the method(s)
indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:

Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

X U.S. Mail X E-mail

_

Facsimile

C.W. Moore Plaza

250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Facsimile: (208) 334-5510

Email: pcollaer@ajhlaw.com
Hon. Mitchell W. Brown
159 South Main
Soda Springs, [D 83276

U.S. Mail

E-mail

X Facsimile

U.S. Mail

E-mail

X Facsimile

Facsimile: (208) 547-2)47

Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263
Facsimile: (208) 852-2926

Dated this 20th day of July, 2016.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTruci'
THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
... _ •. _. .___ . ~- -··-----.--:.. :. '~ i {
~

VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,

vs

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP),
Defendant.

________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2016-195

SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF
TRIAL SETTING AND INTITIAL
PRETRIAL ORDER

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 and 40, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

This matter is set for TRIAL, as follows:
(A).
(B).

PRIMARY SETTING: July 31-August 4, 2017 at 9:00 a.m.
ALTERNATIVE SETTING: November 13-17, 2017 at 9:00 a.m.

All deadlines listed below shall apply to the trial setting listed in line (A) above.
2.

TRIAL: This case is set for a JURY TRIAL as set forth above. The trial will be

conducted in the District Courtroom, Franklin County, Preston, Idaho. A total of FIVE (5) days
have been reserved. On the first day of trial, counsel shall report to the Court's chambers at 8:30
a.m. for a brief status conference. Unless otherwise ordered, other than the first and last day of
trial, proceedings will convene at 9:00 a.m. each morning, and adjourn at approximately 3:00
p.m. each afternoon. Two twenty (20) minute / brief recesses will be taken at approximately
11 :00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m.
3.

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(e), in lieu of a pre-trial conference, trial counsel for the

parties (or the parties if they are self-represented) are ORDERED to meet and/or confer for the
purpose of preparing a joint Pre-Trial Stipulation, which shall be submitted to the Court at least
twenty-one (21) days prior to Trial, and shall contain or include:
(A). A statement that all exhibits to be offered at trial have been provided to all other
parties and attaching an Exhibit List of all such exhibits. The Exhibit List shall indicate: (1) by
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whom the exhibit is being offered, (2) a brief description of the exhibit, (3) whether the parties have
stipulated to its admission, and if not, (4) the legal grounds for objection. If any exhibit includes a
summary of other documents, such as medical expense records, to be offered pursuant to I.RE.
1006, the summary shall be attached to the Stipulation.
(B).
A statement whether depositions or any discovery responses will be offered in lieu
of live testimony, and a list of what will actually be offered, the manner in which such evidence will
be presented, and the legal grounds for any objection to any such offer.
(C).
A list of the names and addresses of all witnesses which each party intends to call to
testify at trial, including anticipated rebuttal or impeachment witnesses. Expert witnesses shall be
identified as such. The Stipulation should also identify whether any witnesses' testimony will be
objected to in its entirety and the legal grounds therefore.
(D).
A brief non-argumentative summary of the factual nature of the case. The purpose
of the summary is to provide an overview of the case for the jury and is to be included in pre-proof
instructions to the jury, unless found inappropriate by the Court.
(E).
A statement counsel have, in good faith, discussed settlement unsuccessfully and/or
completed mediation unsuccessfully, if mediation was ordered by the Court.
(F).
A statement that all pre-trial discovery procedures under I.R.C.P. 26 to 37 have been
complied with and all discovery responses supplemented as required by the rules to reflect facts
known to the date of the Stipulation.
(G).
A statement of all issues of fact and law which remain to be litigated, listing which
party has the burden of proof as to each issue.
(H).

A list of any stipulated admissions of fact, which will avoid unnecessary proof.

(I).

A list of any orders requested by the parties which will expedite the trial.

(J).

A statement as to whether counsel require more than 30 minutes per party for voir

dire or opening statement and, if so, an explanation of the reason more time is needed.
These submissions will be deemed by the Court to constitute the final pre-trial conference
required by IRCP 16(b). However, if either party wishes a more formal pre-trial conference, the
same should be request in writing at least 60 days prior to trial and one will be scheduled.
4.

PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS: All motions to join parties or amend the pleadings

(except motions pertaining to punitive damages under LC. §6-1604) must be filed within sixty
(60) days of this Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial and Initial Pretrial Order. All motions for
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summary judgment and motions to add claims for punitive damages pursuant to I.C. §6-1604
must be filed and served so as to be heard not later than ninety (90) days before trial. All other
non-dispositive pre-trial motions (including, but not limited to motions in limine or motions
which seek to challenge the admissibility or foundation of expert testimony) must be filed and
scheduled for hearing not less than thirty (30) days before trial. Exceptions will be granted
infrequently, and only when justice so requires.
5.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

All motions for summary

judgment must be accompanied by a memorandum which includes a concise statement of each
material fact upon which the moving party claims there is no genuine issue, and which shall
include a specific reference to that portion of the record at or by which such fact is proven or
established. Any party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall, not later than fourteen
(14) days prior to hearing, serve and file any affidavits and opposing brief(s). The opposing brief
shall identify the specific factual matters as to which the non-moving party contends there are
genuine issues requiring denial of the motion, including a specific reference to the portion of the
record which supports the claim that a genuine issue of fact exists. In ruling upon any summary
judgment motion, the Court may assume that the facts as claimed by the moving party are
conceded to exist without dispute except and to the extent the non-moving party shall have
controverted them. Any reply brief must be lodged at least seven (7) days prior to hearing.
Further, any objection to the admissibility of evidence must be in writing and shall be part of the
response to the motion for summary judgment or in reply to the response in opposition to
summary judgment. The failure to object in writing to the admissibility of evidence in support of
or in response to summary judgment shall constitute a waiver as to any objection to the
admissibility of evidence at the time of the hearing on summary judgment. Oral objections to the
admissibility of evidence at the time of hearing on summary judgment will not be considered by
the court.
6.

SCHEDULING AND HEARINGS. The Court holds its regular civil law and motion

calendar the second and fourth Thursday of each month. Absent an order shortening time, all
motions must be filed and served at least fourteen (14) days prior to hearing. A ''judge's copy"
of any memoranda or affidavits should be provided for use by the court. Said ''judge's copy
shall be sent to the court at its chambers in Soda Springs, Idaho. All such documents shall be
clearly marked as "JUDGE'S COPY." As a matter of courtesy, counsel are expected to contact
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the Court's Deputy Clerk, Linda Hampton at (208) 852-0877 to schedule hearings, and to
confirm the availability of opposing counsel for proposed hearing dates. As an accommodation
to out-of-town counsel and parties, hearings on any pretrial motion (except motions for summary
judgment or hearings at which testimony is to be offered) may be conducted by telephone
conference call pursuant to LR.C.P. 7(b)(4), in the discretion of the court. The Court will allow
attorney participation by telephone on all non-dispositive proceedings. Such proceedings
shall be by way of registering with CourtCall at 1-888-882-6878 at least 24 hours prior to
hearing OR with prior Court approval of a conference call system approved 48 hours in
advance.

7.

DISCOVERY AND DISCOVERY DISPUTES: The Court will not entertain

any discovery motion unless accompanied by a written certification signed by counsel, which
confirms that a reasonable effort has been made to voluntarily resolve the dispute with opposing
counsel. A party's obligation to fully and timely respond to discovery requests is distinct from
any obligation imposed by this Order, and no party may rely upon this Order or any deadline it
imposes as justification for failing to timely respond to discovery requests or to supplement prior
responses.
8.

DISCOVERY CUT-OFFS: Absent a stipulation to the contrary, all discovery

shall be propounded and served such that responses are due no later than thirty (30) days before
trial. Any supplemental responses a party is required to make pursuant to LR.C.P. 26(e) or the
terms of an earlier discovery request shall also be served at least thirty (30) days before trial.
Any supplementation of discovery required by the rule shall be made in a timely manner.
9.

WITNESS DISCLOSURES: Each party shall disclose the existence and identity

of intended or potential expert or lay witnesses to the extent required by interrogatories or other
discovery requests propounded by another party. There is no independent duty to disclose
expert or lay witnesses except as required to adequately respond to discovery requests or
supplement prior responses. If discovery requests seeking disclosure of expert witnesses and

the information required to be disclosed pursuant to LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(l)(i) and LR.C.P.
26(B)(4)(A)(l)(ii) are propounded, a plaintiff upon whom such requests are served shall, in good
faith, disclose the existence and identity of potential or intended expert witnesses, including the
disclosures required by I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(l)(i) and I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(l)(ii) at the earliest
opportunity, and in no event later than one hundred-fifty (150) days before trial. A defendant
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upon whom such requests are served shall, in good faith, identify any potential or intended
expert witnesses, including the disclosures required by I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(l)(i) and I.R.C.P.
26(b)(4)(A)(l)(ii) at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than ninety (90) days before
trial.
Any party upon whom discovery is served who intends or reserves the right to call any
expert witness in rebuttal or surrebuttal shall, in good faith, identify such experts, including the
disclosures required by I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) and I.R.C.P. 26(b)94)(A)(ii) at the earliest
opportunity, and in no event later than sixty (60) days before trial. Any party upon whom
discovery requests are served seeking disclosure of lay witnesses shall, in good faith, disclose the
identity of all such witnesses at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than sixty (60) days
before trial. Absent a showing of good cause and a lack of unfair prejudice to any other party,
any witness who has not been timely disclosed will not be permitted to testify at trial.
10.

EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS: When and to the extent required to respond

to interrogatories, requests for production or other discovery requests propounded by another
party, a party must identify and disclose any documentary, tangible or other exhibits that party
intends or reserves the right to offer at trial. Absent a showing of good cause and a lack of unfair
prejudice to all other parties, any exhibit which has not been timely disclosed will be excluded.
Without regard to whether discovery concerning a party's exhibits has been propounded, not less
than seven (7) days prior to trial, each party shall: (A) lodge with the Clerk a completed exhibit
list in the form attached to this order (Exh. 1 attached) together with one complete, duplicate
marked set of that party's proposed exhibits for the Judge's use during trial; and (B) deliver to
counsel for each other party a copy of the completed exhibit list and duplicate copy of that
party's marked exhibits. The exhibit list and duplicate copies need not include exhibits which
will be offered solely for the purpose of impeachment. Unless otherwise ordered, the plaintiff
shall identify exhibits beginning with number "101," and the defendant shall utilize exhibits
beginning with number "201."
11.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS: Jury instructions and verdict forms requested by a

party shall be prepared in conformity with I.R.C.P. 51(a), and shall be filed with the Clerk (with
copies to Chambers in Soda Springs, Idaho) at least seven (7) days before trial. Requested
instructions not timely submitted may not be included in the court's preliminary or final charge.
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Parties may submit additional or supplemental instructions to address unforeseen issues or
disputes arising during trial.
12.

TRIAL BRIEFS: The Court encourages (but does not require) the submission of

trial briefs which address important substantive or evidentiary issues each party expects to arise
during trial. Any trial briefs shall be prepared, exchanged between the parties, and lodged with
the Clerk (with copies to Chambers in Soda Springs, Idaho) at least ten (10) days prior to trial.
13.

REQUEST TO VACATE TRIAL SETTING:

Any party requesting or

stipulating to vacate a trial setting must submit a specific written statement concerning the

reasons for the request, and must certify, in writing, that the request or stipulation has been
discussed with the parties represented by counsel. An order granting a request to vacate or
continue a trial setting may be conditioned upon terms (including orders that the requesting party
or attorney reimburse other parties or their attorneys for attorney's fees incurred for preparation
which must be repeated or expenses advanced in anticipation of the trial setting which cannot be
avoided or recovered). An order vacating or continuing a trial setting shall not serve to alter the
deadlines set forth in this order, and unless otherwise stipulated or ordered, the specific calendar
dates associated with any deadlines shall be adjusted in reference to the new or amended trial
date.
14.

LODGING AT RESIDENT CHAMBERS:

"All" documents filed shall

include the Court on the Certificate of Mailing, with courtesy copies mailed or faxed {but
not both) to the Court's chambers in Soda Springs, Idaho.

Address: 159 South Main,

Soda Springs, ID 83276 Fax# {208) 547-2147.
15.

SANCTIONS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE: A failure to comply with this order

or the deadlines it imposes in a timely manner subject a non-compliant party and/or counsel to an
award of sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(i) and/or other applicable rules, statutes or case
precedent.
16.

All meetings and/or hearings with the Court shall be scheduled in advance with

the Court's Clerk, Linda Hampton, by calling 852-0877. No hearing shall be noticed without
contacting the Clerk.
Notice is hereby given, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)(G), that an alternate judge may be
assigned to preside over the trial of this case, if the currently presiding judge is unavailable. The
list of potential alternative judges is: 1) Honorable Stephen S. Dunn; 2) Honorable David C. Nye;
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3) Honorable Robert C. Naftz; 4) Honorable William H. Woodland; 5) Honorable Richard T. St.
Clair; 6) Honorable Jon J. Shindurling.
Dated this 21 st day of July, 2016.

MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the 22nd day of July, 2016, she caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL, and SETTING AND
INITIAL PRETRIAL ORDER to be served upon the following persons in the following manner:
Attomey(s)/Person(s):

Method of Service:

Blake S. Atkin
Counsel for Plaintiff

Email: batkin@atkinlawoffices.net

Phillip J. Collaer
Counsel for Defendant

Email: pcollaer@ajhlaw.com

SHAUNA T. GEDDES, Clerk

By: f;lfrla 1/a!fr/lt"olf,
Deputy Clerk
i
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EXHIBIT LIST
MITCHELL W. BROWN, DISTRICT JUDGE
CASE NO.: CV-2016-195
Linda Hampton, Deputy Clerk
Rodney M. Felshaw, Court Reporter
DATE:

CASE: Westover vs. ICRMP

NO

DESCRIPTION

DATE

ID

OFFD

OBJ

ADMIT

101
or
201
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Phillip J. Collaer - ISB No. #3447
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
E-Mail:
pcollaer@ajhlaw.com

''.

. '~ . ~

'

;

.

j ••

Attorneys for Defendants, IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(ICRMP)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-2016-195
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)
Defendants.

The above-entitled defendants Idaho Counties Risk Management Program
(ICRMP), by and through their attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian and Hull, move this
Court for its order granting summary judgment to this defendant for the reason that
there are no material facts in dispute and this defendant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
This motion is supported by a memorandum of law, and the Affidavits of Phillip J.
Collaer and Jeff Boice, filed concurrently herewith.
Oral argument is requested.
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DATED this

_K day of August, 2016.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL

LLP

By~-J-~
Phillip J. Collaer, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _Lk day of August, 2016, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method
indicated below, addressed as follows:
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Attorney for Plaintiff

[\lJ

(Courtesy Copy)
Judge Michael W. Brown
159 S. Main Street
Soda Springs, ID 83276

[\(J

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (801) 533-0380
Email:

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email:
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Phillip J. Collaer- lSB No. #3447
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
E-Mail:
pcollaer@ajhlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant, IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(ICRMP)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)

Case No. CV-2016-195

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

This case arises from a lawsuit originally brought by the plaintiff, Val Westover,
against Franklin County and, the Franklin County Assessor (Franklin County
Defendants).
ICRMP.

The Franklin County Defendants were, and are currently, insured by

The current complaint alleges ICRMP improperly controlled the litigation

between the Westovers and Franklin County and, the negotiations during a court
ordered mediation. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment arguing ICRMP is an illegal
entity as its defense of local governments and providing its insureds indemnification for
attorney's fees violates I.C. § 12-117.

ORlGl~!AL
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In the sections below, ICRMP will establish the plaintiff's complaint is a
misguided attempt to maintain a direct action against the insurer of Franklin County.
Direct actions are not allowed in Idaho. For that reason, the plaintiff lacks standing to
seek declaratory relief. Alternatively, the actions of ICRMP were, at all times, consistent
with Idaho statutes and case law.

For these reasons, the defendant is entitled to

summary judgment.

I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 30, 2015, Val and LaRee Westover filed a Complaint against the Franklin
County Assessor, Jase Cundick. See Boice Aff, 1J3, Ex. 2. At the time the lawsuit was
filed, Franklin County had purchased casualty insurance from ICRMP. Id. 1J2, Ex. 1.
ICRMP is a reciprocal insurance company.

See Georgia Siehl Aff., 1J3.

It conducts

business in the State of Idaho pursuant to a Certificate of Authority issued by the Idaho
Department of Insurance as do other insurance companies. Id., 1J4, Ex. A.

Like all

insurance companies doing business in this state, ICRMP is regulated by the Idaho
Department of Insurance.

Id., 1J7.

ICRMP and other insurance companies offer

casualty policies to municipalities. Id., 1J6.
As an elected official of Franklin County, Mr. Cundick, in his individual and official
capacities, was an insured under the ICRMP policy. See Boice Aff., 1J2; Ex. 2, p. 1, 1J8.
Consistent with the language of the insurance policy, ICRMP provided Franklin County
and Mr. Cundick a defense. ICRMP hired the law firm of Naylor & Hales to represent its
insureds. Id., 1J3.
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The Franklin County defendants answered the Westover complaint and,
prepared a motion for summary judgment.

See Boice Aff., ,I3.

The County also

attended a court ordered mediation. Id., ,I4. The parties did not reach a settlement at
mediation. Id. Thereafter, Franklin County's motion for summary judgment was heard
by the district court and, granted. See Boice Aff., ,is, Ex. 4. That case is currently on
appeal. Id., Ex. 5.
II.
PLAINTIFF LACKS STANDING TO SEEK DECLARATORY RELIEF
AGAINST ICRMP.

The Idaho Supreme Court has, for many years, prohibited lawsuits by an injured
party against their tortfeasor's liability insurer. The only exceptions are cases where the
direct action is expressly authorized by statute or contract.

See Stonewall Surplus

Lines Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 132 Idaho 318, 971 P.2d 1142 (1998);
Downing v. Travelers ins. Co., 107 Idaho 511,691 P.2d 375 (1984); Graham v. State
Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 611, 67 P.3d 90 (2003); Hartman v. United Heritage
Property and Casualty Co., 141 Idaho 193, 108 P.3d 340 (2005). The basis of the no

direct action rule is that "the person allegedly injured by the insured is not a party to the
insurance contract and has no rights under it." See Hartman, 141 Idaho at 99.
The fact this case seeks declaratory relief rather than compensatory damages
does not avoid the no direct action rule. This is due to the fact Mr. Westover has no
relationship with ICRMP and, is not an insured under the ICRMP policy.

For that

reason, ICRMP's refusal to settle the Westover v. Franklin County lawsuit at
mediation and, then successfully defend the case, did not cause plaintiff to suffer an
"injury in fact". Because Westover did suffer a legal injury by virtue of the contractual
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-3

57 of 272

relationship between ICRMP and Franklin County, he lacks standing to seek declaratory
relief concerning any aspect of the insurance policy Franklin County purchased from
ICRMP.
The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, at I.C. § 10-1202, describes individuals
and entities who are entitled to seek declaratory relief as follows:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or
other writings constituting a contract or any oral contract, or
whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by
a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may
have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or
franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other
legal relations thereunder.
The language of the statute requires proof that a plaintiff's legal rights or status is
implicated by the agreement they are asking the court to interpret. See Student Loan
Fund of Idaho vs. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824, 827, 875 P.2d 236, 239 (Ct. App.

1994) (landowner lacked standing to challenge an agreement between the City and the
County establishing an area of impact where the plaintiff failed to prove its property
would be located within the disputed area of impact.) In Brooksby v. Geico General
Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 546, 286 P.3d. 182 (2012) the plaintiff sought declaratory judgment

against a tortfeasor's insurer seeking to establish coverage for her claim.

The trial

court dismissed the lawsuit ruling the plaintiff lacked standing and, her complaint
violated the no direct action rule. Plaintiff appealed arguing the "rule barred her only
from seeking monetary damages, as opposed to declaratory relief." See 153 Idaho at
547.

The Supreme Court disagreed concluding plaintiff lacked standing under the

Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act writing:
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In other words, the Act does not create any new rights,
statuses, or legal relations. It applies only where such rights,
statuses, or legal relations already exist. At this juncture,
Brooksby simply has no right, status, or legal relationship
vis-a-vis GEICO which could form the basis of a declaratory
judgment action.
See 153 Idaho at 548, (emphasis in original).

In this case, plaintiff does not allege he is or was an ICRMP insured or, that he
possessed any contractual rights under the ICRMP insurance policy. In Brooksby the
plaintiff, a passenger in a vehicle driven by her father, was injured in a single car
accident. The insurer, GEICO, denied coverage to its insured, the father, asserting an
exclusion in the policy. Plaintiff sued GEICO arguing the exclusion violated Idaho law.
See 153 Idaho at 547. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit as the

plaintiff's claim violated the no direct action rule.
Much like the plaintiff in Brooksby, Westover asks this Court to determine
whether Franklin County is entitled to insurance coverage arguing its insurer, ICRMP, is
violating Idaho law by providing coverage for claims seeking attorney's fees.
Complaint, 1J12.

See

Setting aside the fact plaintiffs' interpretation of I.C. § 12-117 lacks

legal support and, is inconsistent with the Idaho Tort Claims Act, see§ Ill, infra, plaintiff
lacks standing to challenge the contractual relationship that existed between ICRMP
and its insured, Franklin County. Whether or not Franklin County purchased insurance
that provided indemnification for attorney fee claims did not change or impact the
County's potential liability to the Westovers.

The existence of insurance merely

provided a means for payment if the County was found liable for a covered claim. For
that reason, the insurance policy did not affect the Westovers' legal relations with
Franklin County or, its claims against that entity. The current complaint violates the no
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direct action rule.

Westover lacks standing to challenge the contractual relationship

between Franklin County and ICRMP. For these reasons, summary judgment should
be granted.

Ill.
I.C. § 12-117 DID NOT PREVENT FRANKLIN COUNTY FROM PURCHASING
CASUAL TY INSURANCE.

According to the complaint, I.C. § 12-117 is intended to create accountability in
local government by allowing courts to award attorney's fees against municipalities and
political subdivisions where those governmental entities defend a lawsuit without a
reasonable basis in fact or law. See Complaint, 1J1J8-12. Plaintiff alleges § 12-117(3)
requires political subdivisions to pay any fees that may be assessed from their regular
operating budget and, therefore, prohibits them from purchasing insurance that could
provide indemnity coverage for those losses. Id., 1l1J9-11.
These allegations are legally and factually flawed. Plaintiff incorrectly argues that
I.C. § 12-117 was the exclusive basis for awarding attorney's fees in the Westover v.
Franklin County case.

The complaint in that litigation alleged slander of title and

sought a writ of mandate and prohibition.

See Boice Aff., 1J3, Ex. 2.

Because the

slander of title claim involved allegedly tortious misconduct on the part of Franklin
County, those claims were governed by the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA). In Athay v.
Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 196 P.3d 325 (2008) the Idaho Supreme Court ruled the award

of attorney's fees in actions subject to the ITCA was governed exclusively by I.C. § 6918A. The interplay between I.C. § 12-117 and § 6-918A was addressed in Block v.
City of Lewiston, 156 Idaho 484, 328 P.3d 464 (2014) where the court wrote:
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We have held that§ 12-117 "[u]nless otherwise provided by
statute" language allows that when "another statute
expressly provides for the awarding of attorney's fees
against a state agency or political subdivision, attorney's
fees can be granted under that statute also." Syringa
Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of Administration, 155
Idaho 55, 305 P.3d 499, 511 (2013). While this language
does not make I.C. § 12-117 the exclusive means of
awarding attorney's fees against a state agency, it also does
not indicate a specific and express intent to provide an
exception to I.C. § 6-91 BA's exclusive scope. Rather, this
language indicates that where another statute provides the
exclusive means for awarding attorney's fees, I. C. § 12-117
is not an exception to exclusivity. Therefore, I.C. § 6-91 BA is
the exclusive means to award attorney's fees to Lewiston in
this case.

See 156 Idaho at 490.

In this case, consistent with the holdings in Athay v. Stacey, and Block v. City
of Lewiston, the exclusive basis for awarding attorney's fees against Franklin County
was I.C. § 6-918A, not § 12-117.

For that reason alone, the plaintiff's statutory

interpretation argument is flawed and cannot be accepted.
The suggestion the legislature, through the passage of § 12-117, intended to
prohibit political governmental entities from

purchasing

casualty insurance

is

inconsistent with the plain language of I.C. § 6-923 which specifically authorizes political
subdivisions, such as Franklin County, to purchase "the necessary liability insurance for
themselves and their employees." If the terms of the insurance policy Franklin County
purchased was inconsistent with the requirements of the ITCA, the policy would be
reformed and interpreted to conform to the requirements of the Act. See I.C. § 6-925.
A governmental entities tort liability is capped at $500,000 unless it purchases liability
insurance in excess of those limits. See I.C. § 6-926.
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These statutory provisions establish the plaintiffs suggestion a governmental
entity is prohibited through purchasing casualty insurance to protect itself from claims
seeking attorney's fees is without merit. The language of I.C. § 12-117(3) is consistent
with this conclusion.

That section does not suggest indemnity insurance cannot be

purchased in order to protect and preserve the government's financial resources. The
fact the insurance premium is paid from the County's operating budget is consistent with
I.C. § 12-117(3) which creates a mechanism for payment of uninsured fee awards.
Lacking in I.C. § 12-117 is any language stating an entity such as Franklin County,
cannot utilize its scarce resources to purchase casualty insurance to indemnify itself
and its employees from losses which could include compensatory damages and
attorney's fees. To accept the plaintiffs interpretation would require the court to insert
limiting language into § 12-117 which the legislature did not include. This approach
would violate basic rules of statutory construction. See Wright v. Ada County, 2016
WL 3679935 (July 7, 2016) (Courts are not allowed to insert words into a statute that
the court believes the legislature left out, be it intentionally or inadvertently.)

The

plaintiffs argument is also inconsistent with the clear legislative intent set forth into I.C.

§ § 6-924 through 6-926 which unambiguously authorizes and envisions the purchase
of casualty insurance by political subdivisions.
Finally, the plaintiffs argument is limited to cases where the government has
frivolously defended a lawsuit and is required to pay the opposing party's attorney's
fees. That scenario did not arise in the Westover v. Franklin County case. The fact
Franklin County chose to pursue its legal defenses rather than settle at mediation was
not, as a matter of law, frivolous. This point is highlighted by the fact the Westover
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lawsuit was dismissed at summary judgment.
characterized as frivolous.

A successful defense cannot be

Mr. Westover was never entitled to attorney's fees and

Franklin County, through its insurer, ICRMP, recognized that fact at mediation.

For

these reasons, the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint are without merit. ICRMP is
entitled to summary judgment.
DATED this

$

day of August, 2016.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

B y ~ ~ - ~a---_
Phillip J. Collaer, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ___l&:__ day of August, 2016, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of
record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Attorney for Plaintiff
(Courtesy Copy)
Judge Michael W. Brown
159 S. Main Street
Soda Springs, ID 83276

[\Q
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

[\(]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (801) 533-0380
Email:

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email:

Phillip J. Collaer
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Phillip J. Collaer - ISB No. #3447
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
E-Mail:
pcollaer@ajhlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant, IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(ICRMP)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)

Case No. CV-2016-195
AFFIDAVIT OF PHILLIP J.
COLLAER IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss:
County of Ada
)

Phillip J. Collaer, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1.

That your affiant is an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the

State of Idaho. As such, your affiant is a member of the law firm of Anderson, Julian &
Hull, attorneys for the defendant, Idaho Counties Risk Management Program (ICRMP)
in the above entitled litigation. The information contained herein is of your affiant's own
personal knowledge.

ORIGINAL

AFFIDAVIT OF PHILLIP J. COLLAER IN SUPPORT OijJ~~·t;~TS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARYJUDGMENT-1

65 of 272

2.

Attached hereto and identified as Exhibit 1 is an affidavit prepared by the

Idaho Department of Insurance employee, Georgia Siehl.
FURTHER your Affiant saith naught.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

11_ day of August, 2016

CHERYLLONG
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _iK_ day of August, 2016, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PHILLIP J. COLLAER IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by delivering the same to each
of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as
follows:
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Attorney for Plaintiff

[ \{J
]
]
]
]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (801) 533-0380
Email:

(Courtesy Copy)
Judge Michael W. Brown
159 S. Main Street
Soda Springs, ID 83276

[~]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email:

[
[
[
[

Phillip J. Collaer
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STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss:
County of Ada
)

GEORGIA SIEHL, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am Bureau Chief of Company Activities and the Chief Examiner for the Idaho

Department of Insurance (the "Department"). I am over the age of 18 and make this declaration
based on my personal knowledge.
2.

This affidavit is produced upon the request of Philip Collaer, of the firm Anderson

Julian and Hull, LLP, attorneys for the Idaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriters
("ICRMP"). The following information is provided based on my personal knowledge of Idaho's
Insurance Code. I have no specific knowledge concerning the events that prompted Mr. Collaer's
request for this affidavit and offer no opinion as to the specific application of Idaho's Insurance
Code to the underlying facts that likewise prompted Mr. Collaer's request.
3.

ICRMP is a reciprocal company as defined by Idaho Code § 41-2902 and

incorporated by Idaho Code § 41-303. ICRMP is domiciled in Boise, Idaho, and authorized to
transact insurance business of property and casualty, excluding workers compensation, in Idaho
pursuant to chapter 3, title 41, Idaho Code.
4.

ICRMP was initially issued its Certificate of Authority from the Department on

February 1, 1986, and was reissued its certificate on September 26, 1994. Attached as Exhibit A
is a true and correct copy of the Certificate of Authority issued to ICRMP.
5.

On the Department's website, located at www.doi.idaho.gov, under the "Rates and

Policy Forms" menu option found within "Companies" tab, the public can conduct a "Public
Filings Online Search" of the forms and policies filed in Idaho. This online search is linked to the

AFFIDAVIT OF GEORGIA SIEHL - Page 1
69 of 272

National Association of Insurance Commissioner's ("NAIC") "SERFF Filing Access" database
and allows the general public to review a given company's forms and/or policy filings.
6.

Based on a cursory search of the SERFF database, it appears that there are other

companies who have filed various forms in Idaho that also purport to include coverage to
municipalities. Whether these forms are comparable to ICRMP's various forms which assert
coverage to municipalities is unknown without conducting a line-by-line comparison, which the
Department does not do. Additionally, the filing of forms and policies in compliance with Idaho
Code § 41-1812 does not in itself mean that either the forms or the policies are currently marketed
or sold in Idaho or, if they are sold, to whom they are sold.
7.

ICRMP continues to be regulated under Idaho's Insurance Code found in title 41,

Idaho Code.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.

,0.-

DATED THIS _Q__ day of Hv\_(y\J'vJ

, 201Jo.

'
r··

i ).

'

1. \

Ii

I

~) l,(,,t;\__ .·

GEORGIA SIE L
Chief Examiner and Bureau Chief, Company Activities
Department of Insurance

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this/()

YI:- day of~201/JI
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DEPARTMENT OF
INSURANCE

STATE OF IDAHO
Certificate No.
1674

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY
THIS CERTIFIES, THAT
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, UNDERWRITERS
a reciprocal company domicUed in BOISE, IDAHO

subject to the provisions of its Articles of Incorporation, and having presented satisfactory evidence of
compliance with the requirements of the Laws regulating the insurance business In the State of Idaho,
has been granted authority to transact such business, in this State, of the class or classes of insurance
as indicated below:
PROPERTY,
CASUALTY - EXCLUDING WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Expiration Conditions: This Certificate of Authority is expressly conditioned upon the holder hereof remaining in full
compliance with, and not in violation of. any of the applicable laws and requirements of the State of Idaho. It shall at all
times remain the property of the State of Idaho. and shall continue and remain in full force and effect from the date shown
hereon, until expired. suspended. revoked or otherwise terminated; subject to payment of the continuation fee and filing of a
properly completed annual statement with the Director of Insurance on or before the first day of March of each year.
Expiration, suspension. revocation or failure to pay the annual continuation fee or to timely file its properly compiled annual
statement shall automatically terminate the insured's authority to conduct the business of insurance in this State and this
Certificate of Authority must forthwith be returned to the Department of Insurance of the State of Idaho.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the Offlclal.Seal of the Department of Insurance to be
affixed at Bois lciaho, t · at 'I of February, 1986.
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Phillip J. Collaer - ISB No. #3447
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
E-Mail:
pcollaer@ajhlaw.com

,..

-

~

-

.

-

---·, ·- - - - ru
. -

~

-·

-~· ·:: ( CLC,;\

----~

Attorneys for Defendant, IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(ICRMP)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)

Case No. CV-2016-195
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFF BOICE IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss:
County of Ada
)

Jeff Boice, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1.

That, at all times relevant, your affiant has been an employee of the

Idaho's County Risk Management Program (ICRMP) as a claims handler.

The

information contained herein is of your affiant's own personal knowledge.

ORIGINAL
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2.

In 2015, Franklin County purchased casualty insurance from ICRMP.

Attached hereto and identified as Exhibit 1 is a certified copy of the 2014/2015 ICRMP
policy.
3.

In the summer of 2015, I was the claims handler assigned to the lawsuit

filed by Val and LaRee Westover against Franklin County and the Franklin County
Assessor, Jase Cundick. See Exhibit 2 attached hereto. To meet ICRMP's contractual
obligations under the insurance policy described in ,r2, above, I retained the law firm of
Naylor & Hales to represent Franklin County and Mr. Cundick. The Naylor & Hales firm
filed an answer on behalf of Franklin County and Mr. Cundick. Dispositive motions were
filed by Franklin County and the plaintiff. See Exhibit 3 attached hereto.
4.

After the motions for summary judgment were filed, I attended a court

ordered mediation by telephone. The mediation did not result in a settlement.
5.

Following the mediation, the motions for summary judgment described in

,r3, above, were heard by the district court. The Franklin County motion was granted
and the Westover case was dismissed. See Exhibit 4 attached hereto. That ruling was
then appealed and is currently pending before the Idaho S

See Exhibit 5

attached hereto.
FURTHER your Affiant saith naught.

r Jeff Boice
is

_jJ_ day of August, 2016
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /6 day of August, 2016, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JEFF BOICE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by delivering the same to each of the following
attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Attorney for Plaintiff
(Courtesy Copy)
Judge Michael W. Brown
159 S. Main Street
Soda Springs, ID 83276
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U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (801) 533-0380
Email:

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email:

Phillip J. Collaer
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I, Mary Kummer, Secretary of the Idaho Counties Risk Management Program (ICRMP), do hereby certify
that the attached document, consisting of eighty-two (82) total pages, inclusive of seventy-four (74)
pages of agreement provisions plus declarations pages, indexes, and a postscript page, is a true and
correct copy of the 2014-2015 Public Entity Multi-Lines Insurance Policy issued by ICRMP to be effective
on October 1, 2014.
Dated this 17th day of August, 2016

ICRMP Program Secretary

State of Idaho
County of Ada

) ss.
)

~ ~~ , a notary public, do hereby certify that on this 17th day of
August, 2016, personally appeared before me Mary Kummer, who, being by me first duly sworn,
declared that she is the Secretary of the ICRMP Program, that she signed the foregoing certification as
Secretary of the ICRMP Program, and that the certification therein contained is true and accurate.

EXHIBIT

I I
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ICRMP
Policy Year

2014-2015

Multi-Lines Insurance
Policy

Issued for:

Franklin County

Issued by:
Idaho Counties Risk Management Program
3100 Vista Avenue, Suite 300, Boise, ID 83705
Phone: (208) 336-3100 -

Fax: (208) 336-2100

www.icrmp.org
76 of 272
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PUBLIC ENTITY MULTI-LINES INSURANCE POLICY DECLARATIONS
ISSUED BY IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, UNDERWRITERS
Named Insured: Franklin County
Address: 39 W Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263

Policy Number:

34A01021100114

Policy Period: From: October 1, 2014
To:
October 1, 2015
Both dates above at 12:01 AM

Application Date: August 1, 2014
Retroactive Date Section VI,
Insuring Agreement 3: October 1, 201 o

Member Contribution:

$99,726

Retroactive Date Section VIII: July 1, 1986
Retroactive Date Section XI: October 1, 2013

···························· SECTION V- PROPERTY··························

--------------------------

Insuring Agreements

Lim(,t_oft_
Indemn,
1ca ion

-----------

Coverage Basis

Deductible

1. Buildings, Structures & Property:
Professional Fees
Fine Arts

$500,000

Per covered occurrence.

Landscape Items
Ordinance Deficiency
Preservation of Property
Newly Acquired Property

$25,000
$5,000,000
$250,000
$10,000,000

Per covered occurrence and/or in the aggregate for multiple
occurrences.
Per covered occurrence.
Per covered occurrence.
Per covered occurrence.
Per covered occurrence.

Property in Course of Construction:
New or Repairs/Renovations of Existing

$1,000,000

Per covered occurrence.

Property In Transit

$1,000,000

Per covered occurrence.

Service Animals

$1,000,000

$25,000

Per covered occurrence.
Per Covered occurrence and/or in the annual aggregate for
multiple occurrences all members combined.
Annual aggregate - all non-public education members
combined.
Annual aggregate - all non-public education members
combined.

Water/Sewer Backup

$1,000,000

Earth Movement

$50,000,000

Flood Type A*

$50,000,000

Flood Type B**

$5,000,000

Annual aggregate - all non-public education combined.

$1,000,000

Per item per covered occurrence.

$10,000,000
$2,500,000

In the aggregate for multiple Items when not in use.
Per covered occurrence or in the aggregate for multiple
occurrences.

$250,000

Per covered occurrence or in the aggregate for multiple
occurrences.

2. Automobile/&fobile Equipment Physical

The first $1,000 of any loss is
applicable to Section V,
Insuring Agreements 1, 2, 3 &
4, excepting flood and
earthquake losses.

Earth Movement: The first
$100,000 of any loss.

**Flood Type A: The first
$100,000 of any loss.
-Flood Type B: The first
$500,000 per building and
first $500,000 per contents.

Damage
3. Operational Disruption Expense

•

Data Restoration Related to
Operational Disruption Expense

4. Valuable Papers and Records

•

Data Restoration Related to
VI bl P o;
d R rd

$1,000,000

Per covered occurrence and/or in the aggregate for multiple
occurrences.

$500,000

Per covered occurrence and/or in the aggregate for multiple
occ rrences

TOTAL SECTION V LIMIT OF INDEMNIFICATION IS $200.000,000 PER OCCURRENCE LIMIT FOR ALL PROPERTY COVERAGES AND ALL
LIMITS OF INDEMNIFICATION COMBINED FOR ALL NON PUBLIC EDUCATION MEMBERS COLLECTIVELY.

Effective October 1, 2014

D-1

ICRMP34A2015
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------------------------ SECTION VI - GENERAL LIABILITY-----------------------Indemnification Limit For
Defense Cost
Claims Brought Pursuant
Indemnification Limit
Insuring Agreements
Limit for All
to Title 6, Ch. 9, Idaho
for All Other Claims
Liability Claims
Code

1. General Liability

$500,000

$3,000,000
$500,000

Fire Suppression Liability
Law Enforcement Liability

3.

Sexual Molestation LiabilityCLAIMS IIIADE COVERAGE

Per covered occurrence.

Included in above

City/County Prosecutors or Appointed City
Attorneys serving as Independent Contractors
Sewer Backup, Mold & Fungus Abatement &
Remediation

2.

$2,000,000

Coverage Basis

$500,000

Included in above

$500,000

Included in above

$500,000

$3,000,000

$500,000

$3,000,000

Per covered occurrence.

$2,000,000

$2,000,000

Per Covered Claim.

·•·•••••••••••••••••···· SECTION VII-AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY························
Indemnification Limit For
Defense Cost
Indemnification Limit
Claims Brought Pursuant
Limit for All
to Title 6, Ch. 9, Idaho
for All Other Claims
Liability Claims
Code

-----------------------------------------------

Insuring Agreements

Coverage Basis

1. Automobile Liability (Outside State of Idaho)

$500,000

$3,000,000

$2,000,000

Per covered accident.

Automobile Liability (Inside State of Idaho)

$500,000

$500,000

Included in above

2. Automobile Medical Payments

$5,000
$100,000

$5,000
$100,000

Not Applicable

Each person.
Each accident.

3. Uninsured I Underinsured Motorists

$100,000
$300,000

$100,000
$300,000

Included in above

Each person.
Each accident.

··•··•·•················ SECTION VIII - ERRORS AND OMISSIONS CLAIMS MADE························

1. Errors and Omissions
CLAIMS IIIADE COVERAGE

$500,000

$2,000,000

$500,000

Included in above

$500,000

$3,000,000

Included in above

Per covered claim.

$500,000

$3,000,000

Included in above

Per covered claim.

City/County Prosecutors Appointed City Attorneys
serving as Independent Contractors

2. Employee Benefit Liability
CLAIMS IIIADE COVERAGE
3. Employment Practices Liability
CLAIMS IIIADE COVERAGE

Per covered claim.

$3,000,000

THERE IS A $5,000,000 INDEMNIFICATION LIMIT IN THE AGGREGATE ANNUALLY FOR SECTIONS VI, VII, VIII, XI and XII COMBINED.
THERE IS A $3,000,000 DEFENSE COST LIMIT IN THE AGGREGATE FOR SECTIONS VI, VII, VIII, XI and XII COMBINED.

Effective October 1, 2014

D-2
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1.

Employee Dishonesty

$500,000

The first $1,000 of any

Per covered occurrence.

1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - - loss in this section.
2.

Loss Inside Premises

$500,000

Per covered occurrence.

3.

Loss Outside Premises

$500,000

Per covered occurrence.

------------------------ SECTION X- MACHINERY BREAKDOWN INSURANCE-----------------------Insuring Agreements

Limit of Indemnification

Per covered occurrence.

1. Property Damage
Off Premise Property Damage

$100,000

Data or Media (Property)

$1,000,000

Data or Media (Bus. Income & Extra Expense)

$5,000,000

Ammonia Contamination

$1,000,000

Consequential Loss

$1,000,000

Hazardous Substance
Water Damage
Fungus

Coverage Basis

The first $1,000 of any
loss in this section.

$500,000
$2,500,000
$15,000

2.

Expediting Expenses

$2,500,000

Per covered occurrence.

3.

Business Income and Extra Expense

$1,000,000

Per covered occurrence.

4. Spoilage Damage

$1,000,000

Per covered occurrence.

s.

$1,000,000

Per covered occurrence.

6. Newly Acquired Premises

$5,000,000

Per covered occurrence.

7. Ordinance or Law

$5,000,000

Per covered occurrence.

8. Errors and Omissions

$10,000,000

Per covered daim.

Utility Interruption

Deductible

TOTAL SECTION X LIMIT OF INDEMNIFICATION IS $100.000.000 PER OCCURRENCE LIMIT FOR ALL MACHINERY BREAKDOWN
COVERAGES AND ALL LIMITS OF INDEMNIFICATION COMBINED FOR ALL NON PUBLIC EDUCATION MEMBERS COLLECTIVELY.

Effective October 1, 2014

D-3
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•····•••••••···••••••••• SECTION XII- CHEMICAL SPRAYING ACTIVITIES LIABILITY INSURANCE························
Insuring Agreements

1.

Chemical Spraying Activities Liability
CLAIMS MADE COVERAGE

2.

Emergency Clean-up Expense

Indemnification Limit For
Claims Brought
Pursuant to Title 6, Ch.
9, Idaho Code

Indemnification
Limit for All Other
Claims

Defense Cost Limit
for All Liability
Claims

$500,000

$500,000

$2,000,000

$0

$5,000
$100,000

Not applicable

Coverage Basis

Per covered claim
and/or in the aggregate
for multiple claims.
Each Person.
Each Accident.

THERE IS A $5,000,000 INDEMNIFICATION LIMIT IN THE AGGREGATE ANNUALLY FOR SECTIONS VI, VII, VIII, XI AND XII COMBINED.
THERE IS A $3,000,000 DEFENSE COST LIMIT IN THE AGGREGATE FOR SECTION VI, VII, VIII, XI AND XII COMBINED.
······················•· SECTION XII -ENDORSEMENTS ·············••·••······
Limit of
Indemnification

Insuring Agreements

1. Accidental Discharge of Pollutants
Endorsement #1

$50,000

2. Terrorism Insurance Physical Damage/Loss
Endorsement #2

$50,000,000

Defense Cost
Limit for All
Liability Claims

Coverage Basis

Deductible

Not applicable

Per covered occurrence and/or in
the aggregate for multiple claims.

The first $1,000 of any
loss for Endorsement #1.

Not applicable

In the aggregate annually for all
ICRMP Non Public Education
Members Collectively in the
aaareaate.

The first $10,000 of any
loss for Endorsement #2.

3. Coverage Territory for Canada Amendatory
Endorsement #3

The first $1,000 of any
loss for Endorsement #3,
Section V, only.

Section V - Property Insurance (all insuring
agreements)

$500,000

Not applicable

Per Covered Occurrence

Section VI - General Liability Insurance (all
insuring agreement)

$500,000

$2,000,000

Per Covered Occurrence or Claim

Section VII - Automobile Liability Insurance

$500,000

Included in above

Per Covered Accident

Section VIII - Errors & Omissions Insurance (all
insuring agreements)

$500,000

Included in above

Per Covered Claim

4. Public Land Fire Suppression Endorsement #4

$500,000

Not applicable

Per covered occurrence and/or in
the aggregate for multiple claims.

No Deductible for
Endorsement #4.

5. Cyber Liability Endorsement #5
CLAIMS MADE COVERAGE
Retroactive Date: October 1, 2014

$1,000,000

Included in limit of
indemnification

Per Covered Claim and $4,000,000
in the aggregate for multiple claims.

The first $25,000 of any
loss for Endorsement #5.

THERE IS A $5,000,000 INDEMNIFICATION LIMIT IN THE AGGREGATE ANNUALLY FOR SECTIONS VI, Vll,VIII, XI AND XII COMBINED.
THERE IS A $3.000,000 DEFENSE COST LIMIT IN THE AGGREGATE FOR SECTIONS VI. VII, VIII, XI AND XII COMBINED.

NOTICE RE: INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION
As required by Article VIII, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code Section 41-3603(10), the ICRMP
Program is not a participant in the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association. As such, ICRMP Subscribers are not
responsible for the costs of private insurer insolvencies, nor are they or claimants against them entitled to any of
the protections which participation in the Guaranty Association would provide. This notice is provided in
cooperation with the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association. For additional information concerning this notice,
contact the ICRMP Executive Director at 1-800-336-1985.
Effective October 1, 2014
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SECTION I - GENERAL DEFINITIONS
A. Unless otherwise stated in a specific section, the following definitions are applicable to all sections of
this policy.
1.

"Accident" means an unexpected happening without intention or design.

2.

"Damage(s)" means monetary compensation to be awarded through judgment in a court
proceeding or through settlement agreed to by us to compensate a claimant for harm suffered.

3.

"First Aid" means the rendering of emergency medical treatment at the time of an accident and
only when other licensed medical professional care is not immediately available.

4. "First Made" means when you first give written notice to us that a claim has been made against
you, but not later than the end of this policy period or any extended reporting period we provide.
Reports of incidents or circumstances made by you to us as part of risk management or loss
control services shall not be considered notice of a claim.
5.

"Fungi" means any organism of the plant kingdom Fungi, which lacks chlorophyll and vascular
tissue, including but not limited to, yeast, mold, mildew, rust, smut, mushrooms, spores,
mycotoxins, or any other substances, odors, or byproducts arising out of the current or past
presence of fungi.

6. "Medical Expenses" means expenses for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray and dental services,
ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and funeral services.
7.

"Named Insured" means the public entity identified in the declarations pages of this policy.

8.

"Insured" means:

9.

a.

The Named Insured,

b.

Any elected or appointed official serving as a volunteer or employee of the named insured,
as well as any volunteer or employee of the named insured while acting within the scope of
their duties as such. This does not include any appointed or elected official or employee who
is serving the named insured as an independent contractor.

c.

City or county prosecutors, or appointed city attorneys while serving as independent
contractors, in the course and scope of their statutory roles.

"Property Damage" means physical damage to or destruction of tangible property, including loss
of use resulting from such physical damage or destruction.

10. "Pollutant(s)" means:
a.

Those materials that can cause or threaten damage to human health or human welfare or
cause or threaten damage, deterioration, loss of value, marketability or loss of use to
property;

b.

Any solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, metals and waste, including debris and trash and materials
to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed;

c.

Bacteria, fungi, mold, mildew, virus, or hazardous substances as listed in the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, Clean Air Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Toxic
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Substances Control Act or as designated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency or
any other governing authority.
11. "We", "Us" and "Our' means Idaho Counties Risk Management Program, Underwriters
(ICRMP).
12. "You" and "Your' means the named insured identified in the declarations pages of this policy.
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SECTION II - GENERAL INSURING AGREEMENT
A.

Unless otherwise stated in a specific section, the following Insuring Agreement applies to all sections
of this policy.
1.

Idaho Counties Risk Management Program, Underwriters (ICRMP) agrees with the named
insured as listed in the declarations pages of this policy made a part hereof, in consideration of
the payment of the member contribution and subject to the limits of indemnification, Insuring
Agreements, conditions, exclusions and other terms of this policy, as follows:
a.

We will provide the insurance described in this policy and declarations pages if you have
paid the member contribution and have complied with all policy provisions and conditions.
This policy is divided into twelve (12) sections, some with multiple Insuring Agreements.
The insurance set forth in this policy is subject to the indicated limits of indemnification or
any other endorsements issued during this term.

b.

The liability Insuring Agreements afforded by this policy (under sections VI, VII, VIII, XI and
any applicable endorsements) to respond to claims for damages brought pursuant to Title 6,
Chapter 9, Idaho Code (the Idaho Tort Claims Act) are expressly limited to five hundred
thousand dollars ($500,000) per occurrence. It is the express intent of ICRMP to limit
exposure and coverage to the limits established by statute. Any reference to liability
indemnification amounts in excess of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) contained in
this policy shall not apply to claims brought pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Title 6,
Chapter 9, Idaho Code.

c.

All limits of indemnification will be subject to this policy period's per covered claim, accident
or occurrence limit of Indemnification as stated in the declarations pages or within the
accompanying policy and annual aggregate limit of Indemnification for all sections as stated
in the declarations pages.

B. Certain provisions in this policy restrict coverage. The entire policy should be read carefully to
determine your rights and duties, and to determine what is and is not covered.
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SECTION Ill - GENERAL CONDITIONS
A.

Unless otherwise stated in a specific section, the following conditions are applicable to all sections of
this policy.
1. Apportionment. In the event a suit alleges a claim which is covered by the terms of this policy
and a claim which is not covered by the terms of this Policy, our obligation for the costs of
defense and payment of any award or settlement for damages shall be limited to only those sums
related to a covered claim.
2.

Assignment. Your interests in this insurance may not be assigned.

3.

Bankruptcy and Insolvency. In the event of bankruptcy or insolvency of you or any entity
comprising you, we shall not be relieved of the payment of any claim by you or against you or
the liquidator, receiver or statutory successor of you under this policy without diminution because
of your insolvency.

4.

Termination of Insurance Coverage by Member Withdrawal or Expulsion. This insurance
may be terminated by you by sending a written request of withdrawal to us. The effective
termination date will be the date of termination you request, if you are a Member in good
standing, or the date we received your notice of withdrawal, whichever is later. This insurance is
available only through faithful participation as a member of ICRMP. You may be expelled from
ICRMP pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in the Joint Powers Subscriber Agreement
effective as of the date of this policy. If you are expelled from ICRMP, all insurance pursuant to
this policy is terminated immediately upon transmittal of notice of expulsion, or otherwise as soon
as allowed by law.

5.

Concealment or Fraud. This policy or any part hereof, is void if it was obtained by
misrepresentation, fraud or concealment of material facts by you before or after loss.

6.

Currency. The member contribution and losses under this insurance are payable in currency of
the United States.

7.

Declarations. By acceptance of this policy you agree that the declarations pages accurately
indicate the coverages you have purchased.

8.

Defense of Claims or Suit. We may investigate or settle any covered claim or suit against you.
We will provide a defense with counsel of our choice, at our expense, if you are sued for a
covered claim.

a.

With respect to claims or suits involving section VI - General Liability Insurance, section VII Automobile Liability Insurance, section VIII - Errors and Omissions Insurance, section XI Chemical Spraying Activities Liability Insurance, including any amendatory endorsements in
section XII, our defense costs incurred will not exceed $2,000,000 per covered claim, subject
to a $3,000,000 limit in the aggregate for sections VI, VII, VIII, XI and XII combined for all
covered claims that are subject to this policy's policy period. The "per covered claim", "per
covered occurrence", or "per covered accident" defense costs amount is the most we will
incur regardless whether one or more of sections VI, VII, VIII, XI and XII are involved in a
single claim, and is in addition to the limits of indemnification shown in the declarations
pages. Our obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when either:
(1)The amount of loss or damages we pay equals the limit(s) of indemnification afforded
under this policy, or
(2)The defense costs incurred by us equal $2,000,000 per covered claim or the defense
costs incurred by us equal $3,000,000 aggregate for the policy period.
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9. Dispute Resolution Procedure. You and we agree that it is in our mutual interest to have a
dispute resolution procedure in order to address potential disputes and disagreements as to
whether or not a claim is covered by the terms and conditions of this policy. You and we agree
that the dispute resolution procedure as set out in the Joint Powers Subscriber Agreement
currently in force as of the date of this policy shall apply to address any potential disputes and
disagreements as to coverage.
a.

Inapplicable to Certain Disputes and Disagreements:
(1) These dispute resolution procedures do not apply to the appraisal condition set forth in
the specific conditions applicable to the property Insuring Agreements in section V of this
policy, or to the arbitration condition set forth in the specific conditions applicable to the
automobile liability Insuring Agreements set out in section VI of this policy.
(2) These dispute resolution procedures do not apply in any way to our decisions regarding
terms of claim settlement, claim payment amount, or the claim investigation process.

10. Duties After Occurrence, Accident, Wrongful Act, Claim or Suit.
a.

You must see to it that we are notified as soon as practicable of an occurrence which may
reasonably result in a claim. To the extent possible, notice should include:

(1) How, when and where the occurrence, claim, accident, wrongful act, or suit took place,
(2) The names, addresses and telephone numbers of any injured persons and witnesses,
(3) The nature and location of any injury or damage arising out of the occurrence, accident,
wrongful act, claim or suit.
b.

If a claim is made or suit is brought against any insured, you and any involved insured must:
(1) Immediately send us copies of any claims, demands, notices, summonses or legal
papers received in connection with the claim, occurrence, accident, wrongful act, claim or
suit,
(2) See that we receive written notice of the claim or suit as soon as practicable,
(3) Authorize us to obtain records and other information, and submit to a sworn statement, if
requested,
(4) Cooperate with us in the investigation, or defense of the claim or suit, including but not
limited to, attendance at hearings and trials, securing and giving evidence, and obtaining
the attendance of witnesses,
(5) Assist us, upon our request, in the enforcement of any right against any person or
organization which may be liable to you because of injury or damage to which this
Insurance may also apply,

c. You shall not, except at your own risk, voluntarily make a payment, assume any obligation, or
incur any expense, other than for first aid, without our consent,
d. Your failure to comply with the foregoing duties shall constitute a material breach deemed
prejudicial to us, thereby entitling us to refuse any coverage for the occurrence, accident,
wrongful act, claim or suit; or any duties arising therefrom.
11. Entire Agreement. This policy, when read in concert with the Joint Powers Subscriber
Agreement, embodies the entirety of the agreement existing between you and us relating to this
Insurance. You acknowledge that the independent insurance agent responsible for maintaining
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information about your insurance needs has no power to bind ICRMP to provide insurance
beyond that expressed in this policy, its endorsements, and its attendant declarations pages.
12. False or Fraudulent Claims. If you make any claim knowing the same to be false or fraudulent,
as regards amount or otherwise, this policy may become void and all claims hereunder may be
forfeited.
13. Inspections, Audit and Verification of Values. We shall be permitted, but not obligated, to
review or inspect your property, operations, records, and books, at any reasonable time. Neither
our right to make inspections or conduct reviews, nor the making thereof, nor any report thereon,
shall constitute an undertaking on behalf of or for the benefit of you or others, to determine or
warrant that such property or operations are safe or that the values stated by you in your
application are accurate. It is your responsibility to disclose accurate statements of value.
14. Loss Payments. When it has been determined that we are liable under this policy, we shall pay
losses in excess of the stated deductible up to the limits of indemnification stated in the
declarations pages. Our obligation to make loss payments shall arise as amounts owed are
determined.
15. Mitigation. In the event of a loss covered under this policy, you must take all reasonable steps
to prevent further loss or damage.
16. No Benefit to Bailee. We will not recognize any assignment or grant any coverage for the
benefit of any person, entity, or organization holding, storing or transporting your property,
regardless of any other provision of this policy.
17. Non-stacking of Insurance Benefits. No individual or entity entitled to coverage under any
section of this policy shall recover duplicate coverages for the same elements of loss under other
sections of this policy, or other policies written by us. Any claim which transcends more than one
policy period shall be subject to the policy limits set forth in the declarations pages of the policy
which covers the date of the earliest actionable event, which gives rise to the claim.

18. Notice of Member contribution or Coverage Changes.
a.

We will mail or deliver to the named insured, at the last known mailing address, written
notice of the following for a subsequent year at least thirty (30) days prior to the expiration
date of this policy:

(1 )A total member contribution increase greater than ten percent (10%) which is the result of
a comparable increase in member contribution rates.
(2) Changes in deductibles.
(3) Reductions in limits of indemnification.
(4)Reductions in coverage.
b.

If we fail to provide at least thirty (30) day notice, the policy provided to you shall remain in
effect until thirty (30) days after such notice is given or until the effective date of a
replacement policy obtained by you, whichever occurs first.

c.

For purposes of this provision, notice is considered given on the date of mailing of the notice
to the named insured. Proof of mailing of conditions of renewal to the last known mailing
address of the named insured shall be sufficient proof of notice.

19. Other Insurance. If you have other insurance (whether primary, excess or contingent), against
loss covered by this Insurance, we shall be liable, under the terms of this insurance, only as
excess of other valid and collectible insurance. Notwithstanding the foregoing, you may
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purchase insurance specifically in excess of this insurance. Such excess insurance shall not be
considered "other insurance" for purposes of this condition.
20. Reporting Property on Your Schedule of Values. Coverage is conditioned upon information
being entered into the online ICRMP e-Agent website by your agent. It is the responsibility of the
independent insurance agent to enter information into the online ICRMP e-Agent website. It is
the responsibility of you to report the required information to your agent.
21. Salvage. Payments received from the sale of your damaged property as salvage may be
applied toward the amount we have paid to replace your damaged property.
22. Subrogation/Recovery/Right of Reimbursement. If we make payment under this policy to you
or on your behalf, and you or the person or entity for whom payment was made has a right to
recover damages, we will be subrogated to that right. You must do whatever is necessary to
enable us to exercise our rights and must do nothing before or after the loss to prejudice our
rights. We may prosecute an action or pursue other lawful proceedings in your name for the
recovery of these payments, and you must cooperate and assist us at our request. Recoveries
received for payments we have paid on your behalf including both indemnity payments and
expenses we have incurred in handling your claim, will be reimbursed on a pro-rata recovery
basis between you and us, upon closing of the claim.
23. Suit Against Us. No action shall be brought against us by you unless there has been full
compliance with all pertinent provisions of this policy and the ICRMP Joint Powers Subscriber
Agreement. No one shall have any right to join us as a party to any action against an insured.
No action may be brought against us by any party who does not qualify as an insured under this
policy with respect to any liability insuring agreements.
24. Terms of Policy to Conform to Statutes. In the event any terms of this policy are determined to
be in conflict with the statutes of the State of Idaho, they are hereby amended to conform to such
statutes.
25. Territory. The insurance provided by this policy applies to claims filed and maintained only
within the fifty (50) states, including the District of Columbia, of the United States of America, for
all coverage sections.
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SECTION IV - GENERAL EXCLUSIONS
A.

Unless otherwise stated, these exclusions are applicable to all sections of this policy.

1. Asbestos. This policy does not cover any claim, loss, cost or expense arising directly or indirectly
out of, resulting from or contributed to by:
a. The use of, sale of, installation of, removal of, abatement of, distribution of, containment of, or
exposure to asbestos, asbestos products, asbestos-containing material, asbestos fibers, or
asbestos dust;
b. The actual or threatened abatement, mitigation, removal or disposal of asbestos, asbestos
products, asbestos-containing material, asbestos fibers, or asbestos dust;
c. Any supervision, instructions, recommendations, warnings or advice given or which should
have been given in connection with parts (a) and (b) above; or
d. Any obligation of the covered party to indemnify or contribute with any party in connection with
subparagraphs (a), (b) or (c) above.
2.

Civil and Criminal Penalties. This policy does not cover any claim, loss or damage resulting
from any civil penalties, criminal penalties, fines or obligations to pay for public services rendered
where such obligation is imposed or provided for pursuant to any federal, state, or local law,
statute, ordinance, or regulation, however characterized, except as expressly provided
elsewhere, herein.

3.

Claims by Members against Past or Present Public Officials. This policy does not cover the
interest of any past or present employee, elected official, or agent arising out of any claim for
money damages, monetary reimbursement or specific performance brought against such
employee, elected official or agent by the named insured by whom the public official, employee,
elected official or agent was employed or retained. Also excluded are those claims brought by an
elected official, or by one appointed to fill an elected position for a named insured against
another official of the same named insured, or the named insured itself, arising out of a dispute
or interpretation involving the relative governmental authority of the elected officials of the named
insured.

4.

Contractual Liability. This policy does not cover any personal injury, property damage, or any
other claimed loss, however characterized, arising directly or indirectly from:
a. The performance or nonperformance of terms of a contract, whether written, oral or implied.
b. The interests of the State of Idaho or the United States Government, or their officers, agents,
employees, volunteers, officials or trustees, for their conduct and activities arising out of or in
any way related to any written, oral or implied contract or agreement with you, or otherwise.
Each governmental entity shall be responsible for its own conduct and activities under any
contract.

5.

Course and Scope. This policy does not cover any personal injury or property damage
resulting from an act or omission outside the course and scope of employment or any act
performed with malice or criminal intent. This exclusion applies regardless of whether any
insured is actually charged with, or convicted of, a crime.

6.

Cyber Liability. This policy does not cover any personal injury, bodily injury, property damage
to others, wrongful acts, or notification costs, credit monitoring expenses, forensic expenses,
public relations expenses or any other loss, costs or expenses arising directly or indirectly out of,
resulting from, caused by or contributed to by losses related to computer connected access to
and/or computer disclosure of any person's or organization's confidential or personal information,
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including patents, trade secrets, processing methods, customer lists, financial information, credit
card information, health information or any other type of non-public information, except for that
data that is:

7.

8.

a.

Required to be disclosed under the Idaho Public Records Act, or;

b.

Inadvertently and unintentionally released publically by an insured, via computer, without
involvement by a third party, hacker, computer virus, computer bug or similar external
influence.

Fungi. This policy does not cover any bodily injury, personal injury, or property damage arising
directly or indirectly out of, resulting from, caused by or contributed to by:
a.

Any fungus(i) or spore(s);

b.

Any solid, liquid, vapor, or gas produced by or arising out of any fungus(i) or spore(s);

c.

Any material, product, building component, or building structure that contains, harbors,
nurtures or acts as a medium for any fungus(i) or spore(s);

d.

Any intrusion, leakage, or accumulation of water or any other liquid that contains, harbors,
nurtures or acts as a medium for fungus(i) or spore(s);

e.

The actual or threatened abatement, mitigation, removal or disposal of fungus(i) or spore(s)
or any material, product, building component, or building structure that contains, harbors,
nurtures or acts as a medium for any fungus(i) or spore(s);

f.

Any supervision, instructions, recommendations, warnings or advice given or which should
have been given in connection with subparagraphs (a) through (e) above; or

g.

Any obligation to indemnify or contribute with any party in connection with subparagraphs (a)
through (f) above. For the purpose of this exclusion fungus(i) includes, but is not limited to,
any form or type of mold, mushroom or mildew and spore(s) include any reproductive body
produced by or arising out of any fungus(i).

Limits on Defense of Claims or Suit. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Policy, we will
have no duty to investigate or defend any claim, suit, dispute, disagreement or other proceeding
seeking relief or redress in any form other than money damages, including but not limited to
costs, fees, fines, penalties or expenses which any insured may become obligated to pay as a
result of a consent decree, settlement, adverse judgment for declaratory relief or injunctive relief.
Such denial of investigation or defense includes, but shall not be limited to any claim, suit,
dispute, disagreement or other proceeding:
a.

By or on behalf of any named insured, whether directly or derivatively, against:
(1.) Any other named insured; or
(2.) Any other federal, state or local governmental entity or politically subdivision.

b. By the spouse, child, parent, brother, or sister of any insured for consequential injury as a
result of any injury to an insured; or
c. Involving any intergovernmental agreement(s) where any named insured is a party to the
agreement(s).
9.

Intergovernmental Claims. This policy does not cover any claim alleging loss or damage,
arising or in any way related to a dispute or disagreement between an ICRMP member and
another governmental entity, including another political subdivision, a state or the government of
the United States involving any of the following:
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a. Claims of loss or damage between an ICRMP member and another governmental entity
wherein there has been no accident or allegation of actual bodily injury.
b. The respective authority of public agencies to use governmental powers, irrespective of the
style or nature of such claim.
c. The respective duty of public agencies to use governmental powers, irrespective of the style
or nature of such claim.
d. Intergovernmental disputes or disagreements concerning the exercise of powers or
acceptance or assignment of duties by governmental entities to carry out public activities
whether damages are claimed as a result of such dispute or disagreement, or not.
e. Claims in any way related to allocation of financial responsibilities between or among public
agencies.
10. Lead. This policy does not cover any loss or liability arising out of, or contributed to or caused by
lead as described in parts (a) through (d) below:
a. Bodily injury, property damage or personal injury arising out of, resulting from, caused by or
contributed to by the toxic or pathological properties of lead, lead compounds or lead
contained in any materials;
b. Any cost or expense to abate, mitigate, remove or dispose of lead, lead compounds or
materials containing lead;
c. Any supervision, instructions, recommendations, warnings or advice given or which should
have been given in connection with parts (a) or (b) above; or
d. Any obligation to share damages with or repay someone else who must pay damages in
connection with parts (a), (b) or (c) above.
11. Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Incident. This policy does not cover any personal injury,
bodily injury or property damage, or other type of damages or claims arising directly or indirectly
from:
a. Nuclear detonation, reaction, radiation, radioactive contamination or hazardous properties of
nuclear material of any type, however caused or characterized, including any loss or damage
by fire resulting therefrom;
b. The dispersal, application or release of, or exposure to, chemical or biological materials or
agents that are harmful to property or human health, whether controlled or uncontrolled, or
due to any act or condition incidental to any of the foregoing, whether such loss be proximate
or remote, or be in whole or in part caused by, contributed to, or aggravated by, any physical
loss or damage insured against by this policy, however such dispersal, application, release or
exposure may have been caused.
12. Pollution. This is an absolute pollution exclusion. It is the intention of you and we that there is
absolutely no coverage arising out of or relating to pollutants, however characterized or defined.
This policy does not cover any injury, loss, damage, costs, fines, penalties, or expenses of any
kind directly or indirectly arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened existence, discharge,
dispersal, release or escape of pollutants or negligence in any way related thereto:
a. At or from premises you now, or in the past, have owned, rented, or occupied, including but
not limited to premises that you have operated or managed as an involuntary possessor;
b. At or from any site or location used by or for you or others for the handling, storage, disposal,
processing or treatment of waste at any time;
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c. That at any time involves the transportation, handling, storage, treatment, disposal, or
processing by or for you or any person or organization for whom you may be legally
responsible;
( 1) At or from any site or location on which you or any contractors or subcontractors working
directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations:
(2) If the pollutants are brought on or to the site or location in connection with such
operations;

(3) If the operations are to test for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or
neutralize the pollutants;
d. Whether caused or alleged to have been caused by the named insured or any other person,
entity, or third-party, however characterized;
e. Arising out of any direction, request, or order of any governmental agency, court of law, or
other authority, that you test for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or
neutralize pollutants, including any and all costs or attorney's fees associated therewith;
f.

Arising out of the failure of the named insured to prevent or regulate pollutants generated or
caused by any other person, entity, or third-party, however characterized.

g. This exclusion shall not apply to tear gas or mace as applied by law enforcement personnel
within the scope of their duties.

13. Punitive Damages.

This policy does not cover any claim, loss, accident or damage for
exemplary or punitive damages, however characterized.

14. Silica.

This policy does not cover any loss or liability arising out of, or contributed to or caused
by silica as described in paragraphs (a) through (d) below:

a. Bodily injury, property damage, or personal injury arising out of, resulting from, caused by, or
contributed to by silica, exposure to silica or the use of silica;
b. Any damages or any loss, cost or expense arising out of any
(1) claim or suit by or on behalf of any governmental authority or any other alleged
responsible party because of, or

(2) request, demand, order or statutory or regulatory requirement that any covered party or
any other person or entity should be, or should be responsible for:
(i) Assessing the presence, absence or amount or effects of silica;
(ii) Identifying, sampling or testing for, detecting, monitoring, cleaning up, removing,
containing, treating, detoxifying, neutralizing, abating, disposing of or mitigating silica;
or
(iii) Responding to silica in any way other than as described in (a) and (b) above;
(3) Any supervision, instructions, recommendations, warnings or advice given or which
should have been given in connection with any of the subsections above; or
(4) Any obligation to share damages with or repay someone else in connection with any of
the subsections above.
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15. War or Civil Disturbance. This policy does not cover any claim, loss, accident or damage
arising directly or indirectly from, by, happening through or as a consequence of war, invasion,
acts of terrorism, acts of foreign enemies, any weapon of war employing atomic fission or
radioactive force (whether in time of peace or war), hostilities (whether war be declared or not),
civil war, rebellion, revolution, insurrection, military or usurped power, confiscation or
nationalization or requisition or destruction of or damage to property by or under the order of any
government or public or local authority unless such acts of destruction by order of civil authority
are at the time of and for the purpose of preventing spread of fire; or claims or liability arising
directly or indirectly from nuclear fission, nuclear fusion or radioactive contamination.
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SECTION V - PROPERTY INSURANCE
A. Insuring Agreements Applicable to Property Insurance:
1.

Buildings, Structures, and Property. We agree, subject to the conditions and exclusions of this
Insuring Agreement, to pay you, or on your behalf, for direct accidental physical loss of or direct
accidental physical damage to your covered property, during the policy period specified in the
declaration pages.

2.

Mobile Equipment and Automobile Physical Damage. We agree, subject to the conditions and
exclusions of this Insuring Agreement, to pay you, or on your behalf, for direct accidental physical loss
of or direct accidental physical damage to any automobile or mobile equipment owned by you, or any
automobile or mobile equipment for which you have an obligation to provide adequate insurance
because of an ownership or possessory interest during the policy period specified in the declaration
pages.

3. Operational Disruption Expense. We agree, subject to the conditions and exclusions of this Insuring
Agreement, to pay you, or on your behalf, operational disruption expenses resulting from damage to
covered property arising out of a covered loss during the period of restoration under Insuring
Agreements 1 or 2 of this section during the policy period specified in the declaration pages.
4. Valuable Papers and Records. We agree, subject to the conditions and exclusions of this Insuring
Agreement, to pay you, or on your behalf, for direct accidental physical loss of or direct accidental
physical damage to valuable papers and electronic data following damage to covered property arising
out of a covered loss under Insuring Agreement 1 of this section during the policy period specified in the
declaration pages. This Insuring Agreement applies to the costs to research, replace, or restore records
which exist on electronic or magnetic media for which duplicates do not exist.
B. Definitions Applicable to Property Insuring Agreements:

1.

"Actual Cash Value" means the cost of replacing damaged or destroyed property with comparable new
property, minus depreciation and obsolescence.

2. "Aircraft" means any machine capable of sustained atmospheric flight, including unmanned aerial
vehicles.
3. "Automobile" means a motorized land vehicle principally licensed and designed for travel on public
roads. "Automobile" does not include "mobile equipment'.
4. "Computer System" means a system of computer hardware, software, and associated electronic
devices that you operate or own.
5. "Covered Property" means your buildings and structures, building contents, leasehold improvements,
buildings and structures in the course of construction, automobiles and mobile equipment listed on the
schedule of values. It also means personal property of others that are in your care, custody or control,
leased buildings and structures, but only for the portion which you occupy and in which you have an
insurable interest at the time of the loss listed on the schedule of values.
Items placed on the
schedule of values will not be covered if excluded elsewhere by this policy.
6. "Earth Movement" any natural or man-made earth movement, earthquakes, seaquakes, shocks,
tremors, seismic events, landslides, submarine landslides, avalanches, subsidence, sinkhole collapse,
mud flow, rock fall, volcano, lava flow or any other similar earth movement, sinking, rising or shifting
7. "Flood" means a temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of normally dry land from:
a.

The overflow of inland or tidal waters outside the normal watercourse or natural boundaries;
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b.

The overflow, release, rising, backup, runoff or surge of surface water; or

c.

The unusual or rapid accumulation or runoff of surface water from any source.

7.

"Functional Replacement Cost" means the cost of replacing damaged property with similar property
that will perform the same function but may not be identical to the damaged property.

8.

"Mobile Equipment" means equipment that is on wheels or tracks and is not licensed or principally
designed for travel on public roads and is self-propelled or specifically designed to be attached to or
pulled by a vehicle such as a trailer or semi-trailer and identified in your schedule of values. It also
includes watercraft fifty (50) feet and under in length.

9.

"Operational Disruption Expense" means costs incurred by the named insured in order to continue as
nearly as practicable the normal operation of your public entity immediately following a covered loss.
This includes the loss of any income, net of expenses, incurred during the period of restoration of the
operation of the public entity.

10. "Period of Restoration" means that period of time that begins with the date of the direct physical loss of
or direct physical damage to covered property and ends with the date when such part of the covered
property as has been lost or damaged could, with the exercise of due diligence or dispatch, be rebuilt, or
replaced.
11. "Replacement Cost" means the cost to repair, rebuild or replace with new materials of like kind, size and
quality, without deduction for depreciation.
12. "Schedule of Values" means those records describing covered property as entered into the ICRMP eAgent database by the member's agent and kept on file with us.

c.

Specific Conditions Applicable to Property Insuring Agreements:
1.

Appraisal. If you and we fail to agree on the amount of loss, either one can demand that the amount of
loss be set by appraisal. If either makes a written demand for appraisal, each shall select a competent,
independent appraiser, and notify the other of the appraiser's identity within twenty-one (21) days of
receipt of the written demand. The two appraisers shall then select a competent, impartial umpire. If the
two appraisers are unable to agree upon an umpire within fourteen (14) days, you or we can ask a district
judge in the State of Idaho to select an umpire. The appraisers shall then set the amount of the loss. If
the appraisers submit a written report of an agreement to us, the amount agreed upon shall be the
amount of the loss. If the appraisers fail to agree within fourteen (14) days, they shall submit their
differences to the umpire. Written agreements signed by any two of these three shall set the amount of
the loss within seven (7) days. Any such decision resulting from the appraisal process shall be final and
binding upon you and us, and shall not be subject to judicial review or appeal, except upon a showing of
fraud, misrepresentation or other undue means. Each appraiser shall be paid by the party selecting that
appraiser. Other expenses of the appraisal and the compensation of the umpire shall be shared equally
by you and us.

2.

Automobiles and Mobile Equipment that are Leased or Rented. Automobiles and mobile
equipment that are temporarily leased or rented to an insured, for less than ninety (90) days, and used
for official business, are covered under Insuring Agreement 2, and are not required to be listed on the
schedule of values.

3.

Automobiles Owned by Employees or Authorized Volunteers. Automobiles owned by employees or
authorized volunteers of the named insured are provided secondary physical damage insurance while
the automobiles are being used by the employee or authorized volunteers on official business of the
named insured. Insurance provided by this condition shall be deemed secondary to the insurance of the
employee or authorized volunteers' personal insurance, which shall be primary insurance. The intent of
this special condition shall not be interpreted to extend insurance to automobiles owned by other public
or private entities, which are made available to the insured, its employees or volunteers. For these non-
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owned automobiles, the terms and conditions already contained in this section shall apply. This
condition does not apply to automobiles or mobile equipment owned by authorized volunteers engaged
in search and rescue activities. Insuring Agreement 2 is intended to be primary insurance for search and
rescue volunteers only when actively participating in search and rescue mobilizations initiated by the
named insured.
4.

Civil Authority. Property which is insured under this section is also covered against damage or
destruction by civil authority during a conflagration and for the purpose of retarding the same; provided
that neither such conflagration nor such damage or destruction is caused or contributed to by war,
invasion, revolution, rebellion, insurrection, terrorism or other hostilities or warlike operations.

5.

Debris Removal. This section covers up to 25% of the amount of damage to covered property
otherwise payable for any one occurrence under Insuring Agreement 1 for the expenses of removing
debris remaining after any loss thereby insured against, except that there shall be no liability for the
expense of removal of any foundations, unless damaged by a covered accident.

6.

Earth Movement. Flood as defined in this section, that would not have occurred but for an earth
movement as described, shall be deemed to be proximately caused solely by earth movement
regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to such flood,
and consequently shall be considered earth movement.

7.

Flood. When a loss is caused by flood under this section, we will pay only that part of the loss that
exceeds the applicable deductible amount. The deductible in regards to a loss caused by flood is as
follows:
a. Flood Type A: The first $100,000 of each loss for buildings listed in the schedule of values subject to
the aggregate as expressed in the declaration pages of this policy. Flood Type A excludes structures
located wholly or partially within Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA), or areas of one hundred (100)
year flooding, as defined by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
b. Flood Type B: The first $500,000 of each building and the first $500,000 of the contents amount listed
for each building in the schedule of values subject to the aggregate as expressed in the declaration
pages of this policy. Flood Type B applies to structures located wholly or partly within Special Flood
Hazard Areas (SFHA), or areas of one hundred (100) year flooding, as defined by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). .

8.

Inadvertently Omitted Property: We will pay up to first $500,000 of the repair or functional
replacement cost, whichever is less, for property inadvertently omitted from your schedule of values.
Additionally, for any inadvertently omitted property valued in excess of $500,000, up to a total of
$1,000,000 in the aggregate, annually, we will pay 50% of the functional replacement cost, whichever
is less.

9.

Landscaping Items. We will pay for damage to outdoor trees, shrubs, plants and harvested crops as a
result of an accident. The most we will pay in any one occurrence is $25,000.

10. Newly Acquired Property: All newly acquired property shall be reported to us within ninety (90) days in
order for coverage to continue and shall be limited to $10,000,000 until such time as reported to us, but
no longer than ninety (90) days after acquisition.
11. Operational Disruption Expense. We will not be liable for any operational disruption expense
exceeding the period of restoration. The maximum amount we will pay under Insuring Agreement 3 of
this section for any one occurrence or in the aggregate for multiple occurrences is $250,000 for damages
involving actual interruption of the use of your computer system when caused by a covered loss,
provided that the disruption is directly caused by damage to your computer system. The maximum
amount we will pay for all other covered operational disruptions is $2,500,000 for any one occurrence or
in the aggregate for multiple occurrences.
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12. Ordinance Deficiency. In the event of a covered loss, we shall be liable for additional cost not to exceed
$5,000,000 occasioned by the enforcement of any state or municipal law, ordinance or code, which
necessitates repairing, rebuilding, or replacement of covered property to meet such requirements,
provided such repairing, rebuilding or replacement is complete or commences and is continuing within
twenty-four (24) months of the date of loss. If demolition is required to comply with such requirement, we
shall be liable for such additional costs, except as provided in the debris removal provision above. The
provisions of these conditions shall not, in any event, apply to increased costs due to the enforcement of
compliance with pollution statutes, ordinances or laws, whether local, state or federal in nature. Any
payment under this provision shall not serve to increase the limits of indemnification.
13. Preservation of Property. If it is necessary to move covered personal property from the described
premises to preserve it from loss or damage, we will pay up to $250,000 for direct physical loss or
damage to that property while it is being moved or while temporarily stored at another location. We may
pay for reasonable expenses incurred to minimize the insured loss, but any payment under this provision
shall not serve to increase the limits of indemnification that would otherwise apply at the time and place of
loss, nor shall such expenses exceed the amount by which the loss is reduced.
14. Professional Fees to Prove Loss. This policy is extended to cover reasonable and necessary
expenses incurred by you for architects, engineers, or other necessary design professionals who assist
you in rebuilding from your loss under this Policy. Professional fees incurred to prove the extent of a loss
are limited to a maximum of $500,000 per occurrence.
15. Property of Others. Employee or volunteer-owned personal property located within covered property is
covered up to a per occurrence limit of $50,000 per accident. Coverage provided shall be secondary to
any primary coverage available to employees or volunteers.
16. Property in the Course of Construction. New construction of buildings, including equipment,
machinery, tools, materials or supplies intended for use in the construction of such property shall be
covered up to $1,000,000 for each building as listed per the schedule of values. Repairs or renovations
of existing buildings or structures listed on the schedule of values and that you have an insurable
interest in at the time of loss will also be covered up to $1,000,000.
17. Property in Transit. This section covers covered property, while being transported by you, up to a per
occurrence and/or in the aggregate limit of $1,000,000 per policy period.
18. Schedule of Values. Covered property need not be identified in the schedule of values if the
individual value of the item is less than $5,000. It is your responsibility, working with your independent
insurance agent, to make sure all covered property valued over $5,000 is listed on your schedule of
values.
19. Valuable Papers and Records. The maximum amount we will pay under Insuring Agreement 4 of this
section for any one occurrence or in the aggregate for multiple occurrences is $500,000 to restore data
lost by you for an actual interruption of the use of your computer system when caused by a covered
loss. This includes retrieving, repairing, restoring or replacing any of your computer system or any
other data media or media material or any other computer programs for which you are responsible
provided the claim results from a network breach, malicious code or accidental damage to your
computer system. The maximum amount we will pay for all other losses to valuable papers and records
is $1,000,000 for any one occurrence or in the aggregate for multiple occurrences.
20. Valuation of Loss.
a.

Building and structures- We shall not be liable for loss or damage in excess of 125% of the stated
total value per location as reported in the schedule of values, which you have submitted to us in
accordance with the conditions described below:
(1) If damage or destruction to covered property is not repaired, rebuilt or replaced on the same or
another site within two (2) years after the loss or damage, we shall not be liable for more than the
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actual cash value as of the date of loss (ascertained with proper deduction for depreciation) of
the property destroyed;

(2) Our total liability for loss of property covered herein shall not exceed the least of the following:
(i) The cost to repair; or
(ii) The cost to rebuild or replace, calculated as of the date of the loss, on the same site, with
materials that are functionally equivalent; or
(iii)The actual expenditure incurred in rebuilding, repairing or replacing on the same or another
site.
b.

Building Contents -- at replacement cost of the damaged or destroyed covered property.

c.

Automobile and mobile equipment -not to exceed the functional replacement cost, for vehicles
and mobile equipment listed on your schedule of values, up to a maximum of $1,000,000 per item
and no more than $10,000,000 in the aggregate for multiple items while not in use.

d.

Stock in process -- at the value of raw material and labor expended plus the proper proportion of
overhead charges.

e.

Finished goods manufactured by you -- at the regular cash-selling price at the location where the loss
occurs, less all discounts and charges to which the property would have been subject had no loss
occurred.

f.

Property of others - (1) at the amount for which you are liable, but in no event to exceed the
replacement cost value or (2) fine arts on display at the appraised value and included as contents or
listed separately on the schedule of values up to the limits specified in the declaration pages.

g. Leased buildings, leasehold improvements and betterments at replacement cost, if actually replaced
within two (2) years after the loss or damage; if not replaced, at actual cash value on date of loss.
h.

Accounts, manuscripts, mechanical drawings and other records and documents not specifically
excluded -- at value plus cost of transcribing.

i.

Fine arts -- at the appraised value of the article to a maximum of $1,000,000 per occurrence or in the
aggregate for multiple occurrences.

21. Water Backup through Sewer or Drain.
a.

We provide coverage for direct physical loss to your buildings and their related contents when
damage is caused by water which backs up through sewers or drains, not related to a flood, up to a
maximum of $1,000,000 per occurrence or in the aggregate for multiple occurrences within the policy
period.

o. Exclusions Applicable to Property Insuring Agreements:
1.

With Regard to all Property, we do not cover losses under the Property Insuring Agreements
resulting directly or indirectly from:
a.

Loss or damage more specifically covered under any other section of this policy.

b.

Moths, vermin, termites, or other insects; inherent vice; latent defect; wear, tear or gradual
deterioration; and contamination, rust, wet or dry rot, mold, dampness of atmosphere, acid rain,
smog or variations of temperature.
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2.

c.

Settling, shrinkage or expansion of building or foundation, except if damage to covered property is
caused by earth movement or flood.

d.

Loss of use, delay, loss of markets or opportunity.

e.

Breakdown or derangement of any machinery, unless an insured peril ensues, and then only for the
actual loss or damage caused by such ensuing peril.

f.

Electrical appliances, devices, fixtures or wiring caused by artificially generated electrical current,
unless fire or explosion ensues, and then only for the actual loss or damage caused by such ensuing
fire or explosion.

g.

Inventory shortage, mysterious disappearance or loss resulting from any kind of infidelity, dishonesty
by you or any of your employees, whether alone or in collusion with others.

h.

An act or omission intended or reasonably expected from the standpoint of any insured to cause
damage to covered property. This exclusion applies even if the damage to covered property is of
a different kind or degree than that intended or reasonably expected.

i.

Any fraudulent, dishonest, or criminal act by any employee or authorized representative of the
insured while acting alone or in collusion with others.

j.

Any loss to covered property, other than wind or fire damage to covered property, which has been
vacant or unoccupied for more than one hundred and twenty (120) consecutive days, including the
date of the loss. A building is considered vacant or unoccupied when it does not contain enough
property to conduct its customary business operations. However, it does not include any time when
customary activities are suspended due to circumstances that are usual to the building's occupancy.

k.

This policy does not cover any claim made under this section arising directly or indirectly from fungi,
mold, wet or dry rot and bacteria including claims for the cost to clean up, remove, remediate,
detoxify, neutralize, or in any way respond to or assess the effects of any of the foregoing. This
exclusion applies whether or not the loss event results in widespread damage or affects a
substantial area.

With Regard to Buildings and Structures, we do not cover losses under the Property Insuring
Agreements resulting directly or indirectly from:

a.

Settling, cracking, bulging, shrinking or expansion of pavements, foundations, walls, floors, ceilings
or roofs, unless one or more of the walls or roofs of the building or structure are physically broken
and falls to a lower level, except if damage is caused by a covered accident, or if damage to
covered property is caused by earth movement or flood.

b.

Extremes or changes of temperature (except to water piping or space heating equipment due to
freezing) or changes in relative humidity, regardless of whether or not atmospheric except if damage
to covered property is caused by earth movement or flood.

c.

Any increase of loss due to interference with rebuilding, repairing, or replacing a building, or with the
resumption or continuation of business.

d. Any increase of loss due to the suspension, lapse or cancellation of any lease or license, contract or
order.
e.

Loss or damage to property caused by or resulting from errors in design or testing of that property,
except resultant physical loss or damage to other property insured by this section.

f.

The repair or replacement of faulty or defective workmanship, material, or construction, except
resultant physical loss or damage to other property insured by this section.
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3. With Regard to Property in Course of Construction, we do not cover losses under the Property
Insuring Agreements resulting directly or indirectly from:
a.

The repair or replacement of faulty or defective workmanship, material, or construction, except
resultant physical loss or damage to other property insured by this section.

b.

Penalties for non-completion of or delay in completion of contract or non-compliance with contract
conditions, nor for loss of use of occupancy, however caused.

4. With Regard to Specific Property, we do not cover physical loss or physical damage to the following
property:
a.

All animals and birds, except service animals that are identified on your schedule of values. For
those identified service animals, our liability for such loss shall not exceed the amount listed in the
schedule of values or $25,000, whichever is less, for injury, sickness or death.

b.

Land and water.

c.

Aircraft.

d.

Watercraft over (fifty) (50) feet in length.

e.

Retaining walls not constituting part of a building when loss is caused by ice or water pressure.

f.

Underground mines and mining property located below the surface of the ground.

g.

Any property undergoing insulation breakdown tests.

h.

Money, notes or securities.

i.

Jewelry, furs, precious metals or precious stones.

j.

Dams, canals, ditches, retaining ponds and all liners or other membranes designed to separate,
retain, or hold water, sewage, trash, dirt, debris or any other material.

k.

Roadways, highways, streets, bridges, and guardrails, however characterized.

I.

Underground pipes.

m. Any mobile equipment, automobile, watercraft or other property while participating in any
prearranged or organized racing, speed or demolition contest or in any stunting activity or in practice
or preparation for any such contest or activity.
n.

Overhead transmission and distribution lines, including wire, cables, poles, pylons, standards,
towers or other supporting structures which may be attendant to the transmission and/or distribution
of electrical power and/or telephone communications, but this exclusion shall not apply to such
property which is located on the insured's premises or within one thousand (1,000) feet thereof.

o.

Data transmission lines and conduit not contained within walls of covered property.
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SECTION VI -GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
A. Insuring Agreements Applicable to General Liability Insurance

1.

General Liability. We agree, subject to the conditions and exclusions of this Insuring Agreement, to pay
on your behalf those sums which an insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages for personal
injury or property damage which arise out of an occurrence during the policy period. This Insuring
Agreement does not apply to Insuring Agreement 3, Sexual Molestation Liability.

2.

Law Enforcement Liability. We agree, subject to the conditions and exclusions of this Insuring
Agreement, to pay on your behalf those sums which an insured becomes obligated to pay as damages
by reason of negligent acts or wrongful acts arising out of an occurrence from the performance of your
duties while providing law enforcement services or jail operations services or the administration of first
aid resulting in personal injury or property damage during the policy period. This Insuring Agreement
does not apply to Insuring Agreement 3, Sexual Molestation Liability.

3.

Sexual Molestation Liability. {Insuring Agreement 3 provides CLAIMS MADE coverage only.) We
agree, subject to the conditions and exclusions of this Insuring Agreement, to pay on your behalf those
sums you become legally obligated to pay as damages because of any sexual molestation bodily injury
claim which is first made in writing to us by you against an insured during this policy period, or any
Extended Reporting Period we provide, arising out of any sexual molestation incident or a series of
related sexual molestation incidents. This insurance applies to bodily injury only if:

a.

The bodily injury is caused by a sexual molestation incident that takes place or a series of related
sexual molestation incidents that take place in the coverage territory as specified in the general
conditions section of this policy; and

b.

The bodily injury caused by a sexual molestation incident or a series of related sexual molestation
incidents did not occur before the retroactive date, if any, shown in the declarations pages or after the
end of this policy period; and

c. Subject to items a and b above, Insuring Agreement 3 will only apply if the first incident of sexual
molestation bodily injury to the injured person takes place on or after the retroactive date and before
the end of the policy period. Regardless of the number of incidents of sexual molestation involving an
injured person that take place over one or more policy periods while insured by us and whether such
incidents of sexual molestation are committed by the same perpetrator or two or more perpetrators
acting in concert, all such bodily injury to that injured person:
(1) All claims arising out of the same incident or a series of related incidents of sexual molestation
bodily injury will be deemed to be first made to us in writing by you when the first of such
claims is made and will be considered a single claim; and
(2) Will be subject to that policy period's per covered claim limit of Indemnification as stated in the
declarations pages and annual aggregate limit of Indemnification for sections VI, VII, VIII, XI and
XII combined as stated in the declarations pages.

B. Definitions Applicable to General Liability Insuring Agreements
1.

"Automobile" means a motorized land vehicle, principally licensed and designed for travel on public
roads.

2.

"Bodily Injury'' means physical injury to any person, including death or sexual molestation, and any
mental anguish or mental suffering associated with or arising from such physical injury.

3.

''Claim" means a suit or demand made by or for the injured person for monetary damages because of
alleged bodily injury caused by sexual molestation and applies only to Insuring Agreement 3.
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4.

"Fire Suppression Activities" means the application of water or fire suppression chemicals in the
attempt to suppress fires or dislocation of materials or destruction of property deemed necessary to
suppress fires.

5.

''Fire Suppression Chemicals" means chemicals prescribed for extinguishing or preventing fires.

6.

"Jail Operations" means activities relating to the detention of prisoners, arrestees or detainees at a
detention facility, jail, work program, or other facility however described used to hold prisoners, arrestees,
or detainees in the charge of an insured, or in the transportation of prisoners, arrestees or detainees
from one facility to another facility.

7.

"Occurrence" means an accident or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which result in
personal injury or property damage during the policy period. All personal injury to one or more
persons and/or property damage arising out of an accident or a continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions shall be deemed one occurrence.

8.

"Personal Injury" means bodily injury, mental anguish, shock, sickness, disease, disability, wrongful
eviction, malicious prosecution, humiliation, invasion of rights of privacy, libel, slander or defamation of
character, piracy and any infringement of copyright of property, erroneous service of civil papers, assault
and battery and disparagement of property. As respects Insuring Agreement 2 only, personal injury
shall also mean false arrest, false imprisonment, detention, unlawful discrimination and violation of civil
rights arising out of law enforcement activities.

9.

"Premises" means any real property or land possessed and controlled by you in your capacity as a
possessor.

10. "Wrongful Act" means the negligent performance of a legal duty or responsibility or failure to perform a
legal duty or responsibility, respectively, in a tortious manner pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act or
unlawful violations of civil rights pursuant to Federal law arising out of public office or position.

c.

Specific Conditions Applicable to General Liability Insuring Agreements:
1. Extended Reporting Periods. Insuring Agreement 3 of this section is conditioned as follows if this policy
is cancelled or not renewed for any reason, other than non-payment of member contribution or noncompliance with the terms and conditions of this policy:

2.

a.

If you are expelled from ICRMP, or have elected to withdraw from ICRMP and are in good standing
as a Member, as set forth in section Ill - General Conditions, Item 4, we will extend an Extended
Reporting Period of thirty (30) days duration following immediately upon the effective date of
expulsion, to apply to any sexual molestation bodily injury claim which is first made against you in
writing to us but only by reason of a sexual molestation bodily injury which commences and was
sustained subsequent to the retroactive date set forth in the declarations pages and prior to the
effective date of this policy's cancellation or termination, and which is otherwise afforded by Insuring
Agreement 3 of this section.

b.

If, however, this policy is immediately succeeded by similar claims-made insurance policy with any
insurer, in which the retroactive date is the same as or earlier than that shown in the declarations
pages of this policy, the succeeding policy shall be deemed to be a replacement of this policy, and
you shall have no right to secure the Extended Reporting Period coverage from us.

c.

The Extended Reporting Period does not reinstate or increase the limit(s) of indemnification applicable
to Insuring Agreement 3 of this section. Once in effect, an Extended Reporting Period cannot be
canceled.

Fire Suppression Liability. Insuring Agreement 1 of this section provides liability coverage for
damages arising out of fire suppression activities by authorized firefighting personnel, provided
however, all requirements of Insuring Agreement 1 of this section are satisfied. Coverage is limited to
$500,000 per occurrence for claims brought pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act and $500,000 per
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occurrence for all other claims brought for damages related to fire suppression activities. When used
by authorized firefighting personnel in the course of fire suppression activities, fire suppression
chemicals will not be considered a pollutant. Government imposed penalties or fines, however
characterized, assessed to suppress a fire started by your fire suppression activities or for the
improper discharge of fire suppression chemicals will not be covered under this section.
3.

Garagekeeper's Liability. Insuring Agreement 1 of this section provides liability coverage associated
with the ownership and operation of storage garages and parking lots of the named insured as bailee
with respect to an automobile left in its custody and control; provided however, all requirements of the
Insuring Agreement 1 of this section are satisfied.

4.

Hostile Fire Liability. Insuring Agreement 1 of this section provides for loss or damage arising out of
heat, smoke, or fumes resulting from a hostile fire. For purposes of this specific condition, a hostile fire
means one which becomes uncontrollable or breaks out from where it was intended to be; provided
however, all requirements of the Insuring Agreement 1 of this section are satisfied.

5.

Host/Liquor Liability. Insuring Agreement 1 of this section provides liability coverage for actions
resulting from the provision, sale or distribution of alcoholic beverages, or by reason of any local, state or
federal liquor control laws; provided however, all requirements of the Insuring Agreement 1 of this
Section are satisfied.

6.

Incidental Medical Liability. Insuring Agreements 1 and 2 of this section provide liability coverage for
professional medical services rendered in the course and scope of delivering such services or during
medically supervised training related thereto or which should have been rendered to any person or
persons (other than employees of the named insured injured during the course of their employment)
only by any of the following persons acting on behalf of the named insured:

a.

Employed or volunteer emergency medical technicians (EMTs), paramedics or first responders.

b.

Employed or volunteer, nurse practitioners, registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, or nurses
otherwise licensed and regulated under the statutes of the State of Idaho, while employed by you
and while acting within the scope of their duties and responsibilities serving inmates of a jail
operated by you.

c.

Volunteer registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, or nurses otherwise licensed and regulated
under the statutes of the State of Idaho, while volunteering for you and while acting within the scope
of their duties and responsibilities, serving as an EMT, paramedic, first responder or ambulance
personnel.

d.

Any other insured providing first aid.

7.

Multiple Insureds, Claims or Claimants. To the extent that coverage may be applicable to two or
more Insuring Agreements in this section, inclusion herein of more than one insured or the making of
more than one claim or one occurrence or the bringing of suits by more than one person or
organization shall not operate to increase our limits of indemnification as stated in the declarations
pages.

8.

Non-Stacking of Limits - Multiple Sections of this Policy or Multiple Insuring Agreements within
this section Involved in a Single Event if any occurrence, accident, claim or loss covered in whole
or in part under this section VI that also constitutes:

a.

An occurrence or accident covered in whole or in part under section VII; or

b.

A wrongful act, claim or wrongful employment practice covered in whole or in part under section
VIII, or;

c.

A claim covered in whole or in part under section XI; or
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9.

d.

A claim, accident or occurrence in whole or in part under section XII; or

e.

Any combination of two or more of the coverage events listed in subparagraphs 8 (a) (b), (c) and (d)
of this section, or any events subject to multiple insuring agreements within each section, shall be
limited to coverage limits allowed by the section of the policy with the higher limit for the per
occurrence, per accident or per claim(s) limit(s) of indemnification as shown in the declarations
pages, and its corresponding deductible shall be the sole limit applicable to the multiple occurrences,
accidents, claims or losses addressed. If the per occurrence, per accident and per claim(s) limit(s) of
indemnification as shown in the declarations pages are equal, only one limit will still apply and it will
be the limit of indemnification and its corresponding deductible, if any, applicable to the Section
deemed by us to be providing the primary coverage for the claim, accident or occurrence.

Sewer Back-up Claims. Insuring Agreement 1 of this section provides for third-party claims for
property damage arising out of occurrences involving sewer line and facilities back-up and related
events, for which the named insured is responsible by virtue of its negligence; provided however, all
requirements of Insuring Agreement 1 of this section are satisfied. Notwithstanding the general
exclusions stated elsewhere within this policy, this Insuring Agreement extends to mold and other
fungus abatement and remediation demonstrated to be a direct result of a sewer back-up related
occurrence for which you are responsible.

D. Exclusions Applicable to General Liability Insuring Agreements
1.

With Respect to Insuring Agreements 1, 2 and 3, General Liability Insurance under this
Section does not apply:
a.

To any claim, occurrence, accident or loss more specifically covered under any other section of
this policy.

b.

To personal injury or property damage resulting from an act or omission intended or expected
from the standpoint of any insured to cause personal injury or property damage. This
exclusion applies even if the personal injury or property damage is of a different kind or degree,
or is sustained by a different person or property, than that intended or expected. This exclusion
shall not apply to personal injury resulting from the use of reasonable force to protect persons or
property, or in the performance of a duty of the insured.

c.

To the ownership, maintenance or use, including loading and unloading, of watercraft over fifty
(50) feet in length.

d.

To personal injury or property damage resulting from or arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any automobile.

e.

To personal injury or property damage resulting from or arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any aircraft, airfields, runways, hangars, buildings,
or other properties in connection with aviation activities ..

f.

To property damage to property you own, rent or occupy; premises you sell, give away or have
abandoned; property loaned to you; and personal property in your care, custody and control. This
exclusion shall not apply to garagekeeper's liability, as provided in the specific conditions of this
section.

g.

To any claim arising out of estimates of probable costs, or cost estimates being exceeded, or for
faulty preparation of bid specifications or plans.

h.

To any damages claimed for any loss, cost or expense incurred by you or others for the loss of
use, withdrawal, recall, inspection, repair, replacement, adjustment, removal, or disposal of your
product, your work, or the impaired property if such product, work or property is withdrawn or
recalled from the market or from use by any person or organization because of a known or
suspected defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition.
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i.

To any obligation for which you may be held liable under any workers' compensation,
unemployment compensation, disability benefits law, employer's liability, or under any similar
federal, state or local law, ordinance, rule or regulation, however characterized, as well as any
claim or suit by a spouse, child, parent, or sibling of an insured as a consequence of personal
injury to the insured.

j.

To any claim or suit for which the only monetary damages sought are costs of suit and/or
attorney's fees.

k.

To any claim of liability arising out of or in any way connected with the operation of the principles
of eminent domain, condemnation proceedings, inverse condemnation, annexation, regulatory
takings, land use regulation, or planning and zoning activities or proceedings, however any such
matters may be characterized, whether such liability accrues directly against you or by virtue of
any agreement entered into by or on your behalf.

I.

To personal injury or medical expense caused by the following diseases: asbestosis,
mesothelioma, emphysema, pneumoconiosis, pulmonary fibrosis, pleuritis, endothelioma, or to
any lung disease or any ailment caused by, or aggravated by exposure to or inhalation,
consumption or absorption of asbestos in any form.

m. To personal injury or property damage due to, or arising out of, the actual or alleged presence
of asbestos in any form, including the costs of remedial investigations or feasibility studies, or to
the costs of testing, monitoring, abatement, mitigation, cleaning, removal, or disposal of any
property or substance; or damages arising out of any supervision, instructions, recommendations,
warnings or advice given or which should have been given in connection with aforementioned; or
obligations to share damages with or repay someone else who must pay damages in connection
with the aforementioned.
n.

To any claim relating to wrongful employment acts of the employment of any person, including
threatened, actual or alleged discrimination or harassment.

o.

To any investigatory, disciplinary or criminal proceeding against an insured, except that we may
at our own option, associate counsel in the defense of any such investigatory, administrative or
disciplinary proceeding. Should we elect to associate counsel, such election shall not constitute a
waiver or estoppal of any rights we may have pursuant to the terms, conditions, exclusions, and
limitations of this policy.

p.

To any obligation of a named insured to make payments pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-610A, which
provides for the payment of defense costs on behalf of certain employees of governmental entities
who are named as defendants in a criminal action.

q.

Except to the extent coverage 6, Incidental Medical Liability, to any liability arising out of the
rendering of or failure to rendering of or failure to render the following professional health care
services:
(1) Medical, surgical, dental, x-ray or nursing service or treatment or the furnishing of food or
beverages in connection therewith; or
(2) Any professional medical service(s) by a physician, except supervisory physicians as defined
by Idaho Code § 6-902A (2) (b ), and only when performing those duties as outlined in Idaho
Code § 6-902A (2) (a).; or
(3) Any professional medical service(s) by a physician's assistant, nurse practitioner or nurse; or
(4) Furnishing or dispensing of drugs or medical, dental or surgical supplies or appliances.
(5) However, this exclusion shall not apply to liability of an insured for incidental medical liability
coverage, as provided in the specific condition six above.
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r. Service by any person as a member of a formal accreditation or similar professional board or
committee of the insured, or as a person charged with the duty of executing directives of any
such board or committee.
s. To any claim involving miscalculation or legality of assessments, adjustments, disbursements or
the collection of taxes, fees, licenses, however described.
t. To any liability of any insured arising out of the rendering of or failure to render services as an
officer or director, or other official of any organization, other than the named insured. This
exclusion does not apply if the insured is serving at the direction of or on behalf of the named
insured, and is acting within the scope of their duties as such.

2.

With Respect to Insuring Agreement 3, Sexual Molestation Liability Insurance under this
Section does not apply to:
a. Any sexual molestation bodily injury claim:
(1.) Based upon, or arising out of, sexual molestation bodily injury which is the subject of any notice
given under any policy or policies the term of which has or have expired prior to the inception date
of this policy.
(2.) Arising out of any sexual molestation bodily injury that takes place prior to the retroactive date of
this policy.
(3.) Caused by any insured who is found by a court of law to have committed a criminal act
involving sexual molestation. However, we will pay covered damages the named insured
becomes legally obligated to pay as a result of an employee's actions if such obligation is
created pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act, another state's similar law or federal law.
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SECTION VII - AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE
A. Automobile Liabi/i'ty Insuring Agreements:
1.

Automobile Liability. We agree, subject to the conditions and exclusions of this section, to pay on your
behalf those sums which an insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily
injury or property damage caused by an accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use,
loading or unloading, of an insured automobile.

2.

Automobile Medical Payments. We agree, subject to the conditions and exclusions of this section, to
pay medical expenses incurred within the policy period and within ten (10) days of an automobile
accident as shall be necessary on account of bodily injury caused by an accident in a vehicle owned or
rented to an insured. Any such medical expenses must be reported within one hundred and eighty (180)
days of the occurrence.

3.

Uninsured or Underinsured Motorists.

a.

We agree, subject to the conditions and exclusions of this section, to pay damages for bodily injury
which an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured
automobile or underinsured automobile. The bodily injury must be caused by accident and arise
out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured automobile or underinsured
automobile. This policy will pay under this Insuring Agreement only after the limits of liability under
any applicable bodily injury liability policies or bonds have been exhausted in payments, settlements,
or judgments and after all worker's compensation benefits an employee may be entitled to have been
paid.

b.

The limits of indemnification shall be reduced by:
(1) All sums paid because of bodily injury by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be
legally responsible for causing the bodily injury and
(2) All sums paid by worker's compensation benefits or similar disability law.

B. Definitions Applicable to Automobile Liability Insurance Agreements:
1.

"Automobile" means a motorized land vehicle, principally licensed and designed for travel on public roads
and does not include mobile equipment

2.

"Bodily Injury" means physical injury, sickness or disease, including mental anguish or death resulting
therefrom.

3.

"Insured" means anyone operating or occupying an insured automobile with the permission of the
insured.

4.

"Insured Automobile" means an automobile owned by the named insured or a non-owned automobile
while operated by an insured in the course and scope of their duties or such use that is otherwise
authorized by the named insured.

5.

"Mobile Equipment" means equipment that is on wheels or tracks and is not principally licensed and
designed for travel on public roads and is self-propelled or specifically designed to be attached to or pulled
by a vehicle, such as a trailer or semi-trailer and does not include automobiles.

6.

"Occupying" with regard to Insuring Agreements 2 and 3 of this section means an individual who, at the
time of the accident is in physical contact with an insured automobile.
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7.

"Proof of Loss" means any written demand to recover damages for bodily injury pursuant to Insuring
Agreements 2 and 3 of this section.

8.

"Underinsured Automobile" means an automobile for which the sum of liability limits of all applicable
liability bonds or policies at the time of an accident is less than the limits of indemnification applicable to
Insuring Agreement 3 of this section.

9.

"Uninsured Automobile" means an automobile:
a.

To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy does not apply at the time of the accident.

b.

For which an insuring or bonding company denies coverage or has become insolvent.

c.

Which is a hit-and-run automobile and neither the driver nor the owner can be identified. The hitand-run automobile must come in contact with an insured automobile.

C. Specific Conditions Applicable to Automobile Liability Insurance Agreements:
1.

With respect to Insuring Agreements 1, 2 and 3, Auto Liability Insurance under this Section has
the following conditions:
a. Automobiles Owned by Employees or Authorized Volunteers. An automobile owned by an
employee or authorized volunteer of the named insured is provided auto liability coverage by this
section while the automobile is being used by an employee or authorized volunteer on official
business of the named insured. This policy shall be deemed secondary to the policy of the
employee's or authorized volunteer's personal insurance, which is deemed to be primary insurance.
The intent of this special condition shall not be interpreted to extend this policy to an automobile
owned by other public or private entities, which are made available to the named insured or its
employees. For these non-owned automobiles, the terms and conditions already contained in this
policy shall apply This specific condition does not apply to volunteers engaged in search and rescue
activities as coverage is intended to be primary insurance for search and rescue volunteers only when
actively participating in search and rescue mobilizations initiated by the named insured.
b. Limits of Indemnification. We will not pay more than the applicable limits of indemnification shown
in the declarations pages for the damages that result from any one accident.
c. Non-Duplication of Benefits. There will be no duplication of payments under this section for Insuring
Agreements 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of this policy. Any amounts payable under these respective
insuring agreements will be reduced by the amount of any advance payments.

d. Non-Stacking of Limits - Multiple Sections of this Policy or Multiple Insuring Agreements within
this Section Involved in a Single Event. If any occurrence, accident or loss covered in whole or in
part under this section VI I that also constitutes:
(1) An occurrence or accident covered in whole or in part under section VI; or
(2) A wrongful act, claim or wrongful employment practice covered in whole or in part under
section VIII; or
(3) A claim covered in whole or in part under section XI; or
(4) A claim, accident or occurrence covered in whole or in part under section XI I; or
(5)Any combination of two or more of the coverage events listed in subparagraphs d. (1 ), (2), (3), and
(4) of this section, or any events subject to multiple insuring agreements within each section, shall
be limited to coverage limits allowed by the section of this policy with the higher limit for the per
occurrence, per accident or per claim(s) limit(s) of Indemnification as shown in the declarations
pages, and its corresponding deductible, shall be the sole limit applicable to the multiple
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occurrences, accidents, claims or losses addressed. If the per occurrence, per accident and per
claim(s) limit(s) of indemnification as shown in the declarations pages are equal, only one limit will
still apply and it will be the limit of indemnification and its corresponding deductible, if any,
applicable to the section deemed by us to be providing the primary coverage for the claim,
accident or occurrence.
2. With Respect to Insuring Agreement 2, Automobile Medical Payments Insurance under this
Section has the following conditions:
a.

Examinations/Medical Reports. The injured person may be required to take physical examinations
by physicians we choose, as often as we reasonably require. We must be given authorization to
obtain medical reports and other records pertinent to any such claim.

b.

Proof of Loss. As soon as possible, any person making a claim under this Insuring Agreement must
give us written proof of loss as described in paragraph 3 (f.) below. It must include all details we
may need to determine the amounts payable.

With Respect to Insuring Agreement 3, Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Insurance under this
Section has the following conditions:

3.

a.

Arbitration. If we and any person entitled to recover under Insuring Agreement 3 fail to agree on the
amount of damages thereof, the amount shall be settled by arbitration. In that event, each party will
select an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will then select a third arbitrator. If they cannot agree upon a
third arbitrator within thirty (30) days, both parties can ask a district judge in the State of Idaho to
select the third arbitrator. Each party will pay the expenses it incurs, and bear the expenses of the
third arbitrator equally. Written decisions of any two arbitrators will determine the issues and will be
binding. The arbitration will take place pursuant to the Uniform Arbitration Act, Idaho Code Title 7,
Chapter 9, unless both parties agree otherwise. Attorney's fees and fees paid to medical and other
expert witnesses as part of the arbitration proceeding will not be considered arbitration expenses.
These costs and expenses will be paid by the party incurring them.

b.

Hit-and-Run Accident. At our request, you shall make available for inspection any automobile
which any insured was occupying at the time of a hit-and-run accident. You must also notify a law
enforcement agency within twenty-four (24) hours of any hit-and-run accident. You must also notify
us of any such hit-and-run accident within seven (7) days of any such accident. Failure to provide
such notice shall be deemed a material and prejudicial breach of this Insuring Agreement 3, and
render any insurance provided null and void.

c.

Prejudgment or Pre-Arbitration Award Interest. Prejudgment or pre-arbitration award interest
shall not begin to accrue until the date that the proof of loss is received by us.

d.

Medical Examinations. The injured person may be required to take, at our expense, physical
examinations by physicians we choose, as often as we reasonably require.

e.

Non-Binding Judgment. No judgment resulting from a suit brought without our written consent, or
which we are not a party to, is binding on us, either for determining the liability of the uninsured or
underinsured automobile or owner, or the amount of damages sustained.

f.

Proof of Loss. A proof of loss must be served upon us as soon as practicable following any such
accident causing the injury in order to determine the amounts payable. Failure to provide such
notice shall be deemed a material and prejudicial breach of this Insuring Agreement, and render any
insurance provided null and void.
Each proof of loss presented shall accurately describe the
conduct and circumstances which brought about the injury, state the time and place the injury
occurred, state the names of all persons involved, and shall contain the amount of damages claimed,
together with any and all records that exist pertaining to said injury. Said records shall consist of 1)
all police reports pertaining to the accident and 2) complete medical and billing records from all
institutions (hospitals, rehabilitation facilities, and nursing homes) and physician offices. A signed
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medical records release form must be provided with the proof of loss giving us authorization to
obtain additional medical reports and other records pertinent to any such loss.

D. Exclusions Applicable to Automobile Liability Insurance Agreements:
1. With respect to Insuring Agreements 1, 2 and 3, Auto Liability Insurance under this Section does
not apply:

2.

a.

To any claim or loss more specifically covered under any other section of this policy.

b.

To any claim of bodily injury sustained by any person, including an insured, engaged in the
maintenance or repair of an insured automobile.

c.

To any claim that directly or indirectly benefits any worker's compensation or disability benefits
insurer.

d.

To any claim arising out of the operation of mobile equipment.

e.

For any automobiles or mobile equipment owned or leased by a named insured when the
automobile or mobile equipment is being rented or leased to a third party for compensation.

f.

To any person or organization, or to any agent or employee thereof, operating an automobile sales
agency, repair shop, service station, storage garage or public parking place, with respect to any
accident arising out of the operation thereof.

g.

To any employee with respect to injury to or sickness, disease or death of another employee of the
same employer injured in the course of such employment in an accident arising out of the
maintenance or use of the automobile in the business of such employer.

h.

With respect to any hired automobile, to the owner or a lessee thereof, other than the named
insured, nor to any agent or employee or such owner or lessee.

With Respect to Insuring Agreement 1, Auto Liability Insurance under this Section does not apply:

a.

To bodily injury or property damage resulting from an act or omission intended or reasonably
expected from the standpoint of any insured to cause bodily injury or property damage. This
exclusion applies even if the bodily injury or property damage is of a different kind or degree, or is
sustained by a different person or property, than that intended or reasonably expected. This exclusion
shall not apply to bodily injury and property damage resulting from the use of reasonable force to
protect persons or property, or in the performance of your duties.

b.

To property damage to property rented to, used by, or in the care, custody or control of any insured.

c.

To bodily injury to any insured arising out of or in the course of employment.

d.

To any liability for indemnity or contribution brought by any party for bodily injury or property
damage sustained by any insured.

3. With Respect to Insuring Agreement 2, Automobile Medical Payments under this Section does not
apply:

a.

To any bodily injury arising out of or resulting from the use of an automobile not insured by us.

b.

To any bodily injury arising out of or resulting from the operation of an insured automobile while
being used for hire or for a fee with authorization for such use.
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4.

c.

For bodily injury to anyone eligible to receive benefits which are either provided, or are required to be
provided, under any worker's compensation, occupational disease, or similar disability law.

d.

To prisoners, inmates, or any other category of persons being detained by an insured while being
transported by you.

With Respect to Insuring Agreement 3, Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Insurance under this
Section does not apply:
a.

To any insured who enters into a settlement with a third party without our written consent.

b.

To any bodily injury resulting from or arising out of the use of an automobile owned by you and not
insured by us.
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SECTION VIII - ERRORS AND OMISSIONS INSURANCE
ALL INSURING AGREEMENTS ARE CLAIMS MADE ONLY
A.

B.

Errors and Omissions Insuring Agreements:
1.

Errors and Omissions Liability. We agree, subject to the conditions and exclusions of this
Insuring Agreement, to pay on your behalf those sums which you become legally obligated to pay
as damages because of a claim against an insured which is first made in writing to us by you
during this policy period, or any extended reporting period we provide, arising out of any wrongful
act by an insured.

2.

Employee Benefit Liability. We agree, subject to conditions and exclusions of this Insuring
Agreement, to pay on your behalf those sums which you become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of a claim against an insured which is first made in writing to us by you during
this Policy Period, or any extended reporting period we provide, resulting from wrongful acts in the
administration of the named insured's employee benefit program;

3.

Employment Practices Liability. We agree, subject to the conditions and exclusions of this
Insuring Agreement, to pay on your behalf those sums which you become legally obligated to pay
as damages for a claim by or on behalf of a volunteer, employee, former employee, or applicant for
employment which is first made against an insured in writing to us by you during this policy period
or any extended reporting period we provide, arising out of any wrongful employment practice by
an insured.

Definitions Applicable to Errors and Omissions Insuring Agreements:
1.

"Administration" means:
a.

Providing information to employees, including their dependents and beneficiaries, with respect
to eligibility for any employee benefit program;

b.

Handling of records in connection with the employee benefit program; or

c.

Affecting, continuing or terminating any employee participation in any employee benefit
program.

d.

Administration does not mean your decision to not offer a particular benefit, plan or program
unless that particular benefit is required by law.

2.

"Bodily Injury" means physical injury to any person, including death and any mental anguish or
mental suffering associated with or arising from such physical injury. Bodily Injury does not include
sexual molestation.

3.

"Claim" means:
a. For Insuring Agreements 1 and 2, a demand received by you for money damages alleging a
wrongful act of a tortious nature by any insured. No claim exists where the only monetary
damages sought or demanded are costs of suit and/or attorney's fees.
b. For Insuring Agreement 3, a demand received by you for money damages alleging a wrongful
employment practice of a tortious nature by any insured. No claim exists where the only
monetary damages sought or demanded are costs of suit and/or attorney's fees. A claim shall
include complaints filed with the Idaho Human Rights Commission (IHRC) and the Equal
Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC). A claim also includes employment contract
claims premised upon implied employment contracts.

4.

"Discrimination" means any actual or alleged:
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a. Violation of any employment discrimination law; or
b. Disparate treatment of, or the failure or refusal to hire a person because he or she is or claims to
be a member of a class which is or is alleged to be legally protected.
5.

"Employee Benefit Program" means group life insurance, group accident or health insurance, or
group dental, vision and hearing plans, retirement, profit sharing, unemployment insurance, or any
other benefit provided that no one other than your employee may subscribe to such insurance or
plans and such benefits are made generally available to those employees who satisfy the plan's
eligibility requirements.

6.

"Employment Sexual Harassment" means any actual or alleged unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors or any other conduct of a sexual nature which:

a. Is made as a term or condition of a person's employment or advancement; or
b. The submission to or rejection of is used as a basis for decisions affecting that person or the
purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.
7.

"Employment Harassment " means any actual or alleged harassment, other than Employment
Sexual Harassment, which creates a work environment that interferes with job performance, or
creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.

8.

"Insured" means:

a. The Named Insured,
b. Any current or former elected or appointed official serving as a volunteer or employee of the
named insured, as well as any volunteer or employee of the named insured while acting within
the scope of their duties as such. This does not include any appointed or elected official or
employee who is serving the named insured as an independent contractor.
c. City or county prosecutors or appointed city attorneys while serving as independent contractors in
the course and scope of their statutory roles.
9.

"Personal Injury" means bodily injury, mental anguish, shock, sickness, disease, disability,
wrongful eviction, malicious prosecution, humiliation, invasion of rights of privacy, libel, slander or
defamation of character, piracy and any infringement of copyright of property, erroneous service of
civil papers, assault and battery and disparagement of property.

10. "Retaliation" means any actual or alleged wrongful termination or other adverse employment action
by any insured against a person or persons on account of:
a.

Assistance, testimony or cooperation with a proceeding or investigation regarding alleged
violations of law.

b.

Exercise or attempted exercise of rights protected by law;

c.

Disclosure or threat to disclose to a superior or to any governmental agency alleged violations of
the law; or

d.

Refusal to violate any law;

11. "Wrongful Act" means the actual or alleged negligent performance of a legal duty or responsibility
or failure to perform a legal duty or responsibility, or any error, misstatement, act or omission
respectively by you, in a tortious manner pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act or unlawful violations
of civil rights pursuant to Federal law arising out of public office or position. Wrongful Act is not a
Wrongful Employment Practice.
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12. "Wrongful Employment Practice" means any actual or alleged employment-related act or
omission in the form of one or more of the following and does not mean Wrongful Act

a. Discrimination;
b.

Employment-related libel, slander, defamation;

c. Employment sexual harassment or employment harassment,
d.

Negligent hiring, supervision, training or retention.

e. Retaliation;

C.

f.

Violation of the Family Medical Leave Act;

g.

Wrongful discipline, deprivation of career opportunity; or evaluation;

h.

Wrongful termination;

Specific Conditions Applicable to Errors and Omissions Insuring Agreements:
1.

Retroactive Date. All wrongful acts or wrongful employment practices must take place after the
applicable retroactive date, if any, shown in the declaration pages of this policy and on or before the
expiration of this policy period. A claim must also be first made to us in writing by you if it is made
during any Extended Reporting Period we may provide pursuant to the specific conditions outlined in
this section.

2.

Extended Reporting Periods. All Insuring Agreements within this section are conditioned as follows
if this policy is cancelled or not renewed for any reason, other than for non-payment of member
contribution or non-compliance with the terms and conditions of this policy:

a. If you are expelled from ICRMP, or have elected to withdraw from ICRMP and are in good
standing as a Member, as set forth in section Ill - General Conditions, Item 4, we will extend an
Extended Reporting Period of thirty (30) days duration following immediately upon the effective
date of expulsion, to apply to a claim brought forth under this section which is first made against
you in writing to us but only by reason of a wrongful act or a wrongful employment practice
which commences and was sustained subsequent on or after the retroactive date set forth in the
declarations pages and prior to the effective date of this policy's cancellation or termination, and
which is otherwise afforded by all Insuring Agreements of this section.
b. If, however, this policy is immediately succeeded by a similar claims-made insurance policy with
any insurer, in which the retroactive date is the same as or earlier than that shown in the
declarations pages of this policy, the succeeding policy shall be deemed to be a replacement of
this policy, and you shall have no right to secure the Extended Reporting Period coverage from
us.
c.

3.

The Extended Reporting Period does not reinstate or increase the limit(s) of indemnification applicable
to any Insuring Agreements of this section. Once in effect, an Extended Reporting Period cannot be
canceled.

Multiple Insureds, Claims or Claimants. To the extent that coverage may be applicable to two or
more Insuring Agreements in this section, inclusion herein of more than one insured or the making of
more than one claim or the bringing of suits by more than one person or organization shall not
operate to increase our limits of indemnification as stated in the declarations pages.

a. Two or more claims arising out of a single wrongful act or wrongful employment practice or
series of related wrongful acts or wrongful employment practices shall be treated as a single
claim.
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b. All such claims, whenever made, shall be considered first made in writing by you to us during
the policy period, or any Extended Reporting Period, in which the earliest claim arising out of
such wrongful act or wrongful employment practice or related wrongful acts or wrongful
employment practices was first made and all such claims shall be subject to the same limits of
indemnification.

4.

D.

Non-Stacking Of Limits - Multiple Sections of this Policy or Multiple Insuring Agreements
within this Section Involved in a Single Event. If any wrongful act, wrongful employment
practice, claim or loss covered in whole or in part under this section VIII, that also constitutes:

a.

An occurrence or accident covered in whole or in part under section VI; or

b.

An occurrence or accident covered in whole or in part under section VII; or

c.

A claim covered in whole or in part under section XI; or

d.

A claim, occurrence or accident covered in whole or in part under section XII; or

e.

Any combination of two or more of the coverage events listed in subparagraphs 4. (a.), (b.), (c.)
and (d.) of this section, or any events subject to multiple insuring agreements within each section,
shall be limited to coverage limits allowed by the section of this policy with the higher limit for the
per occurrence, per accident or per claim(s) limit(s) of indemnification as shown in the
declarations pages, and its corresponding deductible, shall be the sole limit applicable to the
multiple occurrences, accidents, claims or losses addressed. If the per occurrence, per accident
and per claim(s) limit(s) of indemnification as shown in the declarations pages are equal, only one
limit will still apply and it will be the limit of indemnification and its corresponding deductible, if
any, applicable to the section deemed by us to be providing the primary policy for the claim,
accident or occurrence.

Exclusions Applicable to Errors and Omissions Insuring Agreements:
1.

The Errors and Omissions Insuring Agreements 1, 2 and 3 do not cover any claim:

a. More specifically covered under any other section of this policy.
b. Arising out of any dishonest, fraudulent, or criminal wrongful acts or wrongful employment
practice committed by any insured or at the direction of any insured.
c. Based upon or attributable to the rendering or failure to render any opinion, treatment, consultation
or service, if such opinion, treatment, consultation or service was rendered or failed to have been
rendered while any insured was engaged in any activity for which they received compensation
from any source other than as a public entity or an employee of a public entity.
d. Arising out of the failure to supply water, electrical power, fuel, or any other utilities.
e. For which you are entitled to indemnity and/or payment by reason of having given notice of any
circumstances which might give rise to a claim under any policy or policies, the term of which has
commenced prior to the inception date of this policy, or from a wrongful act or wrongful
employment practice which occurred prior to the applicable retroactive date set forth in the
declarations pages of this policy.
f. Resulting from a continuing wrongful act or wrongful employment practice which commences
prior to the applicable retroactive date set forth in the declarations pages of this policy.
g. Arising out of law enforcement activities or the performance of law enforcement duties.
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h. Obligating a named insured to make payments pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-610A, which provides
for the payment of defense costs on behalf of certain employees of governmental entities who are
named as defendants in a criminal proceeding.
i. Of liability arising out of or in any way connected with the operation of the principles of eminent
domain, condemnation proceedings, inverse condemnation, annexation, regulatory taking, land
use regulation or planning and zoning activities or proceedings, however characterized, whether
such liability accrues directly against you or by virtue of any agreement entered into by or on your
behalf.
j. For back wages or legal penalties to which an employee is lawfully entitled for work performed,
including any claim for wages, damages, liquidated damages or any other form of compensation,
however characterized, pursuant to, or derived in any way, from an employer's responsibility to
comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act or other state or federal statute directing the manner or
amount of payment of compensation to employees.
k. Involving miscalculation or legality of assessments, adjustments, disbursements, fees, licenses or
the collection of taxes, fines, penalties, including those imposed under the Internal Revenue Code
or any state or local law, however described.
I.

For any claim where the alleged harm for which compensation is sought derives from
performance or nonperformance of terms of a contract, concerns the measure of performance or
payment related to contract performance, derives from fines, penalties or administrative sanctions
imposed by a governmental agency, or is generated by intergovernmental determination,
calculation, handling or allocation of funds according to the law. The claims for which this section
provides defense and indemnification must arise out of conduct of a tortious nature or be premised
upon allegations of unlawful violation of civil rights pursuant to state or federal law.

m. Arising directly or indirectly out of the failure of any investment in or by any employee benefit
program including but not limited to stocks, bonds, or mutual funds to perform as represented by
an insured or by any party authorized by an insured to offer benefits to employees.
n. Arising directly or indirectly out of insolvency, poor performance, misrepresentation, or any other
wrongful conduct of any employee benefit program provider.
2.

The Errors and Omissions Insuring Agreements 1 and 2 do not cover any claim:
a. Arising directly or indirectly out of the negligence, financial failure or breach of contract by any
health or employee benefit provider that the named insured contracts with to provide employee
benefits.
b. Arising out of any intentional or deliberate wrongful acts committed by an insured or at an
insured's direction.
c. To any employee benefit liability claim based upon an insured's failure to comply with any law
concerning worker's compensation, unemployment insurance, social security, or disability benefits.
d. To loss arising out of an insufficiency of funds to meet any obligations under any plan included in
the employee benefit program.
e. To any employee benefit liability claim for benefits to the extent that such benefits are available,
with reasonable effort and cooperation of the Insured, from the applicable funds accrued or other
collectible insurance.
f. For bodily injury, personal injury, or property damage.

Effective October 1, 2014

35

ICRMP34A2015

117 of 272

g. Resulting from a wrongful act intended, expected or deliberated on from the standpoint of any
insured to cause injury or damage. - This exclusion applies even if the injury or damage claimed is
of a different kind or degree than that intended, expected, or deliberated on.
h. Arising out of estimates of probable costs, or cost estimates being exceeded, or for faulty
preparation of bid specifications or plans.
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SECTION IX - CRIME INSURANCE
A.

Insuring Agreements Applicable to Crime Insurance:
1.

Employee Dishonesty or Fraud. We agree, subject to the conditions and exclusions of this Insuring
Agreement, to pay the named insured, or on its behalf, for loss of money, securities, and other
financial instruments sustained by the named insured resulting directly from one or more dishonest
or fraudulent acts committed by an employee of the named insured, acting alone or in collusion
with others.

2.

Loss Inside the Premises. We agree, subject to the conditions and exclusions of this Insuring
Agreement, to pay the named insured, or on its behalf, for loss of the money and securities of the
named insured by the actual destruction, disappearance, or wrongful taking within the premises.

3. Loss Outside the Premises. We agree, subject to the conditions and exclusions of this Insuring
Agreement, to pay the named insured, or on its behalf, for loss of the money and securities of the
named insured by the actual destruction, disappearance, or wrongful taking thereof, outside the
premises while being conveyed by a messenger or any armored motor vehicle company.

B.

Definitions Applicable to Crime Insuring Agreements:
1. "Dishonest or Fraudulent Acts" means acts committed by an employee of the named insured
which
a. cause the named insured to sustain such loss; or
b. results in financial benefit to the employee or another person or organization intended by the
employee to receive such benefit not otherwise entitled to.
2. "Employee" shall be as defined by the Idaho Tort Claims Act (Idaho Code, chapter 9, title 6).
3. "Messenger" means any employee who is duly authorized by the named insured to have the care
and custody of the insured property outside the premises.
4. "Premises" means the interior of that portion of any building which is occupied by the named
insured in conducting its business.
5. "Wrongful Taking" means an unauthorized conversion or theft of money, securities, money orders,
counterfeit currency, depositor's forgery or other financial instruments, whether or not proven in a
court of law.

C.

Specific Conditions Applicable to Crime Insuring Agreements:
1. All Incidents - One Loss. All losses incidental to an actual or attempted fraudulent, dishonest, or
criminal act, or series of related acts, whether committed by one or more persons, shall be deemed
one loss. The applicable limits of indemnification stated in the declarations pages are the total limit
of our liability with respect to all losses arising out of any one occurrence.
2. Policy in Lieu of Public Officials Surety Bond. Insurance under this section shall be deemed to
provide insurance compliant with provisions of Idaho Code §59-804 for the terms and responsibilities
of public officials or employees to the extent required by the Idaho Code bonding requirements for
public officials.
3. Limits of Indemnification for Multiple Policy Periods. Our total liability is limited to the total
amount specified in the declarations pages of this policy for all losses caused by any employee or in
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which such employee is concerned or implicated. Regardless of the number of years this policy shall
continue in force and the number of member contributions which shall be payable or paid, the limits of
indemnification specified in the declarations pages shall not be cumulative from year to year or period
to period. The maximum total loss paid to any named insured shall not exceed the limits of
indemnification stated in the policy year during which a claim is made.
4. Loss Caused by Unidentified Employees. If a loss is alleged to have been caused by the fraud or
dishonesty of any one or more employees, and the named insured shall be unable to designate the
specific employee or employees causing such loss, the named insured shall nevertheless have the
benefit of Insuring Agreement 1, provided that the evidence submitted reasonably proves that the loss
was in fact due to the fraud or dishonesty of one or more employees of the named insured.
5. Ownership Interest. Money, securities, and other financial instruments may be covered by this
policy whether owned by the named insured or held by the named insured in its care, custody, or
control.
6. Recoveries. To the extent that a loss of the named insured exceeds the limits of indemnification
applicable to this section, the named insured shall be entitled to recoveries from third parties until
the named insured is fully reimbursed. Any remaining recovery shall be paid to us. Audit fees
incurred by us toward establishing your loss values will be deducted from the ultimate net loss.

D.

Exclusions Applicable to Crime Insuring Agreements:
1. The Crime Insuring Agreements 1, 2 and 3 do not cover:
a. Any claim or loss more specifically covered under any other section of this policy.
b. Any claim for the potential income or increase including, but not limited to, interest and dividends,
not realized by the named insured because of a loss covered under this section.
c. Any claim for costs, fees, or other expenses incurred by the named insured in establishing the
existence of, or amount of loss, covered under this section.
d. Any claim for the funds collected or retained for any state or Federal agency pursuant to
requirements established by law or pursuant to a mutual agreement.
e. Any loss claimed involving conduct more than two (2) years prior to the date of the claim.

2.

The Crime Insuring Agreement 1 does not cover:

a. Any loss, the proof of which, either as to its factual existence or as to its amount, is dependent
upon an inventory computation or a profit and loss computation.
b. Any claim of loss concerning any fiscal year wherein financial records of the political subdivision
have not been timely audited by a certified public accountant in accordance with the requirements
of Idaho Code §67-450B or §67-450C, as appropriate.

3. The Crime Insuring Agreement 2 does not cover:
a. Any claim or loss due to any fraudulent, dishonest, or criminal act by any employee, director,
trustee, or authorized representative of the named insured, while working or otherwise, and
whether acting alone or in collusion with others.
b. Any claim or loss due to:
(1) The giving or surrendering of money or securities in any exchange or purchase; or
(2) Accounting or arithmetical errors or omissions; or
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(3) Manuscripts, books of account, or records; or
(4) Presentation or acceptance of any check returned for insufficient funds.
c. Any claim or loss of money contained in coin operated amusement devices or vending machines,
unless the amount of money deposited within the device or machine is recorded by a continuous
recording instrument therein.

4. The Crime Insuring Agreement 3 does not cover:
a. Any claim or loss due to any fraudulent, dishonest, or criminal act by any employee, director,
trustee, or authorized representative of the named insured, while working or otherwise, and
whether acting alone or in collusion with others.
b. Any claim or loss due to:
(1) The giving or surrendering of money or securities in any exchange or purchase;
(2) Accounting or arithmetical errors or omissions; or
(3) Manuscripts, books of account, or records.
c. Any insured claim or loss of money, securities, and other financial instruments of the named
insured while in the custody of any armored motor vehicle company, except as excess policy over
amounts recovered or received by the named insured under:
(1) The contract of the named insured with said armored motor vehicle company;
(2) Insurance carried by said armored motor vehicle company for the benefit of users of its
services; and
(3) All other insurance and indemnity in force in whatsoever form carried by or for the benefit of
users of said armored motor vehicle company's service.
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SECTION X - MACHINERY BREAKDOWN INSURANCE
A.

Insuring Agreements Applicable to Machinery Breakdown Insurance:
1.

Property Damage. We agree subject to the conditions and exclusions of this Insuring Agreement to
pay for direct damage to covered property caused by a covered cause of loss related to breakdown
of machinery as listed in the schedule of values kept on file with us.

2.

Expediting Expenses. With respect to direct damage to covered property we agree subject to the
conditions and exclusions of this Insuring Agreement to pay for the extra cost you necessarily incur to
make temporary repairs and expedite the permanent repairs or replacement of the damaged property.

3.

Business Income and Extra Expense. We agree subject to the conditions and exclusions of this
Insuring Agreement to pay your actual loss of business income during the period of restoration and
extra expense you necessarily incur to operate your entity during the period of restoration. We will
consider the operations of your entity before the breakdown and the probable experience you would
have had without the breakdown in determining the amount of our payment.

4.

Spoilage Damage. We agree subject to the conditions and exclusions of this Insuring Agreement to
pay for the spoilage damage to raw materials, property in process or finished products, provided
conditions are met that are outlined further in this section. We will also pay any necessary expenses
you incur to reduce the amount of loss under this Insuring Agreement. We will pay such expenses to
the extent that they do not exceed the amount of loss that otherwise would have been payable under
this form.

5.

Utility Interruption. We agree subject to the conditions and exclusions of this Insuring Agreement to
pay for losses resulting from the interruption of utility services provided conditions are met that are
outlined further in this section.

6.

Newly Acquired Premises. We agree subject to the conditions and exclusions of this Insuring
Agreement to provide insurance at newly acquired premises you have purchased or leased. This
insurance begins at the time you acquire the property and continues for a period not exceeding ninety
(90) days under conditions set forth below.

7.

Ordinance or Law. We agree subject to the conditions and exclusions of this Insuring Agreement to
pay for increases in loss as necessitated by the enforcement of any laws or ordinances that are in
force at the time of the breakdown, which regulate the demolition, construction, repair or use of the
building or structure.

8.

Errors and Omissions. We agree subject to the conditions and exclusions of this Insuring
Agreement to pay for any loss or damage, which is not otherwise payable under this Insuring
Agreement solely because of any error or unintentional omission in the description or location of
property as insured under this Insuring Agreement or in any subsequent amendments, any failure
through error to include any premises owned or occupied by you at the inception date of this Insuring
Agreement; or any error or unintentional omission by you that results in cancellation of any premises
insured under this policy.

B. Definitions Applicable to Machinery Breakdown Insuring Agreements:
1.

"Breakdown":

a.

Means the direct physical loss that causes damage to covered equipment and necessitates its
repair or replacement, unless such loss or damage is otherwise excluded within this section:
(1) Mechanical breakdown, including rupture or bursting caused by centrifugal force;
(2)Artificially generated electrical current, including electrical arcing, that disturbs electrical
devices, appliances or wires.
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(3) Explosion of steam boilers, steam piping, steam engines or steam turbines owned or leased
by you, or operated under your control;
(4)Loss or damage to steam boilers, steam pipes, steam engines or steam turbines caused by or
resulting from any condition or event inside such equipment; or
(5) Loss or damage to hot water boilers or other water heating equipment caused by or resulting
from any condition or event inside such boilers or equipment.
b.

Does not mean or include:
(1) Malfunction including but not limited to adjustment, alignment, calibration, cleaning or
modification;
(2) Defects, erasures, errors, limitations or viruses in computer equipment and programs including
the inability to recognize and process any date or time or provide instructions to covered
equipment,
(3) Leakage at any valve, fitting, shaft seal, gland packing, joint or connection;
(4) Damage to any vacuum tube, gas tube, or brush;
(5) Damage to any structure or foundation supporting the covered equipment or any of its parts;
(6) The functioning of any safety or protective device; or
(7) The cracking of any part on an internal combustion gas turbine exposed to the products of
combustion.

2.

"Business Income" means the:
a.

Net income (net profit or loss before income taxes) that would have been earned or incurred; and

b.

Continuing normal operating expenses incurred, including payroll.

3.

"Business Income Actual Annual Value" means the sum of the net income and continuing normal
operating expenses incurred, including payroll that would have been earned had the breakdown not
occurred.

4.

"Computer Equipment" means:
a.

Your programmable electronic equipment that is used to store, retrieve and process data; and

b.

Associated peripheral equipment that provides communication including input and output functions
such as printing or auxiliary functions such as data transmission.

c.

It does not include data or media.

6.

"Covered Cause of Loss" means a breakdown to covered equipment.

7.

"Covered Equipment":
a.

Means and includes any property built to operate under vacuum or pressure, other than weight of
contents or used for the generation, transmission or utilization of energy.

b.

Does not mean or include any:
(1) Media;
(2) Structure, foundation, cabinet or compartment;
(3) Insulating or refractory material;
(4) Equipment manufactured by you for sale;
(5) Catalyst;
(6) Sewer piping, underground vessels or piping, any piping forming a part of a sprinkler system
or any water piping other than:
(a) Boiler feed water piping
(b) Boiler condensate return piping, or
(c) Water piping forming a part of a refrigerating or air conditions system;
(7) Vehicle, aircraft, floating vessel including or any equipment mounted on such vehicle, aircraft
or floating vessel; or
(8) Dragline, excavation, or construction equipment
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8.

9.

"Covered Property" means any property that:

a.

You own; or

b.

Is in your care, custody or control and for which you are legally liable.

"Data" means:

a.

Programmed and recorded material stored on media; and

b.

Programming records used for electronic data processing, or electronically controlled equipment.

10. "Extra Expense" means the additional cost you incur to operate your business during the period of
restoration over and above the cost that you normally would have incurred to operate the business
during the same period had no breakdown occurred.
11. "Hazardous Substance" means any substance other than ammonia that has been declared to be
hazardous to health by a government agency.
12. "Media" means electronic data processing or storage media such as films, tapes, discs, drums or cells.
13. "One Breakdown" means if an initial breakdown causes other breakdowns, all will be considered
one breakdown. All breakdowns at any one premises that manifest themselves at the same time and
are the direct result of the same cause will be considered one breakdown.
14. "Period of Restoration" means the period of time that:
a.

Begins at the time of the breakdown or 24 hours before we receive notice of breakdown
whichever is later; and

b.

Ends (5) five consecutive days after the date when the damaged property is repaired or replaced
with reasonable speed and similar quality.

15. "Schedule of Values" means those records describing covered property as entered into the ICRMP
e-Agent database by the member's agent and kept on file with us.
16. "Stock" means merchandise held in storage or for sale, raw materials, property in process or finished
products including supplies used in their packing or shipping.

c.

Specific Conditions Applicable to Machinery Breakdown Insuring Agreements:
1. With Respect to Insuring Agreement 3 - Business Income and Extra Expense:
a.

2.

Damaged Media or Damaged Data. If media is damaged or data is lost or corrupted, we will pay
your actual loss of business income and/or extra expense during the time necessary to:

(1)

Research, replace or restore the damaged media or lost or corrupted data; and

(2)

Reprogram instructions used in any covered computer equipment.

b.

There shall be no coverage for any media or data that we determine is not or cannot be replaced
or restored.

c.

We will pay the lesser of your actual loss of business income and/or extra expense up to 30
days after the period of restoration or $25,000.

With Respect to Insuring Agreement 4 - Spoilage Damage:

a.

The raw materials, property in process or finished products must be in storage or in the course of
being manufactured;

b.

You must own or be legally liable under written contract for the raw materials, property in process
or finished products; and

c.

The spoilage damage must be due to the lack or excess of power, light, heat, steam or
refrigeration.
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3. With Respect to Insuring Agreement 5 - Utility Interruption:
a.

The interruption is the direct result of a breakdown to covered equipment owned, operated or
controlled by the local private or public utility or distributor that directly generates, transmits,
distributes or provides utility services which you receive;

b.

The covered equipment is used to supply electric power, communications, waste disposal, air
conditioning, refrigeration, heating, gas, air, water or steam to your premises; and

c.

The interruption of utility service to your premises lasts at least the consecutive period of time of
twenty-four (24) hours. Once this waiting period is met, coverage will commence at the initial time
of the interruption and will be subject to all applicable deductibles.

4. With Respect to Insuring Agreement 6 - Newly Acquired Premises:
a.

You must inform us, in writing, of the newly acquired premises as soon as practicable;

b.

The coverage for these premises will be subject to the same terms, conditions, exclusions and
limitations as other insured premises.

5. With Respect to Insuring Agreement 7 - Ordinance or Law:

a. We will pay for:
(1) The loss in value of the undamaged portion of the building or structure as a consequence of
enforcement of an ordinance or law that requires the demolition of undamaged parts of the
same building or structure;
(2) Your actual cost to demolish and clear the site of the undamaged parts of the same building
or structure as a consequence of enforcement of an ordinance or law that requires the
demolition of such undamaged property; and
(3) The increased cost actually and necessarily expended to:
(i) Repair or reconstruct the damaged or destroyed portions of the building or structure; and
(ii) Reconstruct or remodel the undamaged portion of that building or structure with buildings
or structures of like materials, height, floor area, and style for like occupancy, whether or
not demolition is required on:
(1) The same premises or on another premises if you so elect. However if you rebuild at
another premises, the most we will pay is the increased cost of construction that we
would have paid to rebuild at the same premises; or
(2) Another premise if the relocation is required by the ordinance or law. The most we will
pay is the increased cost of construction at the new premises.

b.

We will not pay for:

(1) Demolition or site clearing until the undamaged portions of the buildings or structures are
actually demolished;
(2) Increase in loss until the damaged or destroyed buildings or structures are actually rebuilt or
replaced and approved by the regulating government agency;
(3) Loss due to any ordinance or law that:
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(i)

You were required to comply with before the loss, even if the building was undamaged;
and

(ii) You failed to comply with;
(4) Increase in the loss, excess of the amount required to meet the minimum requirement of any
ordinance or law enforcement at the time of the breakdown; or
(5) Increase in loss resulting from a substance declared to be hazardous to health or environment
by any government agency.

c.

If.

(1) The building or structure is damaged by a breakdown that is covered under this policy and
there is other physical damage that is not covered under this policy and the building damage
in its entirety results in enforcement of ordinance or law, then we will not pay the full amount of
the loss under this section. Instead, we will pay only that proportion of such loss; meaning the
proportion that the covered breakdown loss bears to the total physical damage.
(2) But if the building or structure sustains direct physical damage that is not covered under this
section and such damage is the subject of the ordinance or law, then there is no ordinance or
law coverage under this section even if the building has also sustained damage by a covered
breakdown.

6. With Respect to Insuring Agreement 8 - Errors and Omissions:

D.

a.

No insurance is provided as a result of any error or unintentional omission by you in the reporting
of values or the coverage you requested.

b.

It is a condition of this policy that such errors or unintentional omissions shall be reported and
corrected when discovered. The policy member contribution will be adjusted accordingly to reflect
the date the premises should have been added had no error or omission occurred.

Exclusions Applicable to Machinery Breakdown Insuring Agreements:
1.

We will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such
loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause or event that contributes
concurrently or in any sequence to the loss. The exclusions apply whether or not the loss
event results in widespread damage or affects a substantial area.

a.

Increase in loss from the enforcement of any ordinance, law, rule, regulation or ruling which
restricts or regulates the repair, replacement, alteration, use, operation, construction, installation,
clean-up or disposal of covered property.

b.

Any earth movement, including but not limited to earthquake, subsidence, sinkhole collapse,
landslide, mudslide, earth sinking, tsunami or volcanic action;

c.

Flood, surface water, waves, tides, tidal waves, overflow of any body of water, or their spray, all
whether driven by wind or not;

d.
e.

Nuclear reaction or radiation, or radioactive contamination, however caused.
War, including undeclared or civil war; warlike action by a military force, including action in
hindering or defending against an actual or expected attack, by any government, sovereign or
other authority using military personnel or other agents; or insurrection, rebellion, revolution,
usurped power or action taken by governmental authority in hindering or defending against any of
these.
Explosion (except from steam or centrifugal explosion);

f.
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g.
h.
i.

Fire (including fire resulting from a breakdown); or water or other means used to extinguish a fire;
Explosion of gas or unconsumed fuel within the furnace of any boiler or fired vessel or within the
passages from that furnace to the atmosphere;
Breakage of glass; falling objects; weight of snow, ice or sleet; freezing (caused by cold weather);
collapse; or molten material;

j.
k.

Water damage resulting from a breakdown, unless otherwise shown as covered.
Depletion, deterioration, corrosion, erosion, or wear and tear, or other gradually developing
conditions. But if loss or damage from a breakdown results, we will pay the resulting loss or
damage;
I. Lightning; windstorm or hail, smoke; aircraft or vehicles; riot or civil commotion; vandalism; or
sprinkler leakage;
m. A hydrostatic, pneumatic or gas pressure test of any boiler or pressure vessel; or an insulation
breakdown test of any type of electrical equipment;

n.

A delay in, or an interruption of any business, manufacturing or processing activity except as
provided by the business income and extra expense, and utility interruption Insuring Agreements;

o.

With respect to business income and extra expense, and utility interruption Insuring Agreements,
the following additional exclusions shall apply:
(1) The business that would not or could not have been carried on if the breakdown had not
occurred;
(2) Your failure to use due diligence and dispatch and all reasonable means to operate your
business as nearly normal as practicable at the premises shown in the schedule of values; or
(3) The suspension, lapse or cancellation of a contract following a breakdown extending beyond
the time business could have resumed if the contract had not lapsed, been suspended or
canceled.

p.
q.

Lack or excess of power, light, heat, steam or refrigeration except as provided by the business
income and extra expense, and utility interruption Insuring Agreements.
With respect to utility Interruption Insuring Agreement, any loss resulting from the following additional causes of loss whether or not coverage for that cause of loss is provided by another policy
you have:
(1) Acts of sabotage;
(2) Collapse;
(3) Deliberate act(s) of load shedding by the supplying utility;
(4) Freezing caused by cold weather;
(5) Impact of aircraft, missile or vehicle;
(6) Impact of objects falling from an aircraft or missile;
(7) Lightning;

r.
s.
t.

(8) Riot, civil commotion or vandalism;
(9) Sinkhole collapse;
(10)Smoke; or
(11 )Weight of snow, ice or sleet.
Any indirect result of a breakdown to covered equipment except as provided by the business
income and extra expense, spoilage damage and utility interruption Insuring Agreements.
Neglect by you to use all reasonable means to save and preserve covered property from further
damage at and after the time of the loss.
The most we will pay for any and all Insuring Agreements for loss or damage from any one
breakdown is the applicable limits of indemnification shown in the declarations pages. Any
payment made will not be increased if more than one insured is shown in the declarations pages.
For each Insuring Agreement listed, if:
(1) A limit is shown in the declarations pages, the Limits of Indemnification is part of, not in
addition to, the limit per breakdown.
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(2) A limit is shown in the declarations pages, we will not pay more than the limit of
indemnification for each such Insuring Agreement.
u.

For any covered equipment that is:
(1) Used solely to supply utility services to your premises; owned by a public or private utility; not
in your care, custody or control and for which you are legally liable; and covered under this
section:
(2) The limit of indemnification for property damage stated in the declarations pages is deleted
and replaced by the sum of one dollar.

v.

Unless a higher limit is shown in the declarations pages, the most we will pay for direct damage as
a direct result of a breakdown to covered equipment is $25,000 for each of the following. The
limits are part of, not in addition to, the limits of indemnification for property damage or limit per
breakdown.
(1) Ammonia Contamination. The spoilage to covered property contaminated by ammonia,
including any salvage expense.
(2) Consequential Loss. The reduction in the value of undamaged stock parts of a product
which becomes unmarketable. The reduction in value must be caused by a physical loss or
damage to another part of the product.
(3) Data and Media. Your cost to research, replace or restore damaged data or media including
the cost to reprogram instructions used in any computer equipment.
(4) Hazardous Substance. Any additional expenses incurred by you for the clean-up, repair or
replacement or disposal of covered property that is contaminated by a hazardous
substance. As used here, additional expenses mean the additional cost incurred over and
above the amount that we would have paid had no hazardous substance been involved with
the loss. Ammonia is not considered to be a hazardous substance as respects this limitation.
This applies despite the operation of the ordinance or law exclusion.
(5) Water Damage. The damage to covered property by water including any salvage expenses,
except no insurance applies to such damage resulting from leakage of a sprinkler system or
domestic water piping.
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SECTION XI -CHEMICAL SPRAYING ACTIVITIES LIABILITY
INSURANCE
CLAIMS MADE COVERAGE ONLY

A.

Insuring Agreements Applicable to Chemical Spraying Activities Liability Insurance:
1.

2.

B.

Chemical Spraying Activities Liability. We agree, subject to the conditions and exclusions of this
Insuring Agreement, to pay on your behalf those sums which you become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of a claim for personal injury or property damage because of a chemical
spraying activities claim which is first made against an insured in writing to us by you during this
policy period, or any extended reporting period we provide, arising out of an occurrence during this
policy period, or after the retroactive date shown in the declarations pages of this policy.
Emergency Clean-Up Expense. We agree, subject to the terms, conditions and exclusions of this
Insuring Agreement, to pay you for emergency clean-up expenses that are necessary, reasonable,
and incurred to curtail or prevent an occurrence, arising out of chemical spraying activities, which
take place during the policy period and that poses an imminent and substantial danger of personal
injury or property damage to which this Insuring Agreement applies.

Definitions Applicable to Chemical Spraying Activities Liability Insurance Endorsement:
1.

"Bodily Injury" means physical injury to any person, including death, and any mental anguish or
mental suffering associated with or arising from such physical injury.

2.

"Chemical Spraying Activities" means the intended dispersal of herbicides, defoliants, insecticides
or pesticides or other toxic materials approved by the federal government for the eradication of
undesirable plant growth, insects or rodents and the mixing, loading, storage, transportation and
disposal of such materials.

3.

"Claim" means a demand received by you for money damages alleging a wrongful act of a
tortious nature by an insured. No claim exists where the only monetary damages sought or
demanded are costs of suit and/or attorney's fees.

4.

"Emergency Clean-Up Expense" means the expenses for removal or neutralization of
contaminants, irritants, or pollution that pose an imminent and substantial danger of personal injury
and/or property damage, but only those expenses incurred during the first seventy-two (72) hours
following chemical spray application.

5.

"Occurrence" means an accident or a continuous or repeated exposure to chemical spraying
activities which result in personal injury or property damage during the policy period and also
commences or was sustained on or after the retroactive date. All personal injuries to one or more
persons and/or property damage arising out of an accident or a continuous or repeated exposure
to conditions shall be deemed one occurrence.

6.

"Personal Injury'' means bodily injury, mental anguish, shock, sickness, disease, disability,
wrongful eviction, malicious prosecution, discrimination, humiliation, invasion of rights of privacy,
libel, slander or defamation of character, piracy and any infringement of copyright of property,
erroneous service of civil papers, assault and battery and disparagement of property.

7.

"Wrongful Act" means the negligent performance of a legal duty or responsibility or failure to
perform a legal duty or responsibility, respectively, in a tortious manner pursuant to the Idaho Tort
Claims Act or unlawful violations of civil rights pursuant to Federal law arising out of public office or
position.
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c.

Specific Conditions to Chemical Spraying Activities Liability Insurance Endorsement:
1. Exception to Absolute Pollution Exclusion. The insurance afforded by this Endorsement
constitutes an express exception to the Absolute Pollution Exclusion set forth in the General
Exclusions section IV of this policy. As an exception to such exclusion, this coverage stands only to
pay legally required damages for personal injury or property damage not to exceed the Limits of
Indemnification stated in the policy declarations, and not in any circumstances for natural resource
damage claims made or penalties or fines imposed pursuant to state or Federal law.
2. Extended Reporting Periods. Insuring Agreement 1 of this section is conditioned as follows if this
policy is cancelled or not renewed for any reason, other than non-payment of member contribution or
non-compliance with the terms and conditions of this policy:
a.

If you are expelled from ICRMP, or have elected to withdraw from ICRMP and are in good
standing as a Member, as set forth in section Ill - General Conditions, Item 4, we will extend
an Extended Reporting Period of thirty (30) days duration following immediately upon the
effective date of expulsion, to apply to any personal injury or property damage claim
resulting from chemical spraying activities which is first made against an insured in writing
by you to us which commences and was sustained subsequent to the retroactive date set forth
in the declarations pages and prior to the effective date of this policy's cancellation or
termination, and which is otherwise afforded by Insuring Agreement 1 of this section.

b.

If, however, this policy is immediately succeeded by similar claims-made insurance policy with
any insurer, in which the retroactive date is the same as or earlier than that shown in the
declarations pages of this policy, the succeeding policy shall be deemed to be a replacement of
this policy, and you shall have no right to secure the Extended Reporting Period coverage from
us.

c. The Extended Reporting Period does not reinstate or increase the limit(s) of indemnification
applicable to Insuring Agreement 1 of this section. Once in effect, an Extended Reporting Period
cannot be canceled.
3. Multiple Insureds, Claims or Claimants. Inclusion herein of more than one insured or the making
of more than one claim or the bringing of suits by more than one person or organization shall not
operate to increase our limits of indemnification as stated in the declarations pages. Two or more
claims arising out of a single occurrence or series of related occurrences shall be treated as a
single occurrence. All such claims, whenever made, shall be considered first made against an
insured during the policy period or any extended reporting period, in which the earliest claim arising
out of such occurrence, or series of related occurrences, was first made and all such claims shall
be subject to the same limits of indemnification. It is the intent of this section to not extend coverage
in any way in excess of the liability minimum established by the Idaho Tort Claims Act.
4.

Non-Stacking Of Limits - Multiple Sections of this Policy or Multiple Insuring Agreements
within this Section Involved in a Single Event if any occurrence, accident, claim or loss
covered in whole or in part under this section XI that also constitutes:
a.

An occurrence or accident covered in whole or in part under section VI; or

b.

An occurrence or accident covered in whole or in part under section VII; or

c.

A wrongful act, wrongful employment practice or claim covered in whole or in part under
section VI II; or

d.

A claim, occurrence or accident covered in whole or in part under section XII; or

e.

Any combination of two or more of the coverage events listed in subparagraphs 4. (a.), (b.), (c.)
and (d.) of this section, or any events subject to multiple insuring agreements within each
section, shall be limited to coverage limits allowed by the section of the policy with the higher
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limit for the per occurrence, per accident or per claim(s) limit(s) of indemnification as shown in
the declarations pages, and its corresponding deductible, shall be the sole limit applicable to
multiple occurrences, accidents, claims or losses addressed. If the per occurrence, per
accident and per claim(s) limit(s) of indemnification as shown in the declarations pages are
equal, only one limit will still apply and it will be the limit of indemnification and its corresponding
deductible, if any, applicable to the section deemed by us to be providing the primary policy for
the claim, accident or occurrence.

D.

Exclusions to Chemical Spraying Liability Activities Liability Insurance Endorsement:
1.

To any claim or loss more specifically covered under any other section of this policy.

2.

To personal injury or property damage resulting from an act or omission intended or expected from
the standpoint of any insured to cause personal injury or property damage. This exclusion applies
even if the personal injury or property damage is of a different kind or degree, or is sustained by a
different person or property, than that intended or expected.

3. To personal injury or property damage resulting from an act or omission outside the course and
scope of employment and any act performed with malice or criminal intent. This exclusion applies
regardless of whether any insured is actually charged with, or convicted of, a crime.
4.

To any obligation for which you may be held liable under any workers' compensation, unemployment
compensation, disability benefits law, employer's liability, or under any similar federal, state or local
law, ordinance, rule or regulation, however characterized, as well as any claim or suit by a spouse,
child, parent, or sibling of an insured as a consequence of personal injury to the insured.

5.

To any claim or suit for which the only monetary damages sought are costs of suit and/or attorney's
fees.

6.

To any claim based on or attributable to the rendering or failure to render any opinion, treatment,
consultation or service, if such opinion, treatment, consultation or service was rendered or failed to
have been rendered while you were engaged in any activity for which you received compensation
from any source other than as a public entity or an employee of a public entity.

7.

To any claim for which you are entitled to indemnity and/or payment by reason of having given
notice of any circumstances which might give rise to a claim under any other policy or policies of
insurance.

8.

To personal injury or property damage arising out of chemical spraying activities which results
from or is directly or incidentally attributable to the use of any chemical spraying product in a manner
inconsistent or contrary with its product labeling, including the product label approved by any state or
federal regulatory agency and any additional written materials which may accompany the product
label. For purposes of this exclusion, "labeling" also includes additional sources of information (e.g.,
EPA Protection Standard, EPA Endangered Species Program Bulletin, state Ground Water
Management Plan, company Product Use Bulletins) referenced on the product label or accompanying
materials.
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SECTION XII -ENDORSEMENTS
THESE ENDORSEMENTS MODIFY THE POLICY.
PLEASE READ THEM CAREFULLY.
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SECTION V - PROPERTY AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT
Accidental Discharge of Pollutants Endorsement # 1
Section V - Property is amended by the following:
A. Pollution Exclusion Exception:
1.

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the policy to which this endorsement attaches,
it is hereby understood and agreed that section V, Property Insurance, is extended to cover
"pollution cost or expense" related to an otherwise covered accident as defined and controlled by
section V, Property . This endorsement is limited to $50,000 per occurrence and in the aggregate.

B. Definitions Applicable to Accidental Discharge of Pollutants Endorsement:
1.

c.

"Pollution Cost or Expense" means any cost or expense arising out of costs incurred by you to
monitor , clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize, or in any way respond to, or assess
the effects of pollutants related to any otherwise covered claim as defined in section V Property
Insurance. This coverage will apply whether this cost is incurred due to a request, order, or suit by
any governmental agency or at the discretion of the named insured.

Exclusions Applicable to Accidental Discharge of Pollutants Endorsement:
1. This endorsement does not extend to any landfill, transfer station, trash or recycling collection facility
or any other facility designed primarily for the collection of or transfer of refuse or recycling content or
the vehicles and mobile equipment association with any such described location.

Nothing herein contained shall be held to vary, alter, waive or extend any of the terms,
conditions, or limitations of the policy to which this endorsement is attached other than
as above stated.
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SECTION V - PROPERTY AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT
Terrorism Insurance Physical Damage/Loss Endorsement #2
Section V - Property is amended by the following:
A. Insuring Clause:
1.

Subject to the terms, limits, conditions and exclusions hereinafter contained, this endorsement
insures property as stated in the schedule of values attaching to and forming part of this policy
(hereinafter referred to as the "Schedule") against physical loss or physical damage occurring during
the period of this policy caused by an Act of Terrorism or Sabotage, as herein defined.

2.

For the purpose of this endorsement, an Act of Terrorism means an act or series of acts, including the
use of force or violence, of any person or group(s) of persons, whether acting alone or on behalf of or
in connection with any organization(s), committed for political, religious or ideological purposes
including the intention to influence any government and/or to put the public in fear for such purposes.

3.

For the purpose of this endorsement, an act of sabotage means a subversive act or series of such
acts committed for political, religious or ideological purposes including the intention to influence any
government and/or to put the public in fear for such purposes.

B. Losses Excluded:
1.

Loss or damage arising directly or indirectly from nuclear detonation, nuclear reaction, nuclear
radiation or radioactive contamination, however such nuclear detonation, nuclear reaction, nuclear
radiation or radioactive contamination may have been caused.

2.

Loss or damage occasioned directly or indirectly by war, invasion or warlike operations (whether war
be declared or not), hostile acts of sovereign or local government entities, civil war, rebellion,
revolution, insurrection, martial law, usurpation of power, or civil commotion assuming the proportions
of or amounting to an uprising.

3.

Loss by seizure or legal or illegal occupation unless physical loss or damage is caused directly by an
Act of Terrorism or an Act of Sabotage.

4.

Loss or damage caused by confiscation, nationalisation, requisition, detention, embargo, quarantine,
or any result of any order of public or government authority which deprives the Insured of the use or
value of its property, nor for loss or damage arising from acts of contraband or illegal transportation or
illegal trade.

5.

Loss or damage directly or indirectly arising from or in consequence of the seepage and or discharge
of pollutants or contaminants, which pollutants and contaminants shall include but not be limited to
any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant, contaminant or toxic or hazardous substance or any
substance the presence, existence or release of which endangers or threatens to endanger the
health, safety or welfare of persons or the environment.

6.

Loss or damage arising directly or indirectly from or in consequence of chemical or biological
emission, release, discharge, dispersal or escape or chemical or biological exposure of any kind.

7.

Loss or damage arising directly or indirectly from or in consequence of asbestos emission, release,
discharge, dispersal or escape or asbestos exposure of any kind.

8.

Any fine or penalty or other assessment which is incurred by the Insured or which is imposed by any
court, government agency, public or civil authority or any other person.

9.

Loss or damage by electronic means including but not limited to computer hacking or the introduction
of any form of computer virus or corrupting or unauthorised instructions or code or the use of any
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electromagnetic weapon. This exclusion shall not operate to exclude losses (which would otherwise
be covered under this policy) arising from the use of any computer, computer system or computer
software program or any other electronic system in the launch and/or guidance system and/or firing
mechanism of any weapon or missile.
10. Loss or damage caused by vandals or other persons acting maliciously or by way of protest or
strikes, labour unrest, riots or civil commotion.
11. Loss or increased cost occasioned by any public or government or local or civil authority's
enforcement of any ordinance or law regulating the reconstruction, repair or demolition of any
property insured hereunder.
12. Loss or damage caused by measures taken to prevent, suppress or control actual or potential
terrorism or sabotage unless agreed by ICRMP in writing prior to such measures being taken.
13. Any consequential loss or damage, loss of use, delay or loss of markets, loss of income, depreciation,
reduction in functionality, or increased cost of working.
14. Loss or damage caused by factors including but not limited to cessation, fluctuation or variation in, or
insufficiency of, water, gas or electricity supplies and telecommunications or any type of service.
15. Loss or increased cost as a result of threat or hoax.
16. Loss or damage caused by or arising out of burglary, house - breaking, looting, theft or larceny.
17. Loss or damage caused by mysterious disappearance or unexplained loss.
18. Loss or damage directly or indirectly caused by mold, mildew, fungus, spores or other microorganism
of any type, nature or description, including but not limited to any substance whose presence poses
an actual or potential threat to human health.

C. Property Excluded:
1.

Land or land values.

2.

Power transmission, feeder lines or pipelines not on the lnsured's premises.

3.

Any building or structure, or property contained therein, while such building or structure is vacant or
unoccupied or inoperative for more than thirty days, unless the property is intended to be unoccupied
in its normal operations.

4.

Aircraft or any other aerial device, or watercraft.

5.

Any land conveyance, including vehicles, locomotives or rolling stock, unless such land conveyance
is declared hereon and solely whilst located at the property insured herein at the time of its damage.

6.

Animals, plants and living things of all types.

7.

Property in transit not on the lnsured's premises.

D. Conditions:
1.

Multiple Insureds. ICRMP's total liability for any loss or losses sustained by any one or more of the
Insureds under this endorsement will not exceed the sum insured shown in the declarations pages.
ICRMP shall have no liability in excess of the sum insured whether such amounts consist of insured
losses sustained by all of the named insureds or any one or more of the named insureds.
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2.

Other insurance. This endorsement shall be excess of any other insurance available to the named
insured covering a loss covered hereunder except such other insurance which is written specifically
as excess insurance over this endorsement. When this endorsement is written specifically in excess
of other insurance covering the peril insured hereunder, this endorsement shall not apply until such
time as the amount of the underlying insurance, (whether collectible or not), has been exhausted by
loss and damage covered by this endorsement in excess of the deductible with respect to each and
every covered loss.

3.

Other Insurance. This endorsement shall be excesa,of any other insurance available to the named
insured covering a loss covered hereunder except such other insurance which is written specifically
as excess insurance over this endorsement. When this endorsement is written specifically in excess
of other insurance covering the peril insured hereunder, this endorsement shall not apply until such
time as the amount of the underlying insurance, (whether collectible or not), has been exhausted by
loss and damage covered by this endorsement in excess of the deductible with respect to each and
every covered loss.

4.

Situation. This endorsement insures property located at the addresses stated in the schedule of
values kept on file with us via e-Agent.

5.

Sum Insured. ICRMP hereon shall not be liable for more than the endorsement aggregate of fifty
million dollars ($50,000,000) for all members combined.

6.

Deductible. Each occurrence shall be adjusted separately and from each such amount the sum
stated in the schedule of values shall be deducted of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per occurrence.

7.

Occurrence. The term "occurrence" shall mean any one loss and/or series of losses arising out of
and directly occasioned by one Act or series of Acts of Terrorism or Sabotage for the same purpose
or cause. The duration and extent of any one "occurrence" shall be limited to all losses sustained by
the named insured at the property insured herein during any period of 72 consecutive hours arising
out of the same purpose or cause. However no such period of 72 consecutive hours may extend
beyond the expiration of this endorsement unless the named insured shall first sustain direct
physical damage by an Act of Terrorism or an Act of Sabotage prior to expiration and within said
period of 72 consecutive hours nor shall any period of 72 consecutive hours commence prior to the
attachment of this endorsement.

8.

Debris Removal. This endorsement also covers, within the sum insured, expenses incurred in the
removal from the insured location of debris of property stated in the schedule of values damaged by
an Act of Terrorism or an Act of Sabotage. The cost of removal of debris shall not be considered in
determination of the valuation of the property covered.

9.

Due Diligence. The named insured (or any of the named insured's agents, sub or co-contractors)
must use due diligence and do (and concur in doing and permit to be done) everything reasonably
practicable, including but not limited to taking precautions to protect or remove the insured property,
to avoid or diminish any loss herein insured and to secure compensation for any such loss including
action against other parties to enforce any rights and remedies or to obtain relief or indemnity.

10. Protection Maintenance. It is agreed that any protection provided for the safety of the property
insured shall be maintained in good order throughout the currency of this endorsement and shall be in
use at all relevant times, and that such protection shall not be withdrawn or varied to the detriment of
the interests of ICRMP without our consent.
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11. Valuation. It is understood that, in the event of damage, settlement shall be based upon the cost of
repairing, replacing or reinstating (whichever is the least) property on the same site, or nearest
available site (whichever incurs the least cost) with material of like kind and quality without deduction
for depreciation, subject to the following provisions:
a.

The repairs, replacement or reinstatement (all hereinafter referred to as "replacement") must be
executed with due diligence and dispatch;

b.

Until replacement has been effected the amount of liability under this endorsement in respect of
loss shall be limited to the actual cash value at the time of loss;

c.

If replacement with material of like kind and quality is restricted or prohibited by any by-laws,
ordinance or law, any increased cost of replacement due thereto shall not be covered by this
endorsement.

d.

ICRMP's liability for loss under this endorsement shall not exceed the smallest of the following
amounts:
(1) The endorsement limit applicable to the destroyed or damaged property,
(2) The replacement cost of the property or any part thereof which was intended for the same
occupancy and use, as calculated at the time of the loss,
(3) The amount actually and necessarily expended in replacing said property or any part
thereof.
(4) ICRMP will normally expect the named insured to carry out repair or replacement of the
insured property, but if the named insured and ICRMP agree that it is not practicable or
reasonable to do this, we will pay the you an amount based on the repair or replacement
costs, less an allowance for fees and associated costs which are not otherwise incurred. We
will only pay you up to the limits of indemnification shown in the declarations pages.

12. Incorrect Declaration Penalty. If the values declared as stated in the schedule of values are less
than the correct insured values as determined above, then any recovery otherwise due hereunder
shall be reduced in the same proportion that the values declared bear to the values that should have
been declared, and you shall coinsure for the balance.
13. Notification of Claims. You, upon knowledge of any occurrence likely to give rise to a claim
hereunder, shall give written advice as soon as reasonably practicable to us within seven (7) days of
such knowledge of any occurrence and it is a condition precedent to the liability of ICRMP that such
notification is given by the you as provided for by this endorsement. If you make a claim under this
endorsement you must give us such relevant information and evidence as may reasonably be
required and cooperate fully in the investigation or adjustment of any claim. If required by us, you
must submit to examination under oath by any person designated by us.
14. Proof of Loss. You shall render a signed and sworn proof of loss within sixty (60) days after the
occurrence of a loss (unless such period be extended by the written agreement of us) stating the
time, place and cause of loss, your interests and all others in the property, the sound value thereof
and the amount of loss or damage thereto. If ICRMP has not received such proof of loss within two
years of the expiry date of this endorsement, we shall be discharged from all liability hereunder. In
any claim and/or action, suit or proceeding to enforce a claim for loss under this endorsement, the
burden of proving that the loss is recoverable under this endorsement and that no limitation or
exclusion of this endorsement applies and the quantum of loss shall fall upon you.
15. Subrogation. Any release from liability entered into in writing by you prior to loss hereunder shall
not affect this endorsement or the right of you to recover hereunder. In the event of any payment
under this endorsement, we shall be subrogated to the extent of such payment to all your rights of
recovery therefore. You shall execute all papers required, shall cooperate with us and, upon our
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request, shall attend hearings and trials and shall assist in effecting settlements, securing and giving
evidence, attaining the attendance of witnesses and in the conduct of suits and shall do anything that
may be necessary to secure such right. We will act in concert with all other interests concerned
(including the Insured) in the exercise of such rights of recovery. If any amount is recovered as a
result of such proceedings, such amount shall be distributed in the following priorities:
a.

Any interest, (including yours), exclusive of any deductible or self-insured retention, suffering a
loss of the type covered by this endorsement and in excess of the coverage under this
endorsement shall be reimbursed up to the amount of such loss (excluding the amount of the
deductible);

b.

Out of the balance remaining, we shall be reimbursed to the extent of payment under this
endorsement;

c.

The remaining balance, if any, shall inure to the benefit of you, or any insurer providing insurance
primary to this endorsement, with respect to the amount of such primary insurance, deductible,
self-insured retention, and/or loss of a type not covered by this endorsement.

d. The expense of all proceedings necessary to the recovery of any such amount shall be
apportioned between the interests concerned, including that of the named insured, in the ratio of
their respective recoveries as finally settled. If there should be no recovery and proceedings are
instituted solely on the initiative of us, the expense thereof shall be borne by us.
16. Salvage and Recoveries. All salvages, recoveries and payments recovered or received subsequent
to a loss settlement under this endorsement shall be applied as if recovered or received prior to the
said settlement and all necessary adjustments shall be made by the parties hereto.
17. False or Fraudulent Claims. If you shall make any claim knowing the same to be false or
fraudulent, as regards amount or otherwise, this endorsement shall become void and all claims and
benefit hereunder shall be forfeited.
18. Misrepresentation. If you have concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance
relating to this endorsement, this endorsement shall become void. If you are unsure what constitutes
material fact(s) or circumstance(s), you should consult your agent.
19. Abandonment. There shall be no abandonment to ICRMP of any property.
20. Inspection and Audit. ICRMP or its agents shall be permitted but not obligated to inspect the
property at any time. Neither ICRMP's right to make inspections nor the making thereof nor any
report thereon shall constitute an undertaking, on behalf of or for the benefit of the named insured or
others, to determine or warrant that such property is safe. We may examine and audit your books
and records at any time up to two years after the final termination of this endorsement, as far as they
relate to the subject matter of this endorsement.
21. Assignment. Assignment or transfer of this endorsement shall not be valid except with the prior
written consent of ICRMP.
22. Rights of Third Party Exclusions. This endorsement is effected solely between the named insured
and ICRMP. This endorsement shall not confer any benefits on any third parties, including
shareholders, and no such third party may enforce any term of this endorsement. This clause shall
not affect the rights of the named insured.
23. Cancellation by Withdrawing Member/Expulsion. This endorsement is cancelable by you by
sending written request of cancellation to us. The effective date of the cancellation will be either the
date you requested or the date we received notice, whichever is later. A notice to cancel will be
treated as a notice to withdraw from the ICRMP program. This endorsement is available only through
faithful participation as a member of the ICRMP program. If you are expelled from ICRMP, all
insurance coverage pursuant to this policy is terminated. You may be expelled from the program
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pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Joint Powers Subscriber Agreement effective as of the
date of this policy.
24. Arbitration. If you and we fail to agree in whole or in part regarding any aspect of this endorsement,
each party shall, within ten (10) days after the demand in writing by either party, appoint a competent
and disinterested arbitrator and the two (2) chosen shall before commencing the arbitration select a
competent and disinterested umpire. The arbitrators together shall determine such matters in which
you and ICRMP shall so fail to agree and shall make an award thereon and the award in writing of
any two (2), duly verified, shall determine the same, and if they fail to agree, they will submit their
differences to the umpire. The parties to such arbitration shall pay the arbitrators respectively
appointed by them and bear equally the expenses of the arbitration and the charges of the umpire.
25. Several Liability. ICRMP's obligations under this endorsement are several and not joint and are
limited solely to their individual policies.
26. Legal Action Against ICRMP. No one may bring a legal action against ICRMP unless:
a. There has been full compliance by you with all of the terms of this endorsement and the ICRMP
Joint Powers Subscriber Agreement; and
b. The action is brought within two (2) years after the expiry or cancellation of this endorsement.
27. Material Changes. You shall notify us of any change of circumstances which would materially affect
this Insurance.
28. Experts Fees. This endorsement includes, within the sum insured, the necessary and reasonable
fees of architects, surveyors, consulting engineers and other professional experts which are incurred
in reinstating or repairing the insured property following damage insured under this endorsement.
29. Law. As specified in the General Conditions of this policy.
30. Jurisdiction. As specified in the General Conditions of this policy.
31. Service of Suit. This service of suit clause will not be read to conflict with or override the obligations
of the parties to arbitrate their disputes as provided for in the Arbitration provision within this
endorsement. This clause is intended as an aid to compelling arbitration or enforcing such arbitration
or arbitral award, not as an alternative to such arbitration provision for resolving disputes arising out
of this endorsement. It is agreed that in the event of the failure of us hereon to pay any amount
claimed to be due hereunder, we hereon, at the request of the named insured, will submit to the
jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction within Idaho. Nothing in this clause constitutes or
should be understood to constitute a waiver of our rights to commence an action in any court of
competent jurisdiction in Idaho, to remove an action to a United States District Court, or to seek a
transfer of a case to another court as permitted by the laws of the United States or of any State in the
United States. It is further agreed that service of process in such suit may be made upon ICRMP
representatives and that in any suit instituted against any one of them upon this endorsement, ICRMP
will abide by the final decision of such court or of any appellate court in the event of an appeal.
32. Legal Service. Any summons, notice or process to be served upon ICRMP for the purpose of
instituting any legal proceedings against them in connection with this endorsement may be served
upon the Executive Director of ICRMP who has authority to accept service.
33. Definitions. All defined terms are controlled by section 1, General Definitions and section V,
Property.

Nothing herein contained shall be held to vary, alter, waive or extend any of the terms,
conditions, or limitations of the policy to which this endorsement is attached other than
as above stated.
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Coverage Territory for Canada Amendatory Endorsement #3
A. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the policy to which this endorsement attaches,
it is hereby understood and agreed this endorsement is attached and to the provisions contained
within this endorsement, General Conditions Section: Territory of the policy is extended to include
Canada with policy limits as listed below and all payments made will be in United States currency and
dollar amounts.

1.

Section V - Property is amended by the following. All Insuring Agreements in section V are sublimited to
$500,000 per covered occurrence arising out of events related to insured's operations within the borders
of Canada.

2.

Section VI - General Liability Insurance is amended by the following. Insuring Agreements 1 and 2 in
section VI are sublimited to a maximum of $500,000 per covered occurrence arising out of events
related to insured's operations within the borders of Canada. Insuring Agreement 3 is sublimited to a
maximum of $500,000 per covered claim arising out of events related to insured's operations within the
borders of Canada.

3.

Section VII - Auto Liability Insurance is amended by the following. Insuring Agreement 1, Automobile
Liability is sublimited to a maximum of $500,000 per covered accident arising out of events related to
insured's travel within the borders of Canada. Insuring Agreement 2 is sublimited to $5,000 each person
and $100,000 each accident arising out of events related to insured's travel within the borders of
Canada. Insuring Agreement 3 is sublimited to $100,000 each person and $300,000 each accident
arising out of events related to insured's travel within the borders of Canada.

4.

Section VIII - Errors and Omissions Insurance is amended by the following. All Insuring Agreements in
section VIII are sublimited to a maximum of $500,000 per covered claim arising out of events related to
insured's operations within the borders of Canada.

5.

All other limits of indemnification, defense costs limits and annual aggregates stated within the policy and
the declarations pages and all other terms, conditions and exclusions remain unchanged.

Nothing herein contained shall be held to vary, alter, waive or extend any of the terms,
conditions, or limitations of the policy to which this endorsement is attached other than
as above stated.
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SECTION VI - GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE AMENDATORY
ENDORSEMENT
Public Land Fire Suppression Endorsement #4
Section VI - General Liability Insurance is amended by the following:

A. Insuring Agreements Applicable to Public Land Fire Suppression Liability:
1.

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the policy to which this endorsement attaches,
it is hereby understood and agreed that section VI, General Liability Insurance, is extended to pay
for legally obligated and statutorily allowable costs imposed by state or federal government agencies
specifically related to the suppression of fire only if such costs arise out of a covered occurrence.
This endorsement is limited to $500,000 per occurrence and in the aggregate, annually.

B. Exclusions Applicable to Public Land Fire Suppression Liability:
1.

This endorsement under any circumstance will not pay for penalties or fines imposed pursuant to
state or federal law.

Nothing herein contained shall be held to vary, alter, waive or extend any of the terms,
conditions, or limitations of the policy to which this endorsement is attached other than
as above stated.
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Cyber Liability Coverage Endorsement #5
NOTICE: THIS ENDORSEMENT IS LIMITED TO LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS THAT ARE FIRST MADE
AGAINST YOU AND NOTIFIED TO US DURING THE POLICY PERIOD AS REQUIRED. CLAIM
EXPENSES SHALL REDUCE THE APPLICABLE LIMITS OF LIABILITY.

I. LIMITS OF LIABILITY:
A.

Coverage A, Privacy Liability (Including Employee Privacy) $1,000,000 each and every claim
including costs and expenses

B. Coverage B, Privacy Regulatory Claims Coverage $1,000,000 each and every claim including
costs and expenses
C. Coverage C, Security Breach Response Coverage $1,000,000 each and every claim including
costs and expenses
D. Coverage D, Security Liability $1,000,000 each and every claim including costs and expenses
E. Coverage E, Multimedia Liability $1,000,000 each and every claim including costs and expenses
F.

Coverage F, Cyber Extortion $1,000,000 each and every claim including costs and expenses

G. Coverage H, PCI Assessment $100,000 each and every claim
H. $250,000 each every claim in respect of claims/losses arising out of loss/theft/misplacement of
an unencrypted mobile device.
The maximum paid in any one year for all claims/losses combined is $4,000,000 in the aggregate,
including costs and expenses with aggregate sublimits of:

A. $250,000 aggregate limit including costs and expenses in Coverage H, PCI Assessment
B. $500,000 aggregate limit including costs and expenses in respect of claims/losses arising out of
loss/theft/misplacement of an unencrypted mobile device.

II. COVERAGES

A. PRIVACY LIABILITY (INCLUDING EMPLOYEE PRIVACY)
We shall pay on your behalf damages and claim expenses that you become legally obligated to
pay in excess of the applicable retention resulting from a claim first made against you and
reported to us during the policy period or extended reporting period arising out of a privacy
wrongful act on or after the retroactive date and before the end of the policy period, harming any
third party or employee.

B. PRIVACY REGULATORY CLAIMS COVERAGE
We shall pay on your behalf regulatory 'fines, consumer redress funds and claim expenses
that you become legally obligated to pay in excess of the applicable retention resulting from a
regulatory claim first made against you and reported to us during the policy period or extended
reporting period arising out of a privacy wrongful act on or after the retroactive date and
before the end of the policy period.
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C. SECURITY BREACH RESPONSE COVERAGE
We shall reimburse you for crisis management costs and breach response costs in excess of
the applicable deductible that you incur in the event of a security breach with respect to personal,
non-public information of your customers or employees. We will not make any payment under
this Coverage unless the security breach first occurs on or after the retroactive date and before
the end of the policy period and you first learn of the security breach within the policy period and
report the security breach to us as soon as practicable within the policy period.
D.

SECURITY LIABILITY

We shall pay on your behalf damages and claim expenses that you become legally obligated to
pay in excess of the applicable deductible resulting from a claim first made against you and
reported to us during the policy period or extended reporting period arising out of a security
wrongful act on or after the retroactive date and before the end of the policy period.

E. MULTIMEDIA LIABILITY
We shall pay on your behalf damages and claim expenses that you become legally obligated to
pay in excess of the applicable deductible resulting from a claim first made against you and
reported to us during the policy period or extended reporting period arising out of a multimedia
wrongful act on or after the retroactive date and before the end of the policy period.
F.

CYBER EXTORTION

We shall reimburse you for the cyber-extortion expenses and cyber-extortion payments that
you actually pay directly resulting from a cyber-extortion threat that you first receive and report
to us during the policy period.

G. BUSINESS INCOME AND DIGITAL ASSET RESTORATION
1. We shall pay the business income loss that you sustain during a period of restoration
resulting directly from a network disruption that commences during the policy period, but
only if the duration of such period of restoration exceeds the waiting period set forth in the
endorsement and such network disruption results solely and directly from a security
compromise that commenced on or after the retroactive date.
2. We shall pay the business income loss that you sustain during a period of restoration
resulting directly from a network disruption sustained by a dependent business that
commences during the policy period, but only if the duration of such period of restoration
exceeds the waiting period set forth in the endorsement and such network disruption results
solely and directly from a security compromise that would have been covered if such
dependent business had been part of you and commenced on or after the retroactive date.
3. We shall reimburse you for the restoration costs that you incur because of the alteration,
destruction, damage or loss of digital assets that commences during the policy period
resulting solely and directly from a security compromise, but only if such security
compromise commenced on or after the retroactive date.

H. PCI DSS ASSESSMENT
We shall pay on your behalf damages and claim expenses that you become legally obligated to
pay in excess of the applicable deductible resulting from a PC/ DSS assessment first made
against you and reported to us during the policy period or extended reporting period arising out
of a wrongful act on or after the retroactive date and before the end of the policy period.
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Ill.

DEFENSE, SETTLEMENT, AND INVESTIGATION OF CLAIMS

A. We shall have the right and duty to defend, subject to the applicable endorsement aggregate limit
and applicable sublimits of liability, exclusions and other terms and conditions of this
endorsement, any claim against you seeking damages which are payable under the terms of
this endorsement, even if any of the allegations of the claim are groundless, false, or fraudulent
and we shall have the right to appoint defense counsel. The applicable endorsement aggregate
limit and sublimits of liability available to pay damages and losses shall be reduced and may be
completely exhausted by payment of claim expenses. Damages, losses and claim expenses
shall be applied against the applicable retention you pay.
B.

We shall not be obligated to pay any damages, losses or claim expenses, or to undertake or
continue defense of any claim, after the applicable endorsement aggregate limit or applicable
sublimits of liability has been exhausted by payment of damages, losses and/or claim expenses
or after deposit of the applicable limit of liability in a court of competent jurisdiction, and that upon
such payment or deposit, we shall have the right to withdraw from the further defense thereof by
tendering control of said defense to you.

IV. EXCLUSIONS
The coverage under this endorsement shall not apply to any damages, claim expenses or loss incurred
with respect to any claim, or any crisis management costs, breach response costs or other amounts,
arising out of or resulting, directly or indirectly, from:

A. Failure to adhere to the following minimum risk management controls:
1.

To maintain anti-virus and malware prevention solutions, on any computer that is part of your
computer system and update the protection at regular intervals but no less than at least
once every 30 days;

2.

To maintain firewalls on any computer that is part of your computer system and connected
to the internet,

3.

To take security precautions, as required by state, federal or national law or by contract,
when processing, storing or transmitting credit card payment data or personally identifiable
information;

4.

To maintain, update and test business continuity/disaster recovery protocols and procedures;

5.

To maintain and implement ongoing patch management process to ensure timely patching of
existing network systems and servers;

B. Bodily injury or property damage;
C. Your employment practices or any alleged or actual discrimination against any person or entity
on any basis, including without limitation, race, creed, color, religion, ethnic background, national
origin, age, handicap, disability, sex, sexual orientation, or pregnancy;
D. The failure, malfunction or inadequacy of any satellite; any electrical or mechanical failure and/or
interruption, including but not limited to electrical disturbance, spike, brownout or blackout; or any
outage to gas, water, telephone, cable, telecommunications or other infrastructure, unless such
infrastructure is under your operational control; however this exclusion shall not apply to any
privacy wrongful act that is caused by such electrical or mechanical failure or that is caused by
such failure of telephone lines, data transmission lines or other infrastructure comprising or
supporting the internet,

E. Fire, smoke, explosion, lightning, wind, water, flood, earth movement, volcanic eruption, tidal
wave, landslide, hail, an act of God or any other physical event, however caused;
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F.

Breach of any express, implied, actual or constructive contract, agreement, warranty, guarantee
or promise, provided, however, this exclusion shall not apply to:
1.

any liability or obligation you would have in the absence of such contract or agreement;

2.

any breach of your privacy statement; or

3.

any indemnity by you in a written contract or agreement with your client regarding any
privacy wrongful act or security wrongful act by you in failing to preserve the
confidentiality or privacy of personal information of customers of your client;

G. Any of the following:
1.

Any presence of pollutants or contamination of any kind;

2.

Any actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of pollutants or
contamination of any kind;

3.

Any direction or request to test for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify, or
neutralize pollutants or in any way respond to or assess the effects of pollutants or
contamination of any kind; or

4.

Manufacturing, mining, use, sale, installation, removal, distribution of or exposure to
asbestos, materials, or products containing asbestos, asbestos fibers or dust;

5.

Ionizing radiation or contamination by radioactivity from any nuclear fuel or any nuclear waste
from the combustion of nuclear fuel;

6.

Actual, potential or alleged presence of mold, mildew or fungi of any kind;

7.

The radioactive, toxic, or explosive or other hazardous properties of any explosive nuclear
assembly or nuclear component thereof; or

8.

The existence, emission or discharge of any electromagnetic field, electromagnetic radiation
or electromagnetism that actually or allegedly affects the health, safety or condition of any
person or the environment or that affects the value, marketability, condition or use of any
property;

H. Any of the following:
1.

Purchase, sale, offer of or solicitation of an offer to purchase or sell securities, or alleged or
actual violation of any securities law, including but not limited to the provisions of the
securities Act of 1933, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, or any regulation promulgated under the foregoing statutes, or any
federal, state, local or foreign laws similar to the foregoing statutes (including "Blue Sky"
laws), whether such law is statutory, regulatory or common law;

2.

Alleged or actual violation of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (commonly known as
"Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations Act" or "RICO"), as amended, or any
regulation promulgated thereunder, or any federal, state, local or foreign law similar to the
foregoing statute, whether such law is statutory, regulatory or common law;

3.

Alleged or actual violation of the responsibilities, obligations or duties imposed upon
fiduciaries by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended;

4.

Alleged or actual anti-trust violations, restraint of trade or unfair competition, including without
limitation, violations of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act or the Robinson-Patman Act, or any
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other federal, state, local, or foreign laws regulating the same or similar conduct; provided,
however, this exclusion H.4 shall not apply to a claim for a multimedia wrongful act or
regulatory claim;

I.

Any act of terrorism, strike or similar labor action, war, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities
or warlike operations (whether declared or not), civil war, mutiny, civil commotion assuming the
proportions of or amounting to a popular rising, military rising, insurrection, rebellion, revolution,
military or usurped power, or any action taken to hinder or defend against these actions; including
all amounts, damages, or claim expenses of whatsoever nature directly or indirectly caused by,
resulting from or in connection with any action taken in controlling, preventing, suppressing, or in
any way relating to the above; however, if we allege that by reason of this exclusion any
damages or claim expenses are not covered by this Endorsement, the burden of proving the
contrary shall be upon you. However this exclusion does not apply to acts perpetuated
electronically.

J.

Any of the following:
1.

Any circumstance occurring, or act, error, or omission committed, prior to the inception date,
if on or before the inception date of this Policy, you knew or could have reasonably foreseen
that such circumstance or wrongful act would be the basis of a claim;

2.

Any claim or circumstance previously notified to a prior insurer that could reasonably be
expected to be the type of claim or loss covered by this Endorsement; or

3.

Any circumstance occurring, or act, error, or omission committed prior to the retroactive
date;

K. Any criminal, dishonest, intentional violation of the law, unfair or deceptive business practice,
fraudulent or malicious act, error or omission committed by you with actual criminal, dishonest,
fraudulent or malicious purpose or intent; provided, however, this exclusion shall not apply to:

L.

1.

claim expenses incurred in defending any such claim until there is a final adjudication,
judgment, binding arbitration decision or conviction against you in such claim or an
admission by you establishing such conduct, or a plea of no/o contendere or no contest by
you regarding such conduct, in which event you shall reimburse us for all claim expenses
that we have paid and we shall have no further liability for claim expenses from such claim;
and

2.

any of you who did not personally commit or personally participate in committing or
personally acquiesce in such conduct, except that the exclusion shall apply with respect to
you if an admission, final adjudication, or finding in a proceeding separate or collateral to the
claim establishes that a current principal, partner, director, or officer of your organization in
fact engaged in such conduct;

Any claim made by or on behalf of:
1.

any person or entity within the definition of you against any other Insured person or entity
within the definition of you provided this exclusion shall not apply to an otherwise covered
claim under Coverage A made by a current or your former employee; or

2.

Any entity which:
a) Is operated, managed, or controlled by you or in which you have an ownership interest in
excess of 15% or in which you are an officer or director; or
b) Operates, controls, or manages your organization, or has an ownership interest of more
than 15% in you;
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M. Your activities as a trustee, partner, officer, director, or employee of any employee trust,
charitable organization, corporation, company or business other than your organization;
N. Any alleged or actual infringement or violation of patent rights or misappropriation, theft, copying,
display or publication of any trade secret by, or with active cooperation, participation, or
assistance of, you, any of your former employees, subsidiaries, directors, officers, partners,
trustees, or any of your successors or assignees; or
0. Any trading losses or trading liabilities; the monetary value of any electronic fund transfers or
transactions by or on behalf of you which is lost, diminished, or damaged during transfer from,
into or between accounts; or the face value of coupons, price discounts, prizes, awards, or any
other valuable consideration given in excess of the total contracted or expected amount.
P. Any fine or penalty imposed by a payment card company, merchant bank or payment processor
under any agreement by you to comply with or follow the Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard, as amended, or any payment card company programs, rules, bylaws, policies,
procedures, regulations or requirements, or to implement, maintain or comply with security
measures or standards concerning payment card data.
With respect to Insuring Coverage G only this Endorsement does not apply to any loss arising
out of, or resulting, directly or indirectly, from:
Q. Any costs of updating, upgrading or remediation of your computer systems or your digital

assets; provided, however, this exclusion shall not apply to restoration costs otherwise covered
under Coverage G.3.;
R. Any failure of:
1.

Telephone lines;

2.

Data transmission lines or wireless communications connection; or

3.

Other telecommunications equipment, facilities or electronic infrastructure, including
equipment, facilities or infrastructure that supports the operation of computer networks,
including the internet, which are used to transmit or receive voice or data communications
and which are not under your direct operational control or, if applicable, not under the direct
operational control of your service provider,

S. Any seizure, confiscation, nationalization, or destruction of, or damage to or loss of use of any
digital asset or your computer systems by order of any governmental authority;
T. Ordinary wear and tear, gradual deterioration of or failure to maintain digital assets or computer
systems on which digital assets are processed or stored, whether owned by you or others;
U. The physical loss of, damage to or destruction of tangible property, including the loss of use
thereof; provided, however, "tangible property" does not include digital assets, but does include
all computer hardware;
V. Any form of third party liability or other legal liability, including but not limited to, any lawsuits,
claims or demands by any third party, employee, officer, director or partner.

V. DEFINITIONS
A. Act of terrorism means:
1.

any act certified an act of terrorism pursuant to the federal Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of
2002 or otherwise declared an act of terrorism by any government;
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2.

any act committed by any person or group of persons designated by any government as a
terrorist or terrorist group or any act committed by any person or group of persons acting on
behalf of or in connection with any organization designated by any government as a terrorist
organization; or

3.

the use of force or violence and/or the threat thereof by any person or group of persons,
whether acting alone or on behalf of or in connection with any organization or government,
committed for political, religious, ideological, or similar purposes, including the intention to
influence any government and/or put the public, or any section of the public, in fear.

B. Acquiring bank means a bank or financial institution that accepts credit and or debit card
payments (including credit cards, debit cards, stored value cards and pre-paid cards) for products
or services on behalf of a merchant, including processing and crediting those payments to a
merchant's account.
C. Bodily injury means injury to the body, sickness, or disease sustained by any person, and where
resulting from such injuries, mental anguish, mental injury, shock, humiliation, emotional distress,
loss of consortium, or death.
D. Breach response costs means the following fees, costs, charges or expenses, if reasonable
and necessary, that you incur in responding to a security breach during the period of twelve (12)
months after you first learn of such security breach:
1.

computer forensic professional fees and expenses to determine the cause and extent of such
security breach;

2.

costs to notify customers or employees affected or reasonably believed to be affected by
such security breach, including printing costs, publishing costs, postage expenses, call
center costs or costs of notification via phone or e-mail;

3.

legal fees and expenses to determine whether you are obligated under applicable privacy
regulations to notify applicable regulatory agencies or customers or employees affected or
reasonably believed to be affected by such security breach, effect compliance with any
applicable privacy regulations, draft the text of privacy notifications to customers or
employees affected or reasonably believed to be affected by such security breach, and
coordinate the investigation of such security breach; or

4.

credit monitoring expenses, provided, however, we shall have no obligation to reimburse
you for such breach response costs unless:

a)

You provide an opinion from legal counsel that you were obligated under applicable
privacy regulations to notify applicable regulatory agencies or customers or
employees affected or reasonably believed to be affected by such security breach of
such security breach; or

b)

You voluntarily incur with our prior written consent such breach response costs
(including credit monitoring expenses), such as in a jurisdiction where you have no
obligation to notify applicable regulatory agencies or customers or employees affected
or reasonably believed to be affected by such security breach. Breach response costs
do not include your overhead expenses or any salaries, wages, fees, or benefits of your
employees.

E. Business income loss means:
1.

Earnings loss; and/or

2.

Expenses loss.
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Business income loss does not include:

1.

any contractual penalties;

2.

any costs or expenses incurred to update, upgrade, replace, restore or otherwise improve
any computer system to a level beyond that which existed prior to a network disruption;

3.

any costs or expenses incurred to identify, remove or remediate computer program errors or
vulnerabilities, or costs to update, upgrade, replace, restore, maintain or otherwise improve
any computer system; or

4.

any legal costs or expenses or loss arising out liability to any third party;

5.

any loss incurred as a result of unfavorable business conditions; or

6.

any other consequential loss or damage.

F. Claim means:
1.

A written demand received by you for money or services, including the service of a civil suit
or institution of arbitration proceedings;

2.

Initiation of a civil suit against you seeking injunctive relief (meaning a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary or permanent injunction); or

3.

Solely with respect to Coverage B., a regulatory claim made against you.

4.

A PC/ DSS assessment multiple claims arising from the same or a series of related or
repeated acts, errors, or omissions or from any continuing acts, errors, or omissions shall be
considered a single claim for the purposes of this endorsement, irrespective of the number of
claimants or you involved in the claim. All such claims shall be deemed to have been made
at the time of the first such claim was made or deemed made under section IX.A

G. Claim expenses means:
1.

reasonable and necessary fees charged in the defense or settlement of a claim by an
attorney whom we designate or whom you designate with our prior written consent, such
consent not to be unreasonably withheld; and

2.

all other legal costs and expenses resulting from the investigation, adjustment, defense and
appeal of a claim, if incurred by us or by you with our prior written consent; however, claim
expenses do not include your overhead expenses or any salaries, wages, fees, or benefits
of your employees for any time spent in cooperating in the defense or investigation of any
claim or circumstance that might lead to a claim.

H. Computer system means electronic, wireless, web or similar systems (including all hardware
and software) used to process data or information in an analog, digital, electronic or wireless
format, including computer programs, electronic data, operating systems, and components
thereof, including but not limited to laptops, personal digital assistants, cellular phones, media
storage and peripheral devices, media libraries, associated input and output devices, networking
equipment, and electronic backup equipment. With respect to Insuring Coverage G only
computer system means a computer system, over which you have direct operational control or
that is under the direct operational control of a service provider, used to process, maintain or
store your digital assets.
I.

Consumer redress funds means any sums of money you are legally required to deposit in a
fund for the payment of consumer claims due to a settlement of, or an adverse judgment in, a
regulatory claim.
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J. Credit monitoring expenses means the reasonable and necessary expense of providing free
credit report, identity theft protection services, credit monitoring services, credit freezes, fraud
alerts or call center services for customers affected or reasonably believed to be affected by a
security breach; provided, however, we shall not be obligated to reimburse you for more than
one (1) year of credit monitoring services or identity theft protection services for customers who
are at least eighteen (18) years old unless there is a rule, regulation, court ruling, requirement by
a regulator or statutory requirement requiring otherwise.
K.

Crisis management costs means any reasonable and necessary fees and expenses you incur
with our prior written consent to employ a public relations consultant to avert or mitigate any
material damage to any of your brands due to a newsworthy event that has arisen due to a
security breach or a claim or regulatory claim for a privacy wrongful act, regardless of
whether the expenses are incurred prior or subsequent to any such claim or regulatory claim
being made against you.

L. Cyber-extortion threat means a credible threat or connected series of threats made by someone
other than a director, trustee or partner of your organization:
1.

to introduce malicious code into your computer system;

2.

to interrupt your computer system or interrupt access to your computer system, such as
through a denial of service attack;

3.

to corrupt, damage or destroy your computer system; or

4.

to disseminate, divulge, or improperly utilize any personal or confidential corporate
information residing on your computer systems taken as a result of a network disruption.

M. Cyber-extortion payment means any sum paid to or at the direction of any third party that you
reasonably believe to be responsible for a cyber-extortion threat; provided that:
1.

you obtain our written consent prior to making such cyber-extortion payment;

2.

you make such cyber-extortion payment to terminate the cyber-extortion threat; and

3.

the Cyber-extortion payment does not exceed the amount we reasonably believe would
have been incurred had such Cyber-extortion payment not been made.

N. Cyber-extortion expenses means the reasonable and necessary expenses you incur with our
approval in evaluating and responding to a cyber-extortion threat. However, cyber-extortion
expenses do not include your overhead expenses or any salaries, wages, fees, or benefits of
your employees.
0. Damages means:
1.

Solely with respect to Coverages A, D and E, a monetary judgment, award or settlement,
including:
a)

Pre-judgment interest;

b)

Post-judgment interest that accrues after entry of the judgment or award and before we
have paid, offered to pay or deposited in court that part of the judgment or award within
the applicable limit of liability; and

c)

subject to this Endorsements terms, conditions, and exclusions, punitive or exemplary
damages (where insurable by the applicable law that most favors coverage for such
damages); and
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2.

Solely with respect to Coverage 8, regulatory fines and consumer redress funds

3.

Solely with respect to Coverage H PC/ DSS assessments, damages shall not include or
mean:
a)

Your future profits, restitution, or disgorgement of profits; or your cost to comply with
any order granting injunctive or non-monetary relief, including specific performance, or
any agreement to provide such relief;

b)

Your return or offset of fees, charges, royalties, or commissions for goods or services
already provided or contracted to be provided;

c)

Fines or penalties of any nature, except regulatory fines, consumer redress funds
and PC/ DSS assessments as identified above

d)

Any amount you are not financially or legally obligated to pay;

e)

Multiple damages;

f)

Any donations or contributions to any charitable organization; or

g)

Matters that may be deemed uninsurable under the law pursuant to which this
endorsement may be construed.

Dependent business means any third party, other than a service provider, on whom you
depend for products and/or services required to conduct your business.

Q. Denial of service attack means inability of a third party to gain access to your computer
systems through the internet due to unauthorized attacks or deliberate overloading of bandwidth
connections and/or web servers by means of the sending of substantial quantities of repeat or
irrelevant communication or data with the intent of blocking access to the computer system by
third parties.

R. Digital assets means any electronic data, including personally identifiable, non-public
information, or computer software over which you have direct control or for which such control
has been contractually assigned by you to a service provider. Digital assets do not include
computer hardware of any kind.
S. Earnings loss means the difference between the revenue that you would have earned based on
reasonable projections and the variable costs that would have been incurred, but which you
would have saved as a result of not earning that revenue.
T. Employee means any individual in your service, including any part-time, seasonal, and
temporary employee, who is compensated by salary, wages, fees or commissions and over
whom you have the right to direct and control, but excluding any partner or director of you.
U. Expenses loss means the additional expenses you incurred to minimize the suspension of
business and to continue operations during the period of restoration that are over and above
the cost that you reasonably and necessarily would have incurred to conduct your business had
no network disruption occurred. These additional expenses do not include any restoration
costs or any actual, reasonable and necessary expenses you incur in response to a network
disruption in order to prevent, minimize or mitigate any further damage to your digital assets,
minimize the duration of a network disruption or preserve critical evidence of any wrongdoing.
V.

Extended reporting period means the period of time after the end of the policy period for
reporting claims as provided in the declarations pages.
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W. Intranet means a private computer network inside a company or organization that uses the same
kinds of software found on the internet, but only for internal use.
X.

Internet means the worldwide public network of computer networks which enables the
transmission of electronic data between different users, commonly referred to as the internet,
including a private communications network existing within a shared or public network platform.

Y.

Loss(es) means:
1.

Business income loss;

2.

Restoration costs; and

3.

Cyber-extortion payments and cyber-extortion expenses.

All losses arising from the same or related underlying facts, circumstances, situations,
transactions or events or related security compromises shall be deemed a single loss.
Z.Malicious code means any unauthorized and corrupting or harmful computer code, including but
not limited to computer viruses, spyware, Trojan horses, worms, logic bombs, and mutations of
any of the proceeding.
AA. Media content means data, digital code, images, graphics, sounds, text or any other similar
material.
BB. Multimedia wrongful act means any of the following acts committed in the ordinary course of
your business in gathering, communicating, reproducing, publishing, disseminating, displaying,
releasing, transmitting or disclosing media content via any computer system that you own or
operate or is operated on your behalf by a third party, including any web-based social media
authorized or operated by your organization or any internet or intranet website, or via any nonelectronic media:
1.

defamation, libel, slander, product disparagement, trade libel, infliction of emotional distress,
outrage, outrageous conduct, or other tort related to disparagement or harm to the reputation
or character of any person or organization;

2.

invasion of or interference with the right to privacy or publicity;

3.

false arrest, detention or imprisonment or malicious prosecution;

4.

infringement of any right to private occupancy, including trespass, wrongful entry, eviction or
eavesdropping;

5.

infringement of copyright, domain name, trade dress, title or slogan, or the dilution or
infringement of trademark, service mark, service name or trade name;

6.

plagiarism, piracy or misappropriation of ideas; or

7.

liability regarding any media content for which you are responsible; provided always that
any multimedia wrongful act was committed or alleged to have been committed by you, or
any person for whom or entity for which you are legally responsible, including an
independent contractor or outsourcing organization.

CC.Newsworthy event means an event that has been caused by a claim or security breach within
one of the coverages which you have purchased, that has been publicized through any media
channel, including television, print media, radio or electronic networks, the internet, and/or
electronic mail.
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DD. Network disruption means any of the following events:
1.

A detectable failure, interruption or degradation of the operation of your computer system;
or

2.

The denial, restriction or hindrance of access to or use of your computer system or your
digital assets by any party who is otherwise authorized to have access.
More than one such event that results from the same or related underlying facts,
circumstances, situations, transactions or security compromises shall be considered a
single network disruption which commences on the date of the earliest of such events.

EE.

PC/ DSS assessment(s) means a written demand received by you from your acquiring bank
or a card association (MasterCard, VISA, Discover, American Express or JCB) for a monetary
assessment of a penalty or fine due to your non-compliance with PC/ data security
standards.

FF. PC/ data security standards (known as PCI DSS) means the published data security standard
in effect now or as hereafter amended that all merchants and processors must follow when
storing, processing and transmitting cardholder data.
GG. Period of restoration means the time period from the commencement of a network
disruption to the earlier of:
1.

the date that your computer system is, or with reasonable diligence could have been,
restored to the condition and functionality that existed immediately prior to the network
disruption; or

2.

sixty (60) consecutive days after the termination of the network disruption.

HH. Privacy breach means a common law breach of confidence, infringement, or violation of any
rights to privacy, including but not limited to breach of your privacy statement, breach of a
person's right of publicity, false light, intrusion upon a person's seclusion, public disclosure of a
person's private information, or misappropriation of a person's picture or name for commercial
gain.
II.

Privacy regulations means any federal, state, local or foreign statute or regulation requiring you
to limit or control the collection, use of, or access to, personally identifiable, non-public
information in your possession or under your control, or obligating you to inform customers of
the unauthorized access to or disclosure of such personally identifiable, non-public information,
including the following statutes and regulations:

1.

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-191 ),
including Title II requiring protection of confidentiality and security of electronic protected
health information, and as amended by the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act (HITECH), any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder as they
currently exist and as amended, and any related state medical privacy laws as they currently
exist and as amended;

2.

The Gramm-Leach-Bailey Act of 1999, also known as the Financial Services Modernization
Act of 1999, including sections concerning security protection and standards for customer
records maintained by financial services companies, and the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder as they currently exist and as amended;

3.

Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a), but solely with respect to
alleged unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce;
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JJ.

4.

Federal, state or local privacy protection regulations or laws, such as the California Database
Protection Act of 2003 (previously called SB 1386), as they currently exist now or may be
amended, associated with the control and use of, or limiting unauthorized access to,
personal information, including but not limited to requirements to post privacy policies, adopt
specific privacy controls, or inform customers of breaches of security that has or may impact
their personal information;

5.

Federal, state or local data breach regulations or laws, as they currently exist now or in the
future, imposing liability for failure to take reasonable care to guard against unauthorized
access to credit or debit account information that is in your possession or under your
control;

6.

Identity Theft Red Flags under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003;

7.

Federal and state consumer credit reporting laws, such as the Federal Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA) and the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCCRAA);

8.

the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998; or

9.

Privacy protection regulations or laws adopted by countries outside of the United States, such
as the EU Data Protection Directive and the Canadian Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act, as they currently exist now or may be amended, associated with
the collection, control and use of, or limiting unauthorized access to, personal information.

Privacy wrongful act means any privacy breach or breach of privacy regulations committed
by you or by any person or entity for which you are legally responsible, including an
independent contractor or outsourcing organization.

KK. Property damage means physical injury to or destruction of any tangible property, including the
loss thereof. Data is not considered tangible property.
LL.

Regulatory claim means:

1.

any request for information, civil investigative demand or formal investigation of you by an
administrative or regulatory agency or similar governmental body concerning a privacy
breach or possible breach of privacy regulations; or

2.

any administrative adjudicative proceeding against you by an administrative or regulatory
agency or similar governmental body for a breach of privacy regulations.

MM. Regulatory fines means fines, penalties, or sanctions awarded for a violation of any privacy
regulation.
NN. Restoration costs means the actual, reasonable and necessary costs you incur to replace,
restore, or re-create your digital assets to the level or condition at which they existed prior to
sustaining any loss. If such digital assets cannot be replaced, restored or recreated, then
restoration costs will be limited to the actual, reasonable and necessary costs you incur to
reach this determination. Restoration costs do not include:
1.

any costs you incur to replace, restore or recreate any of your digital assets that were not
subject to regular network back-up procedures at the time of the loss;

2.

any costs or expenses incurred to update, upgrade, replace, restore or otherwise improve
your digital assets to a level beyond that which existed prior to sustaining any loss;

3.

any costs or expenses incurred to identify, remove or remediate computer program errors or
vulnerabilities, or costs to update, upgrade, replace, restore, maintain or otherwise improve
any computer system; or
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4.

the economic or market value of any digital assets, including trade secrets.

00. Retroactive date means the date specified in the Declarations Pages of this Policy.
PP. Security breach means:
1.

the loss or disclosure of personal, non-public information of customers or employees in your
care, custody or control, including such information stored on paper or on a computer
system operated by you or on your behalf; or

2.

Theft of data, unauthorized access to or unauthorized use of personal, non-public
information of customers or employees in your care, custody or control, including such
information stored on paper or on a computer system operated by you or on your behalf;

that results in or may result in the compromise of the privacy or confidentiality of such personal,
nonpublic information. More than one security breach arising from the same or a series of
continuous, repeated or related acts, errors, or omissions shall be considered a single security
breach, which shall be deemed to have first occurred at the time of the first such security breach.
QQ. Security compromise means:

1. The unauthorized access or use of your computer system or your digital assets;
2.

The unauthorized transmission of computer code into your computer system that causes
loss or damage to your digital assets; or

3.

A denial of service attack on your computer system that causes loss or damage to your
digital assets.

RR. Security wrongful act means any act, error, or omission committed by you or a person or entity
for which you are legally responsible, including an independent contractor or outsourcing
organization, in the conduct of computer systems security and the protection of the security
and confidentiality of your customer records or information, that results in:
1.

The inability of a third party, who is authorized to do so, to gain access to your computer
systems;

2.

The failure to prevent or hinder unauthorized access to or unauthorized use of a
computer system operated by you or on your behalf, the failure to prevent physical theft of
hardware or firmware you control, the failure to prevent people or processes security failures,
or the failure to prevent false communications designed to trick the user into surrendering
personal information {such as "phishing", "pharming" or "vishing"), any of which results in:
a) The alteration, copying, corruption, destruction or deletion of, or damage to, electronic
data on a computer system operated by you or on your behalf;

3.

b)

Unauthorized disclosure of commercial, personal or private information;

c)

Theft of data (including identity theft); or

d)

Denial of service attacks against internet sites or computer systems of a third party;
or

The failure to prevent transmission of malicious code from a computer system operated by
you or on your behalf to a third party's computer system.
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SS. Service provider means any third party that is responsible for the processing, maintenance,
protection or storage of your digital assets pursuant to a written contract directly with you. A
service provider does not include any provider of telecommunications services, including
internet access, to you.
TT. Theft of data means the unauthorized taking, misuse or disclosure of information on computer
systems, including but not limited to charge, debit, or credit information, banking, financial and
investment services account information, proprietary information, and personal, private or
confidential information.
UU. Unauthorized access means the gaining of access to a computer system by an unauthorized
person or an authorized person in an unauthorized manner.
W. Unauthorized use means the use of a computer system by an unauthorized person or
persons or an authorized person in an unauthorized manner.
VI. LIMITS OF LIABILITY
A. The amount indicated in the Endorsement as stated within the Limits of Liability is the most we
will pay in the aggregate under this Endorsement, under all coverages combined, for:

1.

all damages, including regulatory fines, consumer redress funds and all claim expenses
from all claims;

2.

all crisis management costs and breach response costs from all security breaches; and

3.

all losses regardless of the number of acts, errors, or omissions, persons or entities covered
by this Endorsement, claimants, claims, losses or security breaches, or coverages triggered.

4.

If any claim or any single claim is covered under more than one Coverage, the highest
applicable sublimit of liability shall be the most we shall pay as to such claim or single claim
and such claim or single claim shall be subject to the highest applicable retention.

Nothing herein contained shall be held to vary, alter, waive or extend any of the terms,
conditions, or limitations of the policy to which this endorsement is attached other than
as above stated.
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ICRMP

Multi-Lines

Insurance Policy

This Policy of Insurance is issued by ICRMP for all public entity Members to be
effective 12:01 A.M., October 1, 2014 for one-year thereafter, unless sooner
terminated, for all continuing Members pursuant to and consistent with the Joint
Powers Subscribers Agreement approved by the ICRMP Board of Trustees to be
effective for the policy year beginning at the time above stated.
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Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Attorney for Plaintiffs
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
)
Val D Westover and
)
)
LaRee H. Westover,
AMENDED COMPLAINT
)
Plaintiffs
(Jury Trial Demanded)
)
)
)
Case No. CV-2015-312
v.
)
Jase D. Cundick, in his individual capacity )
)
And in his official capacity as
Franklin County Assessor,
)
John Does 1 and 2,
Judge Mitchell Brown
)
)
Defendant.
)

PARTIES

1.

Plaintiffs Val D Westover and LaRee H. Westover are individuals residing in

Franklin County, Idaho, at Clifton, ID 83228.
2.

Defendant Jase D. Cundick is the County Assessor for Franklin County, Idaho. In

this action he is being sued in his individual and official capacity.
3.

John Does one and two are persons who work in the Franklin County Assessor's

office who on information and belief were substantially instrumental in the torts that were
committed by the Franklin County Assessor's office.

EXHIBIT

I.. __..&~•:.__
~
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4.

The cause of action set out in this Complaint arose in Franklin County, Idaho.

5.

This Court has jurisdiction of this action both as a court of general jurisdiction in

Franklin County and pursuant to Idaho Code§ 7-302 and§ 7-402, which give the district court
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandate and prohibition.
6.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404, because Plaintiffs

and Defendant are residents of and the cause of action arose in Franklin County, Idaho.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

7.

In a Real Estate Sales Contract, dated November 15, 2007, sellers Don A.

Westover and Connie V. Westover, the parents of Val D Westover, conveyed real property to
buyers Val D Westover and LaRee H. Westover, Val's wife.
8.

A memorandum of that contract was filed on November 15, 2007 with the

Franklin County Recorder. A true and correct copy of that Memorandum is attached to the
original complaint as Exhibit A.
9.

The Memorandum put the public on notice that Val and LaRee Westover are the

owners of the property.
10.

After the filing of the Memorandum of the Real Estate Sales Contract, any later

attempts to convey the property by Don A. Westover did not affect Val and LaRee Westover's
title.
11.

In 2012, there was an attempt by Don A. Westover to convey the property to a

family trust with Val Westover as the trustee. That attempted transfer was rejected by the
county assessor as lacking formalities necessary to make it an effective transfer. Thereafter no
attempt was made by Don Westover to effect any other transfer.
2
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12.

In 2015, Val and LaRee Westover entered into a contract with Rocky Mountain

Power for an underground right-of-way easement.
13.

Rocky Mountain Power's easement was recorded April 20, 2015. A true and

correct copy of this grant of easement was attached to the original Complaint as Exhibit B.
14.

A letter dated May 29, 2015, from Franklin County Assessor Jase Cundick to

Rocky Mountain Power declared that Val and LaRee Westover were not the owners of the
property described in the easement grant.
15.

As a result of this letter, Rocky Mountain Power has threatened to cut off power,

remove its equipment, and declare Val and LaRee Westover in breach of contract.
16.

Through their attorney, Val and LaRee Westover sent Jase Cundick a letter, dated

June 24, 2015, detailing the above allegations and requesting that he retract his slander of title.
17.

Jase Cundick has failed to respond to any communication and has refused to

retract his slander of title. Mr. Cundick now takes the position that the slander of title was not
his fault and he will take no action to clear the title and good name of the plaintiffs' vis-a-vis
Rocky Mountain Power.
18.

By their actions the county assessor's office and persons connected thereto have

undertaken to interfere with the business relationships of persons involved in a real estate
transaction without any justification whatever.
19.

Jase Cundick has acted without or in excess of authority in slandering the property

title of Val and LaRee Westover by sending a letter to Rocky Mountain Power purporting to
determine the genuine ownership of the property.
20.

Idaho Code § 63-703(1) gives an assessor the authority to "ascertain the current

ownership of land" for tax purposes, but it does not give an assessor authority to make judicial
or quasi-judicial determinations about the genuineness or legal effect of documents of title filed
3
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with the county recorder. Rather, Idaho statutes require that an assessor's office change
ownership on its records whenever presented with a deed, title, or contract. LC. § 63-703(2).
21.

In this case the assessor was not presented with a deed, title or contract that

purported to change ownership of any property. Rather he was presented with a grant of an
easement. An easement does not affect ownership of property and has absolutely no tax effect.
There simply was no statutory or other legal authority for the assessor's office to interfere with
the economic relationship between Val and LaRee Westover and the power company.
22.

As a matter of fact, the assessor has now taken the position that his actions were

not an official act of his office.
23.

Jase Cundick and John Does one and two were acting outside the scope of their

authority and therefore are personally liable to the Plaintiffs for the torts alleged herein.
24.

There is no authority for the county assessor to make a determinations whether a

contract is genuine. That power is reserved for the judiciary. Therefore, in making a judicial
determination of true ownership-by telling the power company that Val Westover and LaRee
Westover were not the owners of the property upon which they conveyed an easement to the
power company-Jase Cundick acted without or in excess of authority.

25.

Similarly, the statute gives an assessor no authority whatsoever to slander an

owner's title by informing parties who file documents that, in the assessor's view, the document
cannot be given legal effect, or that the property described is not owned by the grantor of an
easement.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Slander of Title)
26.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the allegations contained in paragraphs

6-25 above in this cause of action.
4
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27.

Jase Cundick aided and abetted by John Does one and two published a slanderous

statement by sending a letter to Rocky Mountain Power, dated May 29, 2015, claiming that Val
and LaRee Westover were not the owners of their property.
28.

The Memorandum of Real Estate Sales Contract filed with Franklin County

proves that the statements by Jase Cundick to Rocky Mountain Power were false.
29.

Jase Cundick had access to the county records, and John Does one and two were

well aware of the memorandum of contract filed in 2007. Moreover, Val and LaRee Westover,
by their attorney, sent all pertinent documents to Mr. Cundick, attached to the June 24, 2015
letter. Therefore, Jase Cundick's letter and his refusal to retract it were done with malice-a
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of his statement.
30.

John Doe one or John Doe two, an employee of the assessor's office, encouraged,

instigated, or was otherwise involved in the sending of the letter to Rocky Mountain Power
because of personal malice toward Plaintiffs.
31.

The sending of the letter to Rocky Mountain Power interfered with business

transactions regarding real estate in Franklin County between the Plaintiff and others, including
Rocky Mountain Power, for no legitimate purpose.
32.

Val and LaRee Westover have suffered special damages with Rocky Mountain

Power threatening to remove its equipment and to declare Val and LaRee Westover in breach of
contract. There have also been special damages in way of attorney fees incurred in attempting to
remove the cloud of title created by the assessor, and the opprobrium of the accusation that Val
and LaRee Westover were attempting to grant an easement across property that they did not own.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Writs of Mandate and Prohibition)

5
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33.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the allegations contained in paragraphs

6-32 above in this cause of action.
34.

A writ of mandate is issued by Idaho Supreme Court or any district court to any

"corporation, board or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law especially
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station." I.C. § 7-302.
35.

A writ of prohibition is the counterpart to the writ of mandate and is issued to

"arrest[] the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or person, when such proceedings
are without or in excess of the jurisdiction." I.C. § 7-401.
36.

A writ of mandate or prohibition "must be issued in all cases where there is not a

plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." I.C. § 7-303.
3 7.

There is no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" for

the slander of title occurring in this case, which the County Assessor has refused to correct. Id.
Slander of title is an intentional tort, and government entities are immune from suits alleging
intentional torts. I.C. § 6-904(3).

38.

Additionally, there are no administrative remedies available since appeals

regarding actions taken by an assessor's office are appealed to the Board of Equalization and the
Idaho Tax Commission. However, the Assessor's actions, in excess of his authority in
determining property ownership and informing third parties of his opinion that the Plaintiffs do
not own the property on which they conveyed an easement, do not regard tax issues and,
therefore, cannot be appealed through existing administrative channels.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional interference with existing or potential economic relations)
39.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the allegations contained in paragraphs

6-38 above in this cause of action.
6
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40.

The actions of the assessor's office and their refusal to rescind the letter to Rocky

Mountain Power which slandered their title, after it was sent has interfered with the existing and
potential economic relationship between the Plaintiffs and the power company.
41.

According to recent assertions by the assessor, the actions of the assessor's office

as described above were not within the course and scope of the assessor's authority, and
therefore the actions of the assessor's office were done using improper means.
42.

It is the Plaintiff's information and belief that the actions by the assessor's office

were taken for an improper purpose as well, namely to interfere with the plaintiff's ability to
provide adequate amenities to a substantial tenant of the property that provides jobs and revenue
to Franklin County, and perhaps for other improper purposes.
43.

On information and belief the employees of the assessor's office were also

motivated by malice.
44.

As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the assessor's office, Plaintiffs

have been damaged in an amount to be proved at trial.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendant as follows:
1. For writ of mandate, ordering Jase Cundick, Franklin County Assessor, to retract his
slander of title;
2. For writ of prohibition, prohibiting Jase Cundick, Franklin County Assessor, from
exceeding his authority in making property ownership determinations for purposes
beyond those required for taxes and prohibiting him from interfering with real estate
transactions in Franklin County;
3. For damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
4. For Plaintiffs costs, including attorney's fees, as are provided in LC. § 7-312; and
7
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5. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable.
Dated this 20th day of August, 2015.
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.

Blake S. Atkin
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
Jury Trial Demand
Plaintiffs demand trial by jury

8
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 20th day of August, 2015, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:

Bruce J. Castleton
Tyler D. Williams
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702

_ _ U.S.Mail
Fax: (208) 383-9516
X Email: bjc@naylorhales.com;
tdw@naylorhales.com

Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, ID 83263

_ _ U.S.Mail
~ Fax: (208) 852-2926
Delivered in-person

Hon. Mitchell W. Brown
159 South Main
Soda Springs, ID 83276
paulcjefferies@gmail.com

_ _ U.S.Mail
___x_ Email: paulcjefferies@gmail.com
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9/14/2015 2:49 PM.
.

M: Fax Naylor _Hales, P.C.

TO: 1-208-852-297

'-" PAGE:

002 OF 003

Bruce J. Castleton
[ISB No. 6915]
Tyler D. Williams
[ISB No. 8512)
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: bic@naylorhales.com; tdw(Zi,lnaylorhales.com
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D. WESTOVER and
LaREE H. WESTOVER,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-2015-312

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
JASE D. CUNDICK,
FRANKLIN COUNTY ASSESSOR,
Defendant.

Defendant Jase D. Cundick, Franklin County Assessor, by and through his attorneys
ofrecord, Naylor & Hales, P.C. hereby files his Motion to Dismiss. A memorandum in support of
this motion will be filed within fourteen days pursuant to Rule 7(b)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 1.

EXHIBIT

3
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DATED this 14th day of September, 2015.

Bru e J. Castleton, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day of September, 2015, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Blake S. Atkin
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, ID 83228
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Hon. Mitchell Brown's Chambers
159 South Main
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Courtesy Copy

~

¥.-

U.S. Mail
Federal Express
Fax: 1-801-533-0380
Email: batkin@atkinlawoffices.net

U.S. Mail
Federal Express
Fax: 1-208-547-2147

9534_04 MTD.wpd

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 2.
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Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380

F

LE

15 OCT 23 At111: 20
NT

CLERK

Attorney for Plaintiffs
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
)
Plaintiffs
)
)
)
V.
)
)
Jase D. Cundick, in his individual capacity )
)
And in his official capacity as
)
Franklin County Assessor,
)
John Does 1 and 2,
)
)
Defendant.

Val D Westover and
LaRee H. Westover,

PLAIN:TIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case No. CV-2015-312

Judge Mitchell Brown

The Franklin County Assessor, in a letter dated May 29, 2015, disparaged plaintiffs'
ownership of a parcel of property in Franklin County to Rocky Mountain Power. Plaintiff has
repeatedly requested that the Assessor correct that erroneous assertion and has repeatedly pointed
out to the county assessor why his assessment about the ownership of the property was wrong.
Plaintiff has no adequate remedy for removal of the cloud the assessor has put on the property
short of an order from this Court requiring the retraction of that erroneous position by the
assessor. The material facts are undisputed and plaintiffs' request for mandamus relief turns on
the proper interpretation of documents on file with the Franklin County Recorder. Plaintiffs are
entitled to the mandamus relief requested as a matter of law. 1bis motion is supported by the
memorandum filed in support hereof.
Dated this 23rd day of October, 2015.

169 of 272

Blake S. Atkin
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE sixm ro»1CI.Ai
A./
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTYJ~F FRANKL~ . ...e<J
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)
)

VAL D. WESTOVER and LAREE H.
\VESTOVER,

)
)

Case No: CV~2015-312

)

Plaintiffs~
vs.

JASE D. CUNDICK,
FRANKLIN COUNTY ASSESSOR,

)

FINAL JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)

Defendant.

JUDGEMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
(1) Plaintiffs' First Cause ofAction for Slander of Title is Dismissed without prejudice;

(2) Plaintifrs Soco:nd Cause of Action for Writs of Mandate and Prohibition are Dismissed with
prejudice;
(3) Plaintiff's third

cause of Action for Intentional Interference with an Existing or Potential

Economic Relations is Dismissed without prejudice.
Dated this 17lh day of February, 2016.

MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Court

EXHIBIT
FINAL JUDOMENT • l
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CERTJfICATE OF MA.ll.JNG/SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of February, 2016, I mailed/served a true copy
of the foregoing Final Judgment on the attomey(s)/person(s) listed below by the method indicated:
Attorney(s}/Pmon(s):

Method of Service:

Blake S. Atkin
Counsel for Plaintiff

Faxed: (801)533--0380

Bruce J. Castleton
Counsel for Defendant

Faxed: (208) 383-9516

By: ):..ind.a Hampton, D$mut}' Clerk

FINAL JUDGMENT - 2
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Atkin Law Offices,. P.C.
Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380

LE
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Attorney for Plaintiffe

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs
)
)
)
v.
)
Jase D. Cundick, in his individual capacity )
)
And in his official capacity as
)
Franklin County Assessor,
)
John Does 1 and 2,
)
)
Defendant.

Val D Westover and
LaRee H. Westover,

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case No. CV-2015-312

Judge Mitchell Brown

The Franklin County Assessor, in a letter dated May 29, 2015, disparaged plaintiffs'
ownership of a parcel of property in Franklin County to Rocky Mountain Power. Plaintiff has
repeatedly requested that the Assessor correct that erroneous assertion and has repeatedly pointed
out to the county assessor why his assessment about the ownership of the property was wrong.
Plaintiff has no adequate remedy for removal of the cloud the assessor has put on the property
short of an order from this Court requiring the retraction of that erroneous position by the
assessor. The material facts are undisputed and plaintiffs' request for mandamus relief turns on
the proper interpretation of documents on file with the Franklin County Recorder. Plaintiffs are
entitled to the mandamus relief requested as a matter of law. This motion is supported by the
memorandum filed in support hereof.
Dated this 23rd day of October, 2015.
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Blake S. Atkin

Attorney for Plaintiffs
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•M: FaK Naylor _Hales, P.C.

TO: 1-208-852-292

PAGE: 002 OF 003

Bruce J. Castleton
[ISB No. 6915)
Tyler D. Williams
[ISB No. 8512]
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: bjc@naylorhales.com; tdw@naylorhales.com
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D. WESTOVER and

LaREE H. WESTOVER,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-2015-312

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

JASE D. CUNDICK,
FRANKLIN COUNTY ASSESSOR,
Defendant.

Defendant Jase D. Cundick, Franklin County Assessor, by and through his attorneys
ofrecord, Naylor & Hales, P.C. hereby files his Motion to Dismiss. A memorandum in support of
this motion will be filed within fourteen days pursuant to Rule 7(b)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS · 1.
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DATED this 14th day of September, 2015.

Bru e J. Castleton, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day of September, 2015, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Blake S. Atkin
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, ID 83228
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Hon. Mitchell Brown's Chambers
159 South Main
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Courtesy Copy

~

¥..-

U.S. Mail
Federal Express
Fax: 1-801-533-0380
Email: batkin@atkinlawoffices.net

U.S. Mail
Federal Express
Fax: 1-208-547-2147

9534_04 MTD.wpd

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 2.
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Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Email: blake@atkinlawoffices.net
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Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
)
Val D Westover and
)
)
LaRee H. Westover,
)
Plaintiffs/Appellants
)
)
V.
)
)
Jase D. Cundick, in his individual capacity )
)
And in his official capacity as
)
Franklin County Assessor,
)
John Does l and 2,
)
)
Defendant/Respondents

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Case No. CV-2015-312
Hon. Mitchell W. Brown

TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS, JASE D. CUNDICK IN HIS
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS FRANKLIN
COUNTY ASSESSOR, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, TYLER D. WILLIAMS,
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C., ATTORNEYS AT LAW, 950 WEST BANNOCK STREET,
SUITE 610, BOISE, IDAHO 83702, (208) 947-2078, TDW@NA YLORHALES.COM,
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellants, VAL D

WESTOVER AND LAREE H.

WESTOVER, appeal against the above-named Respondent, to the Idaho Supreme Court

---E•x•H1111
1Bllll!IT~...

I
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from the Final Judgment dated February 17, 2016 by the Honorable Judge Mitchell W.
Brown presiding. A copy of the judgment is attached to this notice.
2.

That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the said

decision described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable decision under and pursuant to
Rule 11 I.AR.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants then intend

to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the
Appellants from asserting other issues on appeal, are as follows:
A. Whether the District Court erred in refusing to grant injunctive relief
prohibiting defendant/appellee from acting ultra vires of any statutory or
regulatory authority in sending out letters to parties to real estate transactions
that slander the title of the grantor when the defendant/appellee boldly
proclaimed his intention to continue the practice.
B. Whether the District Court erred in refusing injunctive relief in an action
brought as an action for writ of mandamus/prohibition, where under rule 54(c)
it clearly appeared that plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief from
defendants declarations that he planned to continue his ultra vires conduct,
and plaintiffs' counsel asked the Court to grant that remedy even though
injunctive relief had not been specifically demanded in the pleadings.
4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

The reporter's transcript has been produced and paid for.

6.

The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's
record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: None

2
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7.

The Appellants request that all exhibits offered or admitted at the trial be included
in the record.

8.

I certify:
a)

That a transcript has been ordered, prepared, and paid for.

b)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has

been paid.
c)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

d)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Rule 20, LA.R.

DA TED this l 1th day of March, 2016.

Atkin Law Offices

44~--

Blake S. Atkin
Attorneys for the Appellants

3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11 th day of March, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the Notice of Appeal as indicated below to the following:
Tyler D. Williams
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
tdw@naylorhales.com;
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
skh@naylorhales.com
Boise, ID 83702

_lL U.S. Mail
_ _ Fax: (208) 383-9516
_x__Email:

__ u.s. Mail

Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, ID 83263

_ _ Fax: (208) 852-2926
~ Delivered in person
_ _ U.S. Mail
__x_Fax: (208) 547-2147

Hon. Mitchell W. Bro\\an
159 South Main
Soda Springs, ID 83276
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IN THJ!1 DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JlJDICIAL DISTRICT OF~~~~
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
..W
•. ,. · ·

VAL D. WESTOVER. and LAREE H.
WESTOVER,!
Plaintiffs,
vs.

JASE D. CUNJ)ICK,
FRANKLIN OOUNTY ASSESSOR,

)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV~2015-312

)

FINAL Jl.JDGMENT

ct¥lfr-,-.

)
)
)
)
)

Defendant
JUDGEMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
(1) Plaintiff~' First Cause of Action for Slander of Title is Dismissed without prejudice~
(2) Plaintiff's Second cause of Action for Writs of Mandate and Prohibition are Dismissed with

prejudice;

(3) Plaintiff'~ Third Cause of Action for Intentional Interference with an Existmg or Potential

BconomiP Relations is Dismissed without prejudice.
Dated this 17'/JI day of Februaryi 2016.

MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Court

'·
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CERTIFICATE OF MMIJNGISERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of February, 2016, I mailed/served a true copy
of the foregoing Final Judgment on the attorney(s)/p«soo(s) listed below by the method indicated:

~omevfa)[Ptnonls}:

Method of Scn'.i!:e:

Blake S. Atkin

Faxed: (801) 533--0380

Counsel fur Plaintiff
Bruce J. Castleton
Counsel for ™fendant

Faxed: (208) 383-9516

FINAL JUOOMENT - 2
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Phillip J. Collaer- ISB No. #3447
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
E-Mail:
pcollaer@ajhlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants, Idaho Counties Risk Management Program (ICRMP)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)

Case No. CV-2016-195
NOTICE OF HEARING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 29th day of September, 2016, at
2:00 p.m. of said day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, in the courtroom

of the Honorable Judge Michael W. Brown, Franklin County Courthouse, 39 W. Oneida,
Preston, State of Idaho, the undersigned will call up for hearing before the Court
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

ORIGINAL
NOTICE OF HEARING RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

183 of 272

DATED this

_!Z_ day of August, 2016.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL

LLP

By~.J-~
Phillip J. Collaer, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants

NOTICE OF HEARING RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ;g day of August, 2016, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys
of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Attorney for Plaintiff

~]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (801) 533-0380
Email:

(Courtesy Copy)
Judge Michael W. Brown
159 S. Main Street
Soda Springs, ID 83276

~]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email:

~ · 1

Phillip J. Collaer

NOTICE OF HEARING RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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Blake S. Atkin #6903
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
7579 North West Side Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Email: batkin@atkinlawoffices.net
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

VAL D WESTOVER,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO COMPEL AND IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff
V.

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANGEMENT PROGRAM (ICRMP),

Case No. CV-2016-195

Defendant.
Judge: Brown

On June 24, 2016, Plaintiff Val D Westover served discovery requests on ICRMP. On
July 19, 2016, ICRMP responded to requests for admission, but refused to respond to
interrogatories or document requests and instead filed a motion for protective order claiming that
there are no factual issues in the case and the case is merely a legal question of whether local
subdivisions may legally purchase insurance. ICRMP has now filed a motion for summary
judgment. The motion for protective order and the motion for summary judgment miss the point.
The premise of the motions, that discovery is irrelevant since local governments are
statutorily entitled to buy insurance that will reimburse tort claimants under the Idaho Tort
Claims Act misses the point. Further, a motion for protective order is not an appropriate method
1
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to object to discovery considered to be irrelevant.

The ultimate issues in this case or any case

should not be litigated in a discovery dispute, and Rule 56 makes it clear that a party is entitled to
discovery before being required to respond to a motion for summary judgment. Rule 56(d),
Idaho R. Civ. P.
That normal fleshing out of factual issues is as necessary in this case as in any other.
That a local government may legally purchase insurance in the context of a tort claim has little
relevance to the issues in this case. The purpose of tort law, and in particular the tort claims act,
is to provide for compensation for injured persons. LC. § 6-903 et. seq. It is clear from a perusal
of the Tort Claims Act that the legislature did not care in that context who footed the bill. In that
context, insurance is not only permissible, but no doubt desirable from the tort victim's
standpoint because it provides a ready fund for compensation.

On the other hand, the purpose

of LC.§ 12-117(3) is to achieve some modicum of local responsibility for unreasonable conduct
will be greatly undermined if local government officials are able to purchase insurance coverage
that prevents attorney fee awards for violating the legal rights of citizens without a reasonable
basis in fact or law from coming from the regular operating budget of that government.
Recently the Supreme Court tried to limit the effectiveness of LC. § 12-117(3) in
curtailing the abuse oflocal government. See, Smith v. Washington County, 149 Idaho 787,241
P.3d 960 (2010). The legislature responded with amendments in 2012 that made it clear their
intent that Idaho Code 12-117(3) was not to be watered down by the Courts to prevent its full
impact in protecting citizens from local governments and to dis-incentivize such conduct:
Until the summer of 2009, Idaho Code Section 12-117 was interpreted by the Idaho
Supreme Court to allow an award of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in
administrative cases if the non-prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law. Following an Idaho Supreme Court ruling in the summer of2009 which
reinterpreted the statute to bar such awards, HB 4 21 was passed by the 2010 Legislature
and signed into law with the objective of allowing such awards at all stages of an
2
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administrative proceeding, including on appeal to the courts. Nonetheless, on October 6,
2010 the Idaho Supreme Court ruled in Smith v. Washington County, 149 Idaho 787,241
P .3d 960 (2010), that the 2010 amendments did not accomplish this objective. This bill
adds additional language to Idaho Code Section 12-117 to correct this situation. It also
amends Idaho Code Section 12-117 to cover health districts (which are not technically
regarded as state agencies), to provide that the prevailing party in lawsuits between
governmental entities is entitled to recover attorney fees and costs as a disincentive to
such suits, and to make technical corrections.
Statement of Purpose, S.B. 1332 (2012).
That is the issue raised in this lawsuit. Whether insurance being provided by ICRM to
local government officials is having the effect of thwarting the legislative purpose in the
enactment of Idaho Code § 12-117 by shifting the burden of paying attorney fees awarded for
government action that is without a basis in fact or law from the offending party's operating
budget to ICRMP's insurance pool. Mr. Westover's discovery requests were specifically tailored
to find the answer to that question. ICRMP's obfuscation in response to the requests for
admission and its refusal to respond to the interrogatories and document requests has made it
impossible for the Court to answer this rather straightforward question.

ARGUMENT
Our Rules of Civil Procedure define the scope of discovery. Rule 26(b )(1 )(A) provides
the simple formula:
General Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party's claim or defense, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause,
the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action.
Tellingly, the rule continues: "Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if
the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
Issues relating to what might be admissible at trial are not litigated at the discovery stage. Mr.
3
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Westover's discovery was specifically directed to the question of whether ICRMP policies
interfere with the legislative directive found in Idaho Code§ 12-117 designed to bring
accountability to local government by making them feel the consequence of their conduct in their
operating budget. Mr. Westover's discovery is aimed precisely at that pivotal point and is highly
likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Interrogatory No. 1 is a typical request to provide a factual basis for failing to admit
critical issues in the case. Such interrogatories not only help frame the issues that might be
ultimately tried, but provide a buffer against the type of evasive answers to requests for
admission that were submitted in this case. ICRMP's answers to those requests for admission
are a model of obfuscation whenever the request neared the critical issues in this case.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #1: Admit that you have the duty and the right to
defend your members against lawsuits brought against them by citizens subject to their
jurisdiction.
RESPONSE: ICRMP admits that, consistent with the terms and conditions of the
insurance policy purchased by its insureds, it is contractually obligated to provide a defense to
its insureds when they are sued for claims that are potentially entitled to coverage under the
ICRMP insurance policy. ICRMP denies the remainder of Request No. 1.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #2: Admit that you have the right to control the
litigation tendered to you by your members.
RESPONSE: ICRMP admits that, consistent with the terms and conditions of the
insurance policy purchased by its insureds, it has a contractual right to make strategic decisions
concerning litigation involving claims that are entitled to coverage under the ICRMP policy.
Defendant denies the remainder of Request No. 2.

4
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #3: Admit that you have the right to control settlement

and mediation of litigation tendered to you by your members.
RESPONSE: See Response to Request No. 2, above.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #7: Admit that on July 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed an

action against the Franklin County Assessor in the Sixth Judicial District Court, Case No.
CV-2015-312. ("The Assessor Lawsuit")
RESPONSE: It is admitted that there exists a case styled Westover v. Cundick, et al,

Case No. CV-2015-312 in the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Franklin County, Idaho.
When specifically asked requests for admission on the ultimate issues in this lawsuit
(which is specifically allowed under Rule 30, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure),
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #4: Admit that you have the duty to pay any expenses

awarded against your members in lawsuits tendered to you by your members, including actions
covered by Idaho Code Section 12-11 7.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #11: Admit that you refused to authorize the Franklin

County Assessor to pay any money in settlement of the Assessor Lawsuit during that mediation.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #13: Admit that if the Franklin County Assessor is

ordered to pay attorney fees to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit you will be obligated to pay
those fees on behalf of the Franklin County Assessor.
RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, and calls for a

legal conclusion. Any obligation by ICRMP to indemnify the Franklin County Assessor is
controlled by the terms and conditions of the insurance policy purchased by Franklin County.

5
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Request No. 13 is denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #14: Admit that any payment that you make toward

attorney fees that might be awarded to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit will be paid from
funds you collect and pool from all your members.
RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, calls for a legal conclusion,

and is dependent upon facts which have not occurred and may not ever occur. As such, the
request is denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #15: Admit that any payment that you make toward

attorney fees that might be awarded to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit will not be paid from
funds in the regular operating budget of the Franklin County Assessor.
RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, calls for a legal conclusion,

and is dependent upon facts which have not occurred and may not ever occur. As such, the
request is denied.
ICRMP denied the requests, hence the need for a response to the first interrogatory
spelling out the factual basis for denial. Similarly, in response to a requests about the
jurisdictional basis for this lawsuit, Plaintiff was given evasive answers:
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #6: Admit that the Franklin County Assessor is a

political subdivision.
RESPONSE: Denied as phrased.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #8: Admit that the Franklin County Assessor is

and was at the time the Assessor Lawsuit was filed one of your members.
RESPONSE: Objection; the request as phrased is a compound request. It is admitted

only that Franklin County was an insured ofICRMP. The remainder of the request is denied.
6
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Obviously, the contract by which ICRMP was obligated to provide a defense to the
lawsuit brought by Mr. Westover against the Assessor (Interrogatory No. 2), may shed light on
whether the insurance practices ofICRMP undermine the legislative purposes of LC. §12-117.
If that contract provides that ICRMP will pay a judgment for attorney fees despite a ruling by the
Court that the assessor acted "without a reasonable basis in fact or law," the purposes of I.C.
§ 12-117 will be thwarted. Curiously, in response to Request for Admission No. 13, ICRMP
instead of giving a forthright admission or denial as required by the rules, instead obfuscated by
reference to this contract that it now refuses to produce!

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #13: Admit that if the Franklin County Assessor is
ordered to pay attorney fees to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit you will be obligated to pay
those fees on behalf of the Franklin County Assessor.

RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, and calls for a
legal conclusion. Any obligation by ICRMP to indemnify the Franklin County Assessor is
controlled by the terms and conditions of the insurance policy purchased by Franklin County.
Request No. 13 is denied.
Interrogatory No. 3 is directly to the point: "Please identify the source of any payments
that have been made, or that will be made or for which there is an obligation to be made to
reimburse attorney fees to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit in the event that a court orders
the Franklin County Assessor to pay attorney fees in connection with that lawsuit." Any
payment of attorney fees to the plaintiff in the Assessor lawsuit will be on the basis that the
Assessor's position in that lawsuit was "without a reasonable basis in fact or law." The
legislature specifically required that "Expenses awarded against a state agency or political
subdivision pursuant to this section shall be paid from funds in the regular operating budget of
7
192 of 272

the state agency or political subdivision." LC. § 12-117 (3). Obviously, ifICRMP were
obligated to pay those fees and is the source of those payments the legislative purpose in making
sure that irresponsible actions by local government officials is felt at the local level so as to be a
deterrent to future local government irresponsibility will be undermined.
The remaining three interrogatories (mistakenly all numbered No. 3) simply ask for the
identifying information relating to witnesses, expert witnesses, and persons with knowledge of
the facts.

Rule 26 specifically makes that information discoverable. Rule 26(b)(l)(A). It is

difficult to imagine a proper objection to such information.
Mr. Westover' s document requests were similarly all seeking discoverable evidence and
were specifically aimed at facts relevant to the pivotal issue in this case of whether a local
government official has purchased insurance that has the potential of thwarting the goal of LC.
§ 12-11 7 to bring accountability to local government conduct by requiring them to pay attorney
fees incurred by their constituents fighting battles that should never have been fought.

I.

Whether ICRMP Made the Right Call in Not Participating in the Mediation in
Good Faith is Not Relevant
ICRMP makes the argument that it made the correct call when it would not allow the

Assessor to offer any settlement at the mediation because when the parties returned to Court the
Assessor prevailed in having Mr. Westover's claims for Writ of mandamus/prohibition
dismissed.

That argument misses the point for two reasons. The Court will recall that the

Westover's complaint was dismissed, not because the Court found that the Assessor's conduct
had been lawful. Indeed, the Court chastised the Assessor for inserting himself into this real
estate transaction only because no statute prohibited him from doing so.

8
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THE COURT: Enough of this for a minute. Mr. Williams, why is your client so intent on
picking this fight, which seems to exceed perhaps what his role as an elected official with
the Franklin County Assessor's office would be? Why does he concern himself with this
issue?
MR. WILLIAMS: We attempted to resolve this matter back in August. We sent a letter to
Mr. Atkin that said basically this is moot, there's now a deed in place.
THE COURT: But that's not my question. Why did he involve himself in the first
instance? Does he have any responsibility to notify Rocky Mountain Power, or a third
party, that he feels like a filing with the recorder's office should be responded to or that
he should police those issues?
MR. WILLIAMS: That's the practice of the assessor's office and has been for a number
of years. When there is a question as to ownership -THE COURT: Again, it might be a practice, but is there any legal or statutory authority
that he do that?
MR. WILLIAMS: There is no authority to prohibit him from doing it.
THE COURT: And in fact he holds himself out to a lawsuit such as this if he's incorrect
in his legal assessment of the state of affairs, correct?
MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, correct. As we now know. 1
Transcript of Hearing held 11-12-2015, p.p. 15-16.

This action is not premised on the outcome of the litigation between the plaintiff and the
Assessor. Rather, this action is a challenge to an insurance regime that thwarts the legislative
effort to get local government to stay within the law and not embark on the kind of rogue efforts
that spawned the litigation between this plaintiff and the Assessor. Similarly what happened at
the mediation is relevant only for the fact that it illustrates an evil that needs to be eradicated.
The purpose of LC. § 12-117 is to take away the incentive oflocal government officials to be
stubbornly litigious. What happened to the Westovers is not the basis for this action, but it is a
textbook example of what happens when local governments take action to thwart the legislative

1 MR. ATKIN: The other position that the assessor takes that causes me and my clients grave concern is that the assessor takes the position that
what he did in this case was a discretionary function because there's nothing in the statute that prohibits him from doing the things that he did.
That is not my underst1µ1ding of what a discretionary function for a government official is.
Discretionary function doesn't mean that because the statute doesn't prohibit the government official from doing something therefore he's free to
do it. My understanding of a discretionary function is the way it's defined in the tort claims act, a discretionary function is something for which
the government actor is shielded because he is performing a duty that was properly delegated to him under statute or regulation.
THE COURT: And in fact that's how governmental entities work, correct?
MR. ATKIN: That's correct.
Tl IE COURT: They have no authority to act unless there is statutory authority for them to so act, correct?
Transcript qf Hearing held 2-ll-/6, p.p. 3-4.
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intent that the consequences of unfounded and stubborn conduct be felt in their operating budget.
A local government official is less likely to ignore the plea of his constituent to correct a
wrongful interference with a business transaction if he knows he will feel it locally if he persists
in his stubborn refusal. He is less likely to defend arbitrary conduct "because there is not statute
that prohibits his conduct" ifhe knows that taking that kind of position in court is likely to ding
his local operating budget. In short, the stubborn refusal of the Assessor to correct the false
statement he made to the power company in a letter he had no business writing would be far less
likely to have occurred if the Assessor had not had insurance coverage that would pay the fees
incurred by his constituents in getting him to get off his stubborn refusal to simply correct his
wrongs.

If full and complete responses to the discovery that the plaintiff has propounded show
that the indemnification provided by ICRMP will cover awards made to citizens who meet
stubborn litigiousness from their local government officials who have acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or in law, then this action is proper and summary judgment will need to be granted
to the Plaintiff.
The Assessor, without any statutory or other authority to do so, wrote a letter to the
Westovers' Grantee the power company, telling it that the Westovers were not the owners of the
property over which they had granted a power easement. That ultra vires act threatened to
disrupt the Westovers' contract and power to their facility. This conduct was without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.
The Westovers reached out to the Assessor, several times personally, several times
through their lawyer, and finally through a formal demand letter, asking the Assessor to correct
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the error he had made through the ultra vires letter to the power company. Their pleas went
unheeded. This conduct was without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Seeing no alternative, the Westovers brought legal action against the Assessor to have the
court order him through a writ of mandamus to retract his statement to the power company that
the Westovers did not own the property.
Rather than simply retract the false statement in a letter he had no business writing, the
Assessor filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the Westovers did not have standing to seek
legal help to get the ultra vires letter retracted. That conduct was without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.
Ultimately, the Assessor did issue the retraction letter telling the power company that the
Westovers did in fact own the property over which they had conveyed the easement. But that
retraction letter came after months of unnecessary delay, and thousands of dollars in attorney
fees.
At no time was the Assessor able to articulate any reasonable basis in fact or law for his
issuance of the letter to the power company, and more importantly for his reluctance to simply
correct the error at the request of the Westovers until after they had spent months worrying about
their ability to continue their business and thousands of dollars in attorney fees. That prolonged
conduct was "without a reasonable basis in fact or law. "
LC. §12-117 requires that where a political subdivision of the State in litigation with a
private citizen has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, the court shall award
attorney's fees to the prevailing party. The legislature went further, requiring that the brunt of
the attorney fee award be felt by the political subdivision and not be passed off. I.C. §12-117 (3)
specifically states that "Expenses awarded against a state agency or political subdivision
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pursuant to this section shall be paid from funds in the regular operating budget of the state
agency or political subdivision."
If ICRMP offers insurance to political subdivisions against attorney fees awards under
LC. § 12-117(3), it negates the effect of that section and the legislative intent to bring rationality
into the actions of local government through the threat that, if they lose, and if they are found to
have acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law they will have to pay an attorney fee award
out of their regular operating budget.
Throughout this ordeal, the Westovers could never understand why the Assessor ignored
their pleas, spent thousands of dollars on litigation defending conduct for which there is no
statutory authority. Why did he not simply issue the retraction letter which he finally issued
months and thousands of dollars later. At the mediation they learned the reason. The reason was
ICRMP. By illegally insuring against the eventuality of an attorney fee award that needed to be
felt in the local operating budget, ICRMP had removed both the incentive and the power of the
Assessor to act reasonably.
What happened at the mediation, and what happened ultimately in the case (which is
currently on appeal) is beside the point and is being used by ICRMP as a red herring. Obviously
the legislature, in enacting I. C. § 12-117 (3) was not looking for a new way for litigants to get
money from local governments. Rather they had a loftier goal in mind. That of promoting
rational and legal conduct on the part of local government. That is what the Westovers were
deprived of in this case. True, they hope one day as a result of their appeal to be compensated
for the wringer the Assessor ran them through, but whether they ever prevail on that goal, they
have been damaged by having to deal with a local government official who would not, or
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because of his contract with ICRMP could not act rationally and legally in the way that he
conducted the litigation with the Westovers.
At this point, because ICRMP refused to respond to discovery this Court must assume
that the facts after discovery will show that ICRMP agreed to indemnify the Assessor if an award
of attorney fees were assessed for violation of LC. § 12-11 7. ICRMP had a contractual
arrangement with the Assessor that interfered with the Assessor's handling of the litigation so
that he was precluded from acting in the manner that he felt was reasonable and legal. If those
facts tum out to be true, which the Court must assume because of the premature nature of the
motion for summary judgment and ICRMP's refusal to comply with the discovery rules, then
ICRMP is a pernicious organization whose purpose is to annul the legislative pronouncement of
LC. § 12-117, and it must be stopped.
II.

Plaintiff Has Standing to Sue Defendant for Violation of I.C. § 12-117

ICRMP argues that Plaintiff does not have standing to sue in this case, because Plaintiffs
cannot maintain a direct cause of action against an insurance company. While it may be true an
injured third party cannot bring a direct action against a tortfeasor's insurance company,
generally, that is not the basis for Plaintiffs standing in this case. ICRMP's argument
completely misses the mark. Plaintiffs basis for standing is that ICRMP violated LC.§ 12-117
and Plaintiff was injured by this statutory violation. The insurance contract itself is the statutory
violation and the source of Plaintiffs injury.
As explained in detail above the main issue in this case is whether or not ICRMP's
assistance of governmental entities in paying attorney fees awards made against governmental
entities under LC.§ 12-117 is in fact a violation of that statutory mandate in LC.§ 12-117 (3)
that "Expenses awarded against a state agency or political subdivision pursuant to this section
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shall be paid from funds in the regular operating budget of the state agency or political
subdivision."

ICRMP insurance policy appears to enable these entities to avoid the purpose of

this statute by shifting the risk of loss to an insurance pool, rather that the governmental agency
having to shoulder the cost burden directly as § 12-117 intends. As a result, litigants are
subjected to the kind of unfounded, baseless refusal by the government official to correct his
ultra vires conduct early on that the Plaintiffs experienced in their litigation with the Assessor.
Plaintiff has standing to sue because he is claiming that under the circumstances of this
case ICRMP violated I.C. § 12-117 and that such violation was the proximate cause of an injury
suffered by Plaintiff, namely being subjected to litigation with a government official taking a
position for which there was no reasonable basis in fact or law, and a governmental official who
persists in that baseless position to this day. A party may sue based on a violation of a statute.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that: "When deciding whether a party has standing, we have
looked to decisions of the United States Supreme Court for guidance." Kock v. Canyon County,
177 P.3d 372,375; 145 Idaho 158 (Idaho 2008). A party has standing to claim a statutory
violation if that party has suffered or is about to suffer an "injury in fact" to his interests by a
violation of a statute. Id.; Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009). The
alleged injury may be as non-specific as "harm in fact affects the recreational or even the mere
esthetic interests of the plaintiff' to suffice as support for standing. Id.
In this case, Plaintiffs injury was the failure of the Assessor to make a good faith effort
to determine the legality of his actions and not persist in them simply because "there is no
authority to prohibit him from doing it!''
Likewise he would appear to have a duty to take part in Court ordered mediation in the
case of Westover v. Franklin County Assessor Case No. CV-2015-312. The reason the Assessor
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did not participate in the mediation in good faith is because ICRMP was directing that litigation
and instructed the Assessor not to participate in a meaningful way at the mediation. ICRMP
would be liable to pay any settlement amount, rather than Franklin County directly from its
operating budget as I.C. § 12-117(3) requires. It appears obvious that the Assessor would be
much more inclined to resolve the matter by settlement, and would have retracted his slanderous
letter early on, if any settlement were to be paid by the County directly. This is enough of an
"injury in fact" to support standing.
Plaintiff has alleged that lCRMP (as well as the Franklin County Assessor), under the
circumstances of the case, violated the intent and purpose of LC. § 12-117 by providing
insurance for any loss incurred because of the Assessor's unreasonable actions, rather than
requiring the Assessor to pay directly out of his operating funds as the statute requires. This
violation caused harm to plaintiff by the Assessor stubbornly refusing to retract his false
statements about the plaintiffs title to the property and by not participating in good faith in Court
ordered mediation. Plaintiff has standing to bring this case against ICRMP.
CONCLUSION

This Court should deny ICRMP's Motion for Summary Judgement and grant plaintiff's
Motion to Compel ICRMP's response to discovery. Plaintiff should be awarded his fees in
having to bring a Motion to Compel.
DATED this 14th day of September, 2016.
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.

Blake S. Atkin
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
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IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANGEMENT PROGRAM (ICRMP),

Judge: Brown
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Please take notice that the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel will be heard on Thursday, September 29,
2016, at 2:00 p.m.

DATED this 19th day of September, 2016.
Atkin Law Offices

4/c~
, Blake S. Atkin
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
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Attorneys for Defendants, IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(ICRMP)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2016-195

vs.

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)
Defendants.

I.
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT !.C. § 12-117 APPLIED TO THE
CLAIMS AGAINST FRANKNLIN COUNTY.

In their response, plaintiff argues that I.C. § 12-117 was enacted to discourage
governmental entities from "violating the legal rights of citizens without a reasonable
basis in fact or law". See Memorandum in Opposition, p. 2. To support this assertion
he then suggests that allowing the government to purchase casualty insurance would
encourage elected officials to engage in tortious or illegal conduct as the financial
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responsibility for their actions would be shifted to the insurance company rather than
being paid from the governmental entities operating budget.

This argument is

unsupported by the facts in this case and, is inconsistent with case law from the Idaho
Supreme Court.
The initial flaw in plaintiffs argument is his focus upon the insurance company's
agreement to indemnify in the event its insured is found liable for a covered claim. See
Boice Aff, Exb. 1, p. 20, ,rA; p. 31 ,rA. In addition to its indemnity obligations, ICRMP
was required to provide Franklin County a defense. Id., p. 4, ,rs. An insurer's duty to
defend is a separate, unrelated and broader obligation than its duty to pay for damages
under the insurance contract. See Hirst v. Saint Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 106
Idaho 792, 798, 683 P.2d 440, 446 (Ct. App. 1984); Deluna v. State Farm Fire &

Casualty Co., 149 Idaho 81, 85, 233 P.3d 12, 16 (2008). Consistent with the terms of
the insurance policy it sold to Franklin County, ICRMP hired counsel to defend its
insured. See Boice Aff., ,r3. That defense, which included representing and advising
the County at mediation, caused Franklin County to decide to stand on its legal rights
and defend the case rather than seek settlement.
When Mr. Westover filed his lawsuit, that filing did not guarantee he would
receive compensatory damages or non-monetary relief. The rules of civil procedure, as
well as the federal and state constitutions, afforded him the opportunity to pursue his
claims in court.

Those same rules and constitutional guarantees provided Franklin

County the opportunity to retain counsel and defend itself.
misguided attempt to interfere with the County's legal rights.

Plaintiffs argument is a
Idaho Code § 12-117

cannot be interpreted to restrict the County's ability to retain legal counsel, develop legal

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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and factual defenses and, advance those defenses through legal motions or at trial.
Any restriction upon the County's legal rights is not stated in the statute and, would
raise serious constitutional questions.
The second flaw in the plaintiffs argument is the apparent suggestion that I.C.
§ 12-117 is intended to govern a tortfeasor's conduct prior to the time a lawsuit is filed.
This argument ignores the plain language of the statute which allows the court to award
attorney's fees in "any proceeding involving as adverse party's estate agency or a
political subdivision and a person ... if it finds that the non-prevailing party acted without
a reasonable basis in fact or law." See I.C. § 12-117(1). (emphasis added) The plain
language of the statute addresses the conduct of litigants during a lawsuit rather than
the events which caused the lawsuit to be filed. This requires a finding that the factual

See

or legal defenses offered to oppose the plaintiffs lawsuit were frivolous.

Employers Research Management Co. v. Dept. of Insurance, 143 Idaho 179, 141
P.3d 1048 (2006); Ada County v. City of Garden City, 155 Idaho 914, 919, 318 P.3d
904, 909 (2014); Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 159 Idaho 798,
367 P.3d 193, 207 (2016). The same standard applies to the conduct of the plaintiff
with respect to the legal or factual claims offered in support of the liability complaint.
Franklin County aggressively defended the lawsuit filed by the Westovers. The
fact the case was not settled at mediation reflects the County's belief it was not liable
and, that the plaintiffs demands were excessive in light of the available legal and factual
defenses. The fact Franklin County refused to settle and, was then granted summary
judgment establishes, as a matter of law, its defense in the Westover v. Franklin

County lawsuit was not frivolous. Accordingly, there was never a basis for an award of
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attorney's fees against Franklin County. For that reason, § 12-117 was never at issue
and, did not impact Mr. Westover's legal rights in any respect.
Finally, even if Franklin County's legal defenses could be criticized, I.C. § 12-117
could not have been used as a basis for awarding attorney's fees against either Franklin
County or Mr. Westover. The liability complaint alleged slander of title. Because the
defendants included a governmental entity and its elected official, the plaintiff's tort
claims were governed by the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA). The Act, at I.C. § 6-618A,
provided the exclusive basis for attorney fee awards. See Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho
407, 196 P.3d 325 (2008); Block v. City of Lewiston, 156 Idaho 484, 328 P.3d 464
(2014).

The ITCA unambiguously authorizes governmental entities to purchase

casualty insurance for "themselves and their employees". See I.C. § 6-923. Thus, the
argument that I.C. § 12-117 should be interpreted to prohibit or discourage Franklin
County from purchasing casualty insurance would conflict with the plain language of the
ITCA. Considering implied repeals are disfavored, see Callies v. O'Neil, 147 Idaho
841, 848, 216 P.3d 130, 136 (2009), the plaintiff's interpretation of§ 12-117 cannot be
accepted.
The plaintiff has failed to address to this aspect of the defendants' motion.

It

cannot be seriously argued the slander of title claim asserted against Franklin County
and the Assessor described a tort which brought the lawsuit under the umbrella of the
Idaho Tort Claims Act. The plaintiff's continued and misguided reliance upon § 12-117
in light of the Supreme Court's rulings addressing the exclusivity of I.C. § 6-618A shows
the plaintiff's arguments are without legal merit and, have become frivolous.

The

defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.
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II.
PLAINTIFF LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ICRMP AND FRANKLIN COUNTY.
In an effort to establish standing, plaintiff argues that ICRMP violated I.C. § 12117 and, as a result, he suffered injury. See Memorandum In Opposition, p. 13. This
argument is legally and factually frivolous.

Idaho Code § 12-117 does not mention

insurance, does not state a governmental entity is prohibited from purchasing
· insurance, and does not attempt to limit the coverages an insurance company is
allowed to offer to its customers. Plaintiff is asking the court to infuse language into the
statute which the legislature chose to omit. This argument violates established rules of
statutory construction, Wright v. Ada County, 160 Idaho 491, 376 P.3d 58 (2016) and,
is inconsistent with I.C. § § 6-922 through 6-926 which unambiguously authorizes
political subdivisions, such as Franklin County, to purchase insurance to protect
"themselves and their employees". See I.C. § 6-923.
As established in § I, above, the defense provided Franklin County, which
included the unsuccessful mediation, was not frivolous. Logically, a defendant and its
insurer cannot be accused of pursuing a frivolous defense when all claims against the
insured are dismissed through a motion for summary judgment. Because the Franklin
County defense was not frivolous, I.C. § 12-117 was not violated.

Accordingly,

Westover did not suffer an injury protected by the statute and, for that reason alone, his
standing argument fails.
It is unquestioned the plaintiff is not allowed to maintain a direct action against an
alleged tortfeasor's (Franklin County) insurance company. See Graham v. State Farm
Mutual Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 611, 67 P.3d 90 (2003). Plaintiffs have ignored this rule by
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-5

210 of 272

suggesting ICRMP's agreement to defend and indemnify Franklin County violated § 12117. As outlined in§ I, above, this argument is without merit. Westover is attempting to
interject himself into the contractual relationship between ICRMP and it's insured by
arguing the insurer was not allowed to provide insurance which, under certain defined
circumstances, could provide coverage for attorney's fees awarded against its insured. 1
This was the same argument that was rejected in Brooksby v. Geico Ins. Co., 153
Idaho 546, 296 P.3d 182 (2012) where the plaintiff argued an exclusion in the insurance
contract violated Idaho law. The Supreme Court ruled that Brooksby lacked standing to
challenge the insurer's reliance upon the disputed exclusion. See 153 Idaho at 548.
The same conclusion is applicable in this case.

Mr. Westover lacks standing to

question the contractual terms and coverages of the insurance policy purchased by
Franklin County from ICRMP. Additionally, Westover lacks standing to challenge
ICRMP's interpretation of those contractual terms as, he "is not a party to the insurance
contract and has no rights under it." See Hartman v. United Heritage Property and
Casualty, 141 Idaho 340, 346 (2005). This lawsuit is barred by the no direct action rule
and, must be dismissed.

Plaintiff's argument ignores language in the ICRMP policy that excludes coverage for
claims where the sole monetary compensation sought is limited to attorney's fees and
costs of suit. See Boice Aff., Exb. 1, p. 24, 1JD.1.j; p. 31, 1JB.3. Contrary to plaintiff's
argument, the ICRMP policy would exclude coverage if he had not sought
compensatory damages and had limited his claims to prospective injunctive relief and
attorney fees.
1
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DATED this ~day of September, 2016.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL

LLP

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-7

212 of 272

...

ii

'

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ a y of September, 2016, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following
attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Attorney for Plaintiff
(Courtesy Copy)
Judger{\~~W. Brown
159 S. Main Street
Soda Springs, ID 83276

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (801) 533-0380
Email:
batkin@atkinlawoffices.net

W
[ ]
[ ]

[)(.!_
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email:

Phillip J. Collaer

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-8

213 of 272

Phillip J. Collaer- ISB No. #3447
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
E-Mail:
pcollaer@ajhlaw.com

...._

!'

~

··~ ,.,_

-

.• i

l.,..'

--·-. -~-

~- -·

. . . . ,_ -. r.

~

-~----------

Attorneys for Defendant, IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(ICRMP)
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2016-195

vs.
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)

RESPONSE MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO COMPEL REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER

Defendants.

BACKGROUND

ICRMP previously filed its Motion for Protective Order in relation to Plaintiff's First
Set of Document Requests to Defendar.t, Plaintiff's F;rst Set of Requests for Admission
to Defendant, and Plaintiff's First Set o.f Interrogatories to Defendant. In an excess of
caution, it simultaneously filed responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Admission.
Plaintiff, Val D. Westover ("Plaintiff'') has now filed a Motion to Compel which
takes issue both with the Motion for Protective Order, and the Responses to Requests
for Admission. He asks the Court to compel ICRMP'S responses to discovery and to
award Plaintiff attorney's fees for having to bring a Motion to Compel. Neither relief

I I. NIA L
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should be granted, as explained below.
ARGUMENT

Firstly, although Plaintiff asks the Court to "Compel ICRMP's response to
discovery," he also acknowledges that ICRMP has responded to his Requests for
Admission. (Pl.'s Mem., p. 15; pp. 3-8) Plaintiff simply does not approve of ICRMP's
Responses to Requests for Admission, calling them obfuscating. (Pl.'s Mem., pp. 3, 4,
7)

In addition, ICRMP has not "failed" or refused to respond to plaintiff's discovery.
Instead, it properly and timely moved for a protective order. Whether, and when ICRMP
will be required to answer plaintiff's discovery, will be determined by the court when it
rules upon defendant's motions. See I.R.C.P. 26(c)(2). Thus, Plaintiff's request for fees
for "having to move to compel" should be denied, since the motion was not required as
ICRMP has not been ordered to respond to their discovery. 1 (Additionally, Plaintiff's
Motion to Compel does not include a certification as required by I.R.C.P. 37(a)(1) that
counsel conferred or attempted to confer with ICRMP's counsel before filing the
Motion-which did not occur.)
Plaintiff claims that, without responses to his interrogatories and document
requests, it will be "impossible for the Court" to answer what he poses as the central
question of the case:

whether insurance provided by ICRMP to local government

officials covers attorney's fees awarded under I.C. §12-117. (Pl.'s Mem., p. 3) This
argument failes to respond to defendant's Motion for Protective Order.

Whether an

insurance company is allowed to sell governmental agencies insurance that provides
1

Plaintiff should simply have responded to ICRMP's Motion for Protective Order, instead of filing a
Motion to Compel, either mistakenly or, seemingly, in an attempt to create a fee entitlement.
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indemnity coverage for certain claims, including attorney fee awards, presents a legal
issue that does not require factual discovery. The court can resolve these legal issues
prior to allowing either side to pursue unneeded and irrelevant factual discovery.
Additionally, as explained in ICRMP's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Brief,
I.C. § 12-117, could not have been utilized to award attorney fees in the Westover v.

Franklin Co. case. For that reason, the statute did not impact either Franklin County or
Mr. Westover.
The question before the Court is whether Franklin County was empowered to
purchase insurance from ICRMP or any other insurance company.

This is a purely

legal question that does not require factual discovery.
CONCLUSION

There is nothing to "compel" in relation to the Requests for Admission as ICRMP
has responded to that aspect of plaintiffs discovery requests.
qualified admissions and denials were allowable.

Further, ICRMP's

Cf. Schwan's Sales Enterprises,

Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 142 Idaho 826, 136 P.3d 297 (2006) (party could have
qualified its responses to requests for admissions).

Any response to plaintiffs

interrogatories and document requests should be suspended until the defendants'
pending motion for summary judgment is resolved. See Serv. Employees Int'/ Union,

Local 6 v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 106 Idaho 756, 761, 683 P.2d 404, 409
(1984). Defendants' motion for protective order should be granted.
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DATED this

--a--

day of September, 2016.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL

By

LLP

~~-W~Oa~·-Phillip J. Collaer, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -z.-z- day of September, 2016, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
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ORDER by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the
method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Attorney for Plaintiff
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Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (801) 533-0380
Email:

Phillip J. Collaer
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Blake S. Atkin #6903
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
7579North West Side Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Email: batkin@atkinlawoffices.net
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D WESTOVE~

MOTION TO COMPEL
Plaintiff
Case No. CV-2016-195

V.

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANGEMENT PROGRAM (ICRMP),

Judge: Brown

Defendant.

Pursuant to the Court's order this date, Plaintiff files this motion to compel discovery.
Counsel's signature below certifies that prior to filing the motion to compel, on August 15, 2016
he caused the attached letter to be mailed to counsel for ICRlvlP attempting to negotiate answers
to the discovery, but never received a response.
DATED this 29th day of September, 2016.

Atkin Law Offices, P.C.

Blake S. Atkin
Attorneys for the Plaintiff

1
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ATKIN LAW OFFICES
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, ID 83228
TELEPHONE (801) 533-0300
FACSIMILE (801) 53J.-0380
e-mail: batkin@atkinlawoffices.net

August 15, 2016

Phillip J. Collaer
Anderson, Julian & Hull LLP
C.W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700

P.O. Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Re: Westoverv. ICRMP case no. CV·2016-l95
Responses to discovery requests
Dear Mr. Collaer:

I am writing this letter in order to try to avoid the cost of a motion to compel responses to
our discovery requests served on you on June 24, 2016. You served responses to our requests
for admission, but have not responded to our interrogatories nor our document requests. I have
received your motion for protective order and take it from that filing that you do not intend to
respond to our other discovery requests until compelled to do so by the Court. Hence this letter.
I do not agree with your premise that our discovery is irrelevant since local governments
are statutorily entitled to buy insurance that will reimburse tort claimants. Further, I do not think
that filing a motion for protective order is an appropriate method to object to discovery that you
consider to be irre\evant.

The ultimate issues in this case should not be litigated in a discovery

dispute, but would appear to me to be better relegated to a summary judgment motion after
proper discovery responses have fleshed out the issues factually.
On the issue of a local government's legal right to purchase insurance, I believe you miss
the point. As I am sure you are aware, the purpose of tort law, and in particular the tort claims
act, is to provide for compensation for injured persons. In that context, insurance is not only
pennissible, but no doubt desirable from the tort victim's standpoint because it provides a ready
fund for compensation.

On the other hand, the purpose of Idaho Code 12-11 7(3) to achieve

some modicum of local responsibility for unreasonable conduct will be greatly undermined if
local government officials are able to purchase insurance coverage that prevents attorney fee
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V
. awards for violating the legal rights of citizens without a reasonable basis in fact or law from
coming from the regular operating budget of that government.

That is the issue we are raising in this lawsuit. We want to know ·whether your insurance
to local government officials is having the effect of thwarting the legislative purpose in the

enactment ofldaho Code Section 12-117 by shifting the burden of paying attorney fees awarded
for government action that is without a basis in fact or law from the offending party's operating
budget to your insurance pool. Our discovery requests were specifically tailored to find the
answer to that question. Your obfuscation in response to our requests for admission and your
refusal to respond to the interrogatories and document requests has made it impossible for us to
answer this rather straightforward question.
Our rules of civil procedure define the scope of discovery. Rule 26(b)(l)(A) provides the
simple formula:
General Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party's claim or defense, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause,
the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action.
Tellingly, the rule continues: "Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if
the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
Issues relating to what might be admissible at trial are not litigated at the discovery stage. Mr.
Westover's discovery was specifically directed to the question of whether ICRMP policies
interfere with the legislative directive found in Idaho Code section 12-117 designed to bring
accountability to local government by making them feel the consequence of their conduct in their
operating budget. :Mr. Westover' s discovery is aimed precisely at that pivotal point and is highly
likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Interrogatory No. 1 is a typical request to provide a factual basis for failing· to admit
critical issues in the case. Such interrogatories not only help frame the issues that might be
ultimately tried, but provide a buffer against the type of evasive answers to requests for
admission that were submitted in this case. ICRMP's answers to those requests for admission
are aroodel_ofobfuscation.whenever,the request neared the_critical_i~_su_es in_this case. __ ...... ,-··-·-········
2 IPage
221 of 272

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #1: Admit that you have the duty and the right to
defend your members against lawsuits brought against them by citizens subject to their
jurisdiction.

RESPONSE: ICRMP admits that, consistent with the tenns and conditions of the
insurance policy purchased by its insureds, it is contractually obligated to provide a defense to
its insureds when they are sued for claims that are potentially entitled to coverage under the
ICRMP insurance policy. ICRMP denies the remainder of Request No. 1.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #2: Admit that you have the right to control the
litigation tendered to you by your members.
RESPONSE: ICRMP admits that, consistent with the terms and conditions of the

insurance policy purchased by its insureds, it has a contractual right to make strategic decisions
concerning litigation involving claims that are entitled to coverage under the ICRMP policy.
Defendant denies the remainder of Request No. 2.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #3: Admit that you have the right to control settlement
and mediation of litigation tendered to you by your members.
RESPONSE: See Response to Request No. 2, above.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #7: Admit that on July 30~ 2015, Plaintiff filed an

action against the Franklin County Assessor in the Sixth Judicial District Court, Case No.
CV~2015-312. ("The Assessor Lawsuit")
RESPONSE: It is admitted that there exists a case styled Westover v. Cundick, et al,

Case No. CV-2015-312 in the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Franklin County, Idaho.
When specifically asked requests for admission on the ultimate issues in this lawsuit
(which is specifically allowed under rule 30, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure),
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #4: Admit that you have the duty to pay any expenses

awarded against your members in lawsuits tendered to you by your members, including actions
covered by Idaho Code Section 12-117.
RESPONSE: Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #11: Admit that you refused to authorize the Franklin
County Assessor to pay any money in settlement of the Assessor Lawsuit during that mediation.
RESPONSE: Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #13: Admit that if the Franklin County Assessor is
ordered to pay attorney fees to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit you will be obligated to pay
3 !Page
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those fees on behalf of the Franklin County Assessor.

RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, and calls for a
legal conclusion. Any obligation by ICRMP to indemnify the Franklin County Assessor is
controlled by the terms and conditions of the insurance policy purchased by Franklin County.
Request No. 13 is denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #14: Admit that any payment that you make toward
attorney fees that might be awarded to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit will be paid from
funds you collect and pool from all your members.

RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, calls for a legal conclusion,
and is dependent upon facts which have not occurred and may not ever occur. As such, the
request is denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #15: Admit that any payment that you make to~-ard
attorney fees th.at might be awarded to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit will not be paid from
funds in the regular operating budget of the Franklin County Assessor.

RF,SPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, calls for a legal conclusion,
and is dependent upon facts which have not occurred and may not ever occur. As such, the
request is denied.
ICR.MP denied the requests, hence the need for a response to the first interrogatory
spelling out the factual basis for denial.
Similarly, in response to a requests about the jurisdictional basis for this lawsuit, Plaintiff
was given evasive answers:

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #6: Adroit that.the Franklin County Assessor is a
political subdivision.

RESPONSE: Denied as phrased.
REQUEST FOR ADl\fiSSION #8: Admit that the Franklin County Assessor is
and was at the time the Assessor Lawsuit was filed one of your members.

RESPONSE: Objection; the request as phrased is a compound request. It is admitted
only that Franklin County was an insured ofICRMP. The remainder of the request is denied.
Obviously, the contract by which ICRMP was obligated to provide a defense to the
lawsuit brought by Mr. Westover against the Assessor (Interrogatory No. 2), may shed light on
whether the insurance practices of ICRMP undermine the legislative purposes of Idaho Code
section 12-117. If that contract provides that ICRMP "'ill pay a judgment for attorney fees
4jPage
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despite a ruling by the Court that the assessor acted "without a reasonable basis in fact or law,"
the purposes of Idaho Code section 12-11 7 will be thwarted. Curiously, in responses to request
for admission No. 13; ICRM:P instead of giving a forthright admission or denial as required by
the rules, instead obfuscated by reference to this contract that it now refuses to produce!
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #13: Admit that if the Franklin County Assessor is

ordered to pay attorney fees to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit you will be obligated to pay
those fees on behalf of the Franklin County Assessor.
RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, and calls for a

legal conclusion. Any obligation by ICRMP to indemnify the Franklin County Assessor is
controlled by the terms and conditions of the insurance policy purchased by Franklin County.
Request No. 13 is denied.
Interrogatory No. 3 is directly to the point: "Please identify the source of any payments
that have been made, or that will be made or for which there is an obligation to be made to
reimburse attorney fees to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit in the event that a court orders
the Franklin County Assessor to pay attorney fees in connection with that lawsuit." Any
payment of attorney fees to the plaintiff in the Assessor lawsuit will be on the basis that the
Assessor's position in that lawsuit was "without a reasonable basis in fact or law." The
legislature specifically required that "Expenses awarded against a state agency or political
subdivision pursuant to this section shall be paid from funds in the regular operating budget of
the state agency or political subdivision." Idaho Code Section 12-117 (3). Obviously, if ICRMP
were obligated to pay those fees and is the source of those payments the legislative purpose in
making sure that irresponsible actions by local government officials is felt at the local level so as
to be a deterrent to future local government irresponsibility will be undermined.
The remaining three interrogatories (mistakenly all numbered No. 3) simply ask for the
identifying information relating to witnesses, expert witnesses, and persons with knowledge of
the facts.

Rule 26 specifically makes that information discoverable. Rule 26(b)(1 )(A). It is

difficult to imagine a proper objection to such information.
Mr. Westover's document requests were similarly all see.king discoverable evidence and
were specifically aimed at facts relevant to the pivotal issue in this case of whether a local
government official has purchased insurance that has the potential of thwarting the goal of Idaho
Code section 12-11 7 to bring accountability to local government conduct by requiring them to
pay attorney fees incurred by their constituents fighting battles that should never have been
5 IPage
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fought.
I hope that as you consider the points I have raised in this letter> you will decide to

provide us with the evidence we have sought in our discovery requests. If you continue to assert
that you have no duty to do so, please advise me of the reasonable basis for your refusal to
provide what seems to me to be highly relevant information.

Sincerely,

Blake S. Atkin
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day of September, 2016, I caused to be served. by the
method(s) indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON, JULL\N & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700

X U.S. Mail X E-mail

_Facsimile

P.O. Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Facsimile: (208) 334-5510
Email: pcollaer@ajhlaw.com
Hon. Mitchell W. Bro-wn
159 South Main
Soda Springs, ID 83276

U.S. Mail

E-mail

X Facsimile

U.S. Mail

E-mail

X Facsimile

Facsimile: (208) 547-2147

Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263
Facsimile: (208) 852'."2926

Dated this 29th day of September, 2016.
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FRANKLIN COUN1Y CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,

vs

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)
Defendant.

________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2016-195

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

This matter came before the Court on September 29, 2016 for hearing on various
motions.

Blake S. Atkin appeared for and on behalf of the Plaintiff, Val D. Westover. The

Plaintiff was also present in the courtroom. Phillip J. Collaer appeared for and on behalf of the
Defendant, Idaho Counties Risk Management Program (ICRMP). Rodney M. Felshaw acted as
court reporter.
Pursuant to stipulation by the parties, the Court will hear on shortened notice the parties'
Motion to Compel and a Motion for Protective order. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
was also duly scheduled for hearing on today's date. The Court noted that Plaintiff had not filed a
formal motion to compel but had filed a memorandum; the Court asked that the Plaintiff file the
appropriate Motion to Compel. The Court noted that to the extent the Plaintiff was seeking a delay
of the summary judgment hearing pursuant to Rule 56(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
("I.R.C.P.") Plaintiff had failed to comply with the Rule. Specifically, Plaintiff had not filed an

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER - l
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affidavit or declaration. The Court, to the extent that Plaintiff was seeking a delay of the summary
judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(d), the request is DENIED.
The Court heard the parties' arguments with respect to the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and
Motion for Protective Order.
The Court heard the parties' arguments with respect to the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Thereafter, the Court GRANTED Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment advising that it will issue a written decision. The Court also reserves the right to amend
the order that was announced here today. Further, the Court will not enter a judgment until it has
issued the Memorandum Decision and Order.

Based upon the Court's summary judgment

determination, the Court will not address or rule on the Motion to Compel or Motion for Protective
Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 1st day of October, 2016.

MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER - 2

228 of 272

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE

":i·

The undersigned certifies that on the
~ay of October, 2016, she caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in
the following manner:
Attomey(s)/Person(s):

Method of Service:

Blake S. Atkin
Counsel for Plaintiff

Email: batkin@atkinlawoffices.net

Phillip J. Collaer
Counsel for Defendnat

Email: pcollaer@jhlaw.com

SHAUNA T. GEDDES, Clerk

By:

Ltirrlo. /l(J/1(/Jtolf, Deputy Clerk
'
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICt OF THE .
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,

vs

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)
Defendant.

_________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2016-195

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

The Court having considered Defendants Idaho Counties Risk Management Program's
(ICRMP), Motion for Summary Judgment and having considered oral arguments of the parties, it
is hereby ordered that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims in the complaint against defendants will be
dismissed with prejudice. The Court will prepare a written Memorandum Decision and Order on
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and will also file a final judgment in accordance
with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 1st day ofNovember, 2016.

MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge
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correct copy of the foregoing Order Re Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment to be served
upon the following persons in the following manner:
Attomey{s)/Person{s):

Method of Service:

Blake S. Atkin
Counsel for Plaintiff

Faxed: (801) 533-0380

Phillip J. Collaer
Counsel for Defendnat

Faxed: (208) 344-5510

SHAUNA T. GEDDES, Clerk

By: Lilfrla 1/(1/1(/Jtolf, Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
)

)
)

VAL D. WESTOVER,

Case No: CV-2016-195

)

Plaintiff,

vs

)

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK IYIANAGEMENT

)
)
)

PROGRAM (ICRMP)

)

:MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON ICRMP'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARYJUDGMENT

)

Defendant.

_______________ ))
1bis matter is before the Court on the Defendant's, Idaho Counties Risk Management
Program ("ICRMP"), Motion for Summary Judgment ("MSJ"). 1 In conjunction with a Motion to
Compel, the Plaintiff, Val D. Westover ("Westover"), filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Compel and in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment ("Opposition Memorandum").2

11CRMP's MSJ was supported by a Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Supporting
Memorandum"), the Affidavit of Phillip J. Collaer in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Collaer Affidavit"), and the
Affidavit of Jeff Boice in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Boice Affidavit").
2At this point the Court must depart and address other procedural issues that came up in the conto,,..t of this summary judgment
proceeding. Westover did not file any affidavits or other evidence in support of his Opposition Memorandum. Instead, Westover
filed a separate Motion to Compel. While Westover obtaim:d a Stipulation with counsel for JCRMP to have his Motion to
Compel heard on shortened notice (See Stipulation filed on September 19, 19, 2016), his Motion to Compel was not actually filed
until after the hearing on ICRMP's MSJ. See Minute Entry and Order entered on October 1, 2016. Because the Court granted
ICRMP's MSJ from the bench, the Court did not take up Westover's Motion to Compel despite the parties' Stipulation. Toe
Court would also note that as pa11 of the proceedings on summary judgment and presumably Westover's Motion to Compel,
Westover made reference to Rule 56(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("I.R.C.P.") arguing that said Rule "makes it clear
that a party is entitled to discovery before being required to respond to a motion for summary judgment" See Opposition
Memorandum, p. 2. While I.R.C.P. 56(d) does provide a mechanism upon which a non-moving party faced with summary
judgment may obtain relief from the pending summary judgment, Westover has completely failed to comply with the
requirements ofl.R.C.P. 56(d). This Rule provides as follows:
If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential
to justify its opposition, the court may:
(\) defer considering the motion or deny it;
(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or
(3) issue any othet appropriate order.
Westover has wholly failed to comply with I.R.C.P. 56(d). He did not file a motion requesting any relief allowed pursuant to.
I.R.C.P. 56(d) subparagraphs (1) through (3). He did not file an affidavit or declaration setting forth a "specified reason" for any
of the l'elief allowed pursuant to t.R.C.P. 56(d)(l), (2) or (3). The burden of the moving party associated with a request made
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ICRMP filed a Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Reply
Memorandum'').

ICRMP's MSJ was argued before the Court and at the conclusion of the

parties' argument, the Court

GRANTED ICRMP's MSJ. However, the Court advised the

parties that it would issue a written Memorandum Decision and Order with respect to its order
granting summary judgment.

BACKGROUND
The genesis of the present controversy arises out of civil litigation between Westover and
Jase Cundick, the Franklin County Assessor.

See Westover v. Cundick, Franklin County

Assessor, Franklin County Case No. CV-2015-312 ("Westover v. Cundiclt'). In said litigation,
Westover requested that this Court enter a Writ of Mandamus and/or a Writ of Prohibition in his
favor. 3 The Court, in Westover v. Cundick, denied ·westover's requested relief. See Westover v.

Cundick, Final Judgment filed stamped February 17, 2016 and Minute Entry and Order file
stamped February 24, 2016.4 During the course of the litigation in Westover v. Cundick, the

pu1·suant to I.R.C.P. 56(d)(l) (formerly numbered as l.R.C.P. 56(f)) was recently addressed in Fagen, Jnc. v. Lava Beds Wind
Park, LLC, 159 Idaho 628, 364 P.3d 1193 (2016) (:'Fagen"). In Fagen, the Idaho Supreme Court noted as follows:
Rule 56(f) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure permits a trial court to continue the hearing on a motion for
summary judgment if"it appear[s] from the affidavits ofa party opposing the motion that the party cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify lhe party's opposition." "The rule clearly
contemplates that such a. motion must be supported with an affidavit stating the reasons why the continuance
is necessary." Franklin. Bldg. Supply Co. v. Hymas, 157 Idaho 632, 638, 339 P.3d 357, 363 (2014). The party
seeking a continuence "has the burden of setting out 'what further discovery would reveal that is essential to
justify their opposition,' making clear 'what information is sought and how it would preclude summary
judgment."' Jenkins v. Boise Cascade. Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 239, 108 P.3d 380, 386 (2005). In ruling on a
motion for a continuance under Rule 56(f), the trial court can consider "the moving party's previous lack of
diligence in pursing discovery." Boise Mode., LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 ldaho 99, 106, 294
P.3d 1 J l, 1118 (2013).
Jd. at 632, 364 P.3d at 1197. Therefore, the Court denied I.R.C.P. 56(d) relief, to the extent that Westover was requesting a
continuance pursuant to l.R.C.P. 56(d)(l ). See Minute Entry and Order entered on October 1, 2016.
3$pecifically, Westover requested that the Court issue a Writ of Mandate "ordering Jase Cundick, Franklin County Assessor, to
l'etract his slander of title." See Westover v. C1md1'ck, Complaint, p. 5. Westover also requested that the Court issue a Writ of
Prohibition "prohibiting Jase Cundick, Franklin County Assessor, from exceeding his authority in making property ownership
determinations for purposes beyond those required for taxes, and from communicating those determinations to third parties.'' Jd.
Interestingly, the thil'd cause of action asserted by Westover was one for Slander of Title. This is likely thi:: cause of action which
invoked a duty to defend under IC.RM.P's insurance contract with Franklin County, which defense and associated involvement in
the litigation provides the basis for Westover's complaints in the present litigation. This cause of action was ultimately dismissed
by Westover at the time of ore.I argument on Cundick's Motion to Dismiss.
"Westover perfocted an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court conce1ning this detenninBtion of the Court. This matter is presently
pending before the Idaho Supreme Court.
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parties pa11icipated in mediation. Westover alleges that the "focus of mediation was how much
the county would pay in attorney fees to the Plaintiff because the county assessor had retracted
its slanderous letter before mediation." Complaint,

,r 5. 5

Westover alleges that at mediation,

Cundick "announced ... that he could not offer anything in way of settlement of Plaintiff's
claims for attorney fees because he had no authority from ICRMP to offer anything in
settlement." Complaint,

,r

6. Westover alleges further, that he was "informed that ICRMP

controlled the litigation, provided lawyers who were defending [Cundick], would ultimately be
responsible to pay any judgment Plaintiff might obtain against the county assessor for attorney
fees, and asserted the right to control the negotiations at the mediation." Complaint ,r 7.
Based upon the foregoing, Westover filed his Complaint against ICRMP seeking a
declaration of rights, specifically requesting that the Court declare "ICRMP [to be] an illegal
entity, not authorized by Idaho Law" and also a declaration that "ICRMP in controlling litigation
between citizens and their local government by providing the defense and indemnifying for
attorney fees undermines principles of good governance as adopted by the legislature in Idaho
Code Section 12-117(3) and is therefore illegal." See Complaint, Prayer for Relief,

,r,r 1 and 2.

ICRMP filed its Answer followed sho11ly by the present MSJ.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party is entitled to summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving paity is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Idaho Rules of Civil

'The Court cannot speak to issue of what the primary focus of the mediation was. However, the Court's intention with respect to
ordering mediation in this matter was directed at resolving, through the mediation process, Westover's requests for Writ's of
Mandamus and Prohibition and his Slander of Title claim. See Westover v. Cundick, Minute Entry and Order file stamped
December 7, 2015. Ultimately, this mediation proved to be unsuccessful resulting in the Court having to rule on Cundick's
Motion to Dismiss. See Westover v. Cundick, Final Judgment filed stamped February t?, 2016 and Minute Entry and
Order file stamped Febrnary 24, 2016.
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Procedure 56(c); Syringa Netrvorks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't ofAdmin., 159 Idaho 813, 367 P.3d 208,
223 (2016).
The standards applicable to summary judgment require the courts to liberally construe the
facts in the record in favor of the non-moving party and to draw all reasonable inferences from
the facts in favor of the non-moving party. Hilliardv. Murphy Land Co., LLC, 158 Idaho 737,
744, 351 P.3d 1195, 1202 (2015), reh'g denied (July 20, 2015). If the record contains conflicting
inferences or reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be
denied. Edged In Stone, Inc. v. Nw. Power Sys., LLC, 156 Idaho 176, 180, 321 P.3d 726, 730
(2014). All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Unifund CCR, LLC v. Lowe, 159 ldaho 750,367 P.3d 145, 149 (2016)
Tue burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all
times with the party moving for summary judgment. La Bella Vita, LLC v. Shuler, 158 Idaho
799, 805, 353 P.3d 420, 426 (2015).

In order to meet its burden, the moving party must

challenge in its motion and establish through evidence the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact on an element of the non-moving party's case.

If the moving party fails to

challenge an element or fails to present evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, the burden does not shift to the non-moving party, and the non-moving party is not
required to respond with supporting evidence. Meikle v. Watson, 138 Idaho 680, 683, 69 P.3d
100, 103 (2003). However, if the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's
case on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Id.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the non-moving party bearing the burden of proof fails
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to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case. T.JT, Inc. v. Mori, 152 Idaho 1, 4,266 P.3d 476,479 (2011).
The party opposing the summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial."

Holdaway v. Broulim's Supermarket, 158 Idaho 606, 610, 349 P.3d 1197, 1201

(2015), reh'g denied (June 22, 2015).

The non-moving party's case must be anchored in

something more than speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a
genuine issue of fact. Am. Bank v. Wadsworth Golf Const. Co. of the Sw., 155 Idaho 186, 190,
307 P.3d 1212, 1216 (2013). If the non-moving party does not come forward as provided in the
rule, then summary judgment should be entered against that party. Rody Mountain Power v.

Jensen, 154 Idaho 549,554,300 P.3d 1037, 1042 (2012).

All doubts are to be resolved against the moving party, and the motion must be denied if
the evidence is such that one may draw conflicting inferences, and if reasonable people might
reach different conclusions. Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 411, 179 P.3d
1064, 1066-67 (2008).
The burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact rests at all times
upon the moving party. Silicon Int'[ Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538,550,314 P.3d
593, 605 (2013). However, once the absence of sufficient evidence on an element has been
shown, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish a genuine issue of material fact.

Holdaway v. Broulirn's Supermarket, 158 Idaho 606, 610-11, 349 P.3d 1197, 1201-02 (2015),
reh'g denied (June 22, 2015).
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DISCUSSION
ICRMP seeks summary judgment with respect to Westover's declaratory judgment
action, arguing "that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that [ICRMP] is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

MSJ, p. l.

Specifically, ICRMP asserts: (1) that

Westover "lacks standing to seek declaratory relief against ICRMP" (See Supporting
Memorandum, pp. 3-6); and (2) that Idaho Code ("LC.") § 12-117 does "not prevent Franklin
County from Purchasing Casualty Insurance" (See Supporting Memorandum, pp. 6-9).

A. ICRMP's Assertion of Lack of Standing
The Court will first address ICRMP's assertion that Westover lacks standing to pursue
this declaratory judgment action. Westover's claim is for a declaration declaring that ICRMP is
an "illegal entity" and that ICRMP's conduct in providing Cundick a defense in Westover v.

Cundick, directing the litigation and indemnifying Cundick for any award of attorney fees was
also illegal.
Title 10 of the Idaho Code, Chapter 12, addresses declaratory judgments in Idaho.
Specifically, LC.§ 10-1201 provides as follows:
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare
rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either
affinnative or negative in fonn and effect, and such declarations shall have the
force aud effect of a final judgment or decree.
LC.§ 10-1202 provides that:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writmgs
constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordjnance, contract or franchise, may
have determined any question of constructjon or validity arising under the
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
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[Bold Emphasis Added by Court].
ICRMP argues that what is commonly referred to as the "direct action rule" prohibits
Westover from pursuing this action directly against ICRMP.

One of Idaho's earlier

pronouncements articulating the "direct action rule" is contained in Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v.

Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980) ("Pocatello Indus. Parlf} In Pocatello
Indus. Park, the Idaho Supreme Court states as follows:
It is well established that absent a contractual or statutory provision authorizing
the action, an insurance carrier cannot be sued directly and cannot be joined as a
party defendant.

Id. at p. 791, 621 P.2d at 407. Certainly, there is no contractual basis authorizing the present
In fact, there is no contractual relationship between Westover and ICRMP, nor has

action.

Westover pointed the Court to any provision of ICRMP's contract of insurance with Franklin
County that would afford a third party, such as Westover, to bring a direct action against
ICRMP.
Therefore, the only basis upon which an argument may be asserted that Westover may
pursue bis "direct action" against ICRMP would be a "statutory provision authorizing the
action". One can certainly argue that LC. § 10-1202 is a "statutory provision authorizing such an
action. The prefatory phrase of J.C. § 10-1202 is "any interested person", without any limiting
language in the statute; th.is phrase can certainly be interpreted broadly e11m1gh to include
Westover under the facts of this case. Certainly utilizing a broad definition of "any interested
person", Westover is interested in the insurance relationship between !CR.MP and Franklin
County to the extent outlined in his Complaint.
However, Idaho case law has been unwilling to apply such a broad definition to the
phrase contained in I.C. § 10~ 1202, "any interested person." This Comt concludes that Brooksby
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v. Geico Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 546,286 P.3d 182 (2012) ("Brooksby") and its ruling relating to the
application of the language in LC. § 10-1202 is dispositive of the issue before this Court on
summary judgment.

Brooksby involved a case where Christina Brooksby ("Christina") was injured in a one
car motor vehicle accident while a passenger in a vehicle operated by her father, Craig Brooksby
("Craig'').

Christina demanded payment from Craig's liablility insurer, GEICO General

Insurance Company ("GEICO"). GEICO rejected Christina's claim and Christina filed a
declaratory judgment action against GEICO requesting a declaration of coverage under Craig's
insurance policy with GEICO.

Id. at p. 547, 286 P.3d 183.

The trial court "dismissed

Christina's Complaint for lack of standing. " 6
Christina appealed the detennination of the trial court dismissing her complaint. The trial
court's dismissal was af:fi.m1ed by the Idaho Supreme Court.

In affirming the trial court's

dismissal, the Supreme Court restated the basis for the "direct action rule" stating as follows:
The basis for this [the direct action] rule is that an insurance policy is "a matter of
contract between the insurer and the insured," and a third party "allegedly injured
by the insured is not a party to the insurance contract and has no rights under it."
Hartman, 141 Idaho at 199, 108 P.3d at 346

Id. at 548,286 P.3d, at 184. The Supreme Court continued its holding by stating as follows:

It makes no difference that Brooksby seeks declaratory relief as opposed to
money damages. The requirement that a party have standing is equally applicable
in both types of actions. See Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. State ex. rel. Batt, 128
Idaho 831, 834, 919 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1996) ("[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act
does not relieve a party from showing that it has standing to bring the action in the
first instance."); State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 597, 809 P.2d 455, 458 (1991)
("[AJ declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a case where an actual or
6Thc

Court would note that Brookrby 's posture at the time of dismissal was different than the case at bar. In Broolcsby, the issue
before the tdal court was a request for dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), failure to state a. claim upon which relief can be
granted. The present motion is one for summary judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56. However, this distinction is without
substance. It has long been the rule in Idaho that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) will be b:eatcd as a summary judgment motion. See Cobbley v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 134,
139 P.3d 732, 736. That ts essentially what is before the Court in the present motion, a motion to dismiss with supporting
affidavits tiled !CR.MP.
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justiciable controversy exists.)) (quoting Harris v. Cassia Cnty., 106 Idaho 513,
516, 681 P .2d 988, 991 (1984))).
Moreover) Brooksby's position is contradicted by the plain language of Idaho's
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act:
Any person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a ...
contract ... may have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the ... contract ... and obtain a declaration ofrights) status or other
legal relations thereunder.
I. C. § 10-1202 (emphasis added). In other words, the Act does not create any new
rights, statuses, or legal relations. It applies only where such rights, statuses, or
legal relations already exist. At this juncture, Brooksby simply has no right,
status, or legal relationship vis-a-vis GEICO that could form the basis of a
declaratory judgment action. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Dist. Court for Fourth
Judicial Dist., 862 P.2d 944, 948 (Colo.1993) (declaratory judgment would not
affect injured third party's then-existing or reasonably foreseeable rights, as she
might fail to establish alleged tortfeasor's liability); Knittle v. Progressive Cas.
Ins. Co., 112 Nev. 8,908 P.2d 724, 726 (1996).

Id at 548-49, 286 P.3d at 184-85. As was the case in Brooksby, outside of Westover's attempt
to obtain standing pursuant to Idaho's Declaratory Judgment statutes, Westover has no
contractual, tortious or other legal basis or standing to sue !CR.MP. Without some independent
"actual or justiciable controversy" between ICRMP and Westover, Idaho's Declaratory
Judgment Act "does not create any new rights, statuses or legal relations." Id. Rather, it only
provides a forum for declaration in a context "where such rights, statuses, or legal relations
already exist" Id.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Westover lacks standing to pursue a

declaratory judgment action against ICRMP. As a result, the Court will GRANT ICRMP's

MSJ. 7

7ICRMP also seeks summary judgment on the alternative ground that I.C. § 12-117 does not prevent Franklin
County from purchasing casualty insurance. The Court need not address this alternative ground for summary
judgment based upon its conclusion that Westover lacks standing. However, the Court agrees with ICRMP's
analysis of the summary judgment record as it relates to ICRMP's alternative basis for summary judgment. Had the
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CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the Court GRANTS ICRMP's MSJ having concluded, based
upon the record before the Court on summary judgment, that there are no genuine issues of
material fact and that ICRMP is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon Westover's
lack of standing to pursue his Complaint requesting declaratory relief. The Court will enter a
separate final judgment in this matter, dismissing Westover's Complaint with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 14th day ofNovember, 2016.

v

~/f
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the_ day of November, 2016, she caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in
the following manner:
Attomey(s)/Person(s):

Method of Service:

Blake S. Atkin
Counsel for Plaintiff

Facsimile: (801) 533-0380

Phillip J. Collaer

Facsimile: (208) 344-5510

Counsel for Defendnat

SHAUNA T. GEDDES, Clerk
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By:~#~
Court not granted summary judgment on the standing issue, it would also have granted summary judgment on the
alternative ground asserted by ICRMP.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,

vs
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)
Defendant.

_________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2016-195

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Plaintiffs Complaint (Jury Trial Demand) is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Counsel for Defendnat
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Phillip J. Collaer - ISB No. #3447
Anne S. Magnelli- lSB No. #9452
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street 1 Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
E-Mail:
pcollaer@ajhlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant, IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(ICRMP)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Case No. CV-2016-195

Plaintiff,
vs.

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)

DEFENDANT ICRMP'S MOTION
FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND
COSTS

Defendants.

COMES NOW IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM ("ICRMP"),
by and through its undersigned counsel Anderson, Julian & Hull LLP, and moves this
Court pursuant to I.C. §12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e) 1 for an award of attorneys'
fees and costs. ICRMP requests an award of attorney fees in the amount of $9,111.00.
ICRMP also moves for costs including costs as a matter of right in the amount of
$136.00 and discretionary costs in the amount of $188.49. This Motion is supported by
a Memorandum of Law In Support, a Verifled Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys'
Fees, the Declaration of Phillip

J. Collaer, and the business records of Anderson, Julian
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& Hull LLP submitted contemporaneously herewith.
DATED this

~~

l:_ day of November, 2016.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

By

O__. :t.

~ ; J ' . . ) ~ ' 1 ~ $'1_

~hillip J_ Collaer, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9-~day of November, 2016, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Motion by delivering the same to each of the following
attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414

[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]

~
]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (801) 533-0380
Email:

Attorney for Plaintiff

~hillip J. Collaer
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Phillip J. Collaer- lSB No. #3447
Anne S. Magnelli - ISB No. #9452
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
-pcollaer@ajhlaw.com
E-Mail:
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Attorneys for Defendant, IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
{ICRMP)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Case No. CV-2016-195

Plaintiff,
vs.
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)

DEFENDANT ICRMP'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS

Defendant.

COMES NOW IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM ("ICRMP"),
by and through its undersigned counsel Anderson, Julian & Hull LLP, and pursuant to

I.C. §12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e), submits its Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion for Fees and Costs. Its Memorandum of Costs as required by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5)
is filed concurrently herewith.

INTRODUCTION
Judgment was entered., with prejudice, in favor of ICRMP on November 14, 2016.
This followed the Court's Order granting defendant's Motion

DEFENDANT ICRMP'S MEMORANDUM
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS-1

for Summary Judgment.
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The Court ruled plaintiff could not maintain a direct action against ICRMP, and that the
plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the contractual relationship between, ICRMP and
Franklin County.

The Court also indicated that in the absence of the standing

argument, it would have granted summary judgment on the alternative basis that I.C.
§12-117 does not prevent ICRMP from providing insurance that could potentially
provide coverage for attorneys' fees awards.
ICRMP is entitled to attorneys' fees because the entire declaratory judgment
action was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. It is
also entitled to its discretionary costs.
ARGUMENT

Through its dispositive motion, defendant advised plaintiff, that he lacked
standing to pursue a third-party direct action against ICRMP, as Franklin County's
insurer. In the same vein, as noted in the briefing in the Motion for Protective Order,
defendant sought an agreement from plaintiff that factual discovery was not necessary
since the issues argued by ICRMP-on which it was ultimately granted judgment-were
legal issues. Nevertheless, plaintiff continued to pursue a ruling that ICRMP was an
illegal entity that was not allowed to pay for attorneys' fees awarded against its
insureds.
A. FEES RECOVERABLE UNDER I.C. §12-121

Idaho Code § 12-121 states, in part:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable
attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties ...
Meanwhile, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 provides:
(e)(1) Attorney Fees. In any civil action the court may award
DEFENDANT ICRMP'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS-2
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reasonable attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court
may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties
as defined in Rule 54(d)(1 )(B), when provided for by any
statute or contract. Provided, attorney fees under section
12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only
when it finds, from the ·facts presented to it, that the
case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation; but attorney fees
shall not be awarded pursuant to section 12-121, Idaho
Code, on a default judgment. (emphases supplied)
In the present case, Westover's case was brought and pursued frivolously,
unreasonably, and without foundation. The fact plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his
claim was clearly established in Brooksby v. Geico General Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 546,
286 P.3d 182 (2012), Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 196 P.3d (2008), and Block v.
City of Lewiston, 156 Idaho 484, 328 P.3d 464 (2014).

In his briefing opposing

defendant's motion plaintiff failed to offer any authority or precedent suggesting he
possessed standing plaintiff's case was brought and then pursued frivolously,
unreasonably, and without foundation, because from the beginning, he lacked the
necessary standing to challenge the contractual obligations owed by ICRMP to its
insured pursuant to the insurance policy Franklin County had purchased from ICRMP.
In Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 199 Idaho 87, 803
P.2d 993 (1991), the Supreme Court affirmed a grant of attorney's fees to defendants
on the basis of I.C. §12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1 ). The court repeated the standard
discussed in Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982) ruling a
plaintiff must have brought its claim "without reasonable foundation." See 199 Idaho at
90 (citing Anderson at 660). Even if Westover initially believed he was entitled to file
the case, when defendant raised the standing issue at summary judgment, he should
have, at that point, ceased to pursue the case against ICRMP. See, e.g., Ortiz v.
DEFENDANT ICRMP'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS-3
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Reamy, 115 Idaho 1099, 1101, 772 P.2d 737, 739 (Ct. App. 1989) ("The terms 'brought'

and 'pursued,' used disjunctively in Rule 54(e)(1), signify that a nonprevailing litigant
may suffer an award of fees if a claim which is arguably meritorious when initially
asserted is rendered frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation by subsequent
events or information during the pendency of the suit.")
It is Within a trial court's discretion to determine that a specific claim has been
pursued frivolously and determine the entire lawsuit was also "brought unreasonably
and without foundation." See Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 137 Idaho
747, 754 53 P.3d 330, 337 (2002) (upholding fee award made under§ 12-121). This
Court should make that finding, and should award ICRMP fees for having to defend
Westover's claims.
B. FEES AND COSTS AWARDABLE UNDER RULE 54

As noted supra, attorney's fees are awardable to ICRMP pursuant to I.R.C.P.
54(e) for Westover's frivolous pursuit of his declaratory judgment action. Costs are also
due to ICRMP under Rule 54(d)(1) on the ground that that it is a prevailing party.
ICRMP is entitled to its prevailing party costs allowed by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 )(A) and
(C) and detailed in the concurrently-filed Memorandum of Costs. See Fish v. Smith,
131 Idaho 492, 493, 960 P.2d 175, 176 (1998} ("The prevailing party in a civil action has
a right to seek reimbursement of the costs incurred in prosecuting or defending the
action.") (citing I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(A)); Eagle Water Co. v. Roundy Pole Fence Co., 134
Idaho 633, 637, 7 P.3d 1110, 1114 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Costs are also allowed as a matter
of right pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 ).") ICRMP may also be entitled to certain other
costs, the award of which is discretionary with the Court pursuant to I.R.C.P.

DEFENDANT ICRMP'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
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54(d)(1 )(D).
"Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1 )(D) permits the district court to award
additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that allowed as
a matter of right."

Hoagland v. Ada Cty., 154 Idaho 900, 913, 303 P.3d 587, 600

(2013) (citation omitted). "A trial court may, in its discretion, award a prevailing party
certain costs where there has been 'a showing that the costs are necessary .and
exceptional, reasonably incurred, and should in the interests of justice be assessed
against the adverse party.' " Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,
314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005) (citing I.RC.P. 54(d)(1)(D)). "Discretionary costs may
include long distance phone calls, photocopying, faxes, travel expenses and additional
costs for expert witnesses." Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist., Id. (citation omitted). In
awarding such costs, the Court "should assess the context and nature of a case as a
whole along with multiple circumstances." Hoagland, Id., 154 Idaho at 914. "Particular
standards a court should consider include, but are not limited to, whether there was
unnecessary duplication of work, whether there was an unnecessary waste of time, the
frivolity of issues presented, and creation of unnecessary costs that could have been
easily avoided." Id. at 914.
In the present case defendant seeks its costs associated with traveling to
Franklin County to argue its Motion for Summary Judgment.

These costs were

necessarily incurred evidenced by the fact the motion was filed and, plaintiff's legal
allegations found to lack merit.
CONCLUSION

ICRMP is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs from the filing of plaintiff's

DEFENDANT ICRMP'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
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Complaint on the grounds set forth above. A Memorandum of Costs· as required by
I.RC.P. 54(d)(5) is filed concurrently herewith.
DATED this i~~Y of November, 2016.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

By

Q_ '1'-· ~

;s:s4' 7).5.Z

~Phillip J. Collaer, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF. MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~~ay of November, 2016, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum by delivering the same to each of the
following attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Attorney for Plaintiff

[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
[ l / Overnight Mail
[ 1 Facsimile (801) 533-0380
[ ]
Email:

~ '}- ~ J:Sbil 5,p2..~illip J. Collaer
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Phillip J. Collaer - ISB No. #3447
Anne S. Magnelli - ISB No. #9452
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza ·
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-551 O
E-Mail:
pcollaer@ajhlaw.com
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Attorneys for Defendant, IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(ICRMP)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2016-195
VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES

vs.
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
COUNTY OF ADA )
COMES NOW Defendant Idaho Counties Risk Management Program ("ICRMP"),
by and through its undersigned counsel Anderson, Julian & Hull LLP, and moves this
Court for an Order awarding costs and attorneys' fees incurred in defending this lawsuit.
The undersigned attorney states:
1.
Idaho.

My name is Anne S. Magnelli. I am an attorney licensed in the State of
I am an associate in the firm of Anderson, Julian & Hull LLP and I am an
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attorney for ICRMP in the above-entitled action.
2.

The matters set forth herein are based upon my own personal knowledge,

information, and belief, and are also based upon the accounts, records 1 and business
ledgers kept by the firm in the regular and ordinary course of its business.

I have

personally reviewed the billing statements and invoices and have affirmed that the
following information is true and correct.
3.

The costs and disbursements set forth herein are to my knowledge and

belief correctly stated, properly claimed, and in accordance with I.RC.P. 54. To my
knowledge and belief, all such costs and disbursements were incurred or expended
reasonably, in good faith, for purposes of preparing and defending this action, and were
not incurred to vex, harass, or annoy the Plaintiff. The costs and disbursements hereby
claimed are truly and correctly stated and were actually paid, and are claimed in
compliance with I.R.C.P. 54(d) as follows:

I.
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

1.

Filing Fee: ICRMP is entitled to reimbursement for the court appearance

fee for filing its Answer in the amount of $136.00, paid under State of Idaho Filing Fee
Schedule (1)(1 }, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 )(C)(1 ).
Total of Costs as a Matter of Right= $136.00

II.
DISCRETIONARY COSTS

ICRMP sustained the following necessary, exceptional, and reasonably-incurred
costs, the award of which is discretionary under 54(d}(1 )(D), and which should in the
interests of justice be assessed against Plaintiff. The following costs are separate from
VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES w 2
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and do not include the costs as a matter of right set forth in Section I. The discretionary
costs are:

1.

Travel Costs:

ICRMP should be able to recover its costs for counsel's

travel expenses to and from the courthouse for the hearing on summary judgment, in
the amount of $188.49.

Total of Discretionary Costs= $188.49
TOTAL COSTS CLAIMED= $324.49

Ill.
ATTORNEYS' FEES
Anderson, Julian & Hull LLP was retained to protect the interests of ICRMP in Val

D. Westover v, Idaho Counties Risk Management Program, Case No. CV-2016-195 in
and for the County of Franklin, Idaho. Attorney's fees and costs are requested pursuant
to I.C. §12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e) for proving Plaintiff could not maintain a direct
action against ICRMP.

TOTAL ATTORNEYS' FEES REQUESTED= $9!111.00
To the best of my knowledge and belief, the items of costs are in compliance with
Rule 54(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. These costs were actually incurred
and paid, were reasonable and necessary for the proper defense of this action, and
were not expended for the purpose of vexation or harassment.
FURTHER your Affiant sayeth naught.

f).'&~

DATED this_ day of November, 2016.
AN~N, JULlt~ ~ HULL LLP .

By~

'J

~

Anne S. Magnelli, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant ICRMP
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

d'i~y of November, 2016.

Notary Publi for laaho
Residing at ~Se 7tfcqho
My Commission Ex~ires: [{

C~IE J. FARNWORTii
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATI: OF IOAHO

/tLPb(

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
of November, 2016, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum by delivering the same to each of the
following attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone:·(208) 747-3414

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

[<
[ )

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (801) 533-0380
Email:

Attorney for Plaintiff

Anne S. Magnelli
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Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin lSB# 6903
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Telephone: (801) 533·0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380

. :

~

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO{lRT IN AND FOR

FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
)
) OPPOSITION TO ICRMP'S MOTION FOR

Val D Westover,
Plaintiff

)
V.

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

)
,

)
)

Idaho Counties Risk Management Program )
(ICRMP),
)
)
Defendant.
)

Case No. CV-2016-195
Judge Brown

INTRODUCTION
JCRMP moves for attorney's fees citing as the sole basis for such an award Idaho Code
Section 12-121, claiming that Plaintiff's claims were frivolous because he lacked standing.
That argument itself, is frivolous. Plaintiff is one of a very few citizens in a position to
challenge the legality of ]CR.MP in light of the legislative pronouncement in I.C. § 12-J J7. This

Court found that it was at least arguable that Plaintiff had standing under I.C. § l 0-1202, but
ruled otherwise. Plaintiff's assertion of rights under J.C. § 12-117, a statute yet to be judicially
interpreted, does not even approach frivolity.
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PLAINTIFF'S ASSERTION OF STANDING WAS NOT FRIVOLOUS
This case is a case of first impression. Neither party nor the Court could find a case that
interprets J.C.§ 12-117. As this Court perceived, Plaintiff arguably has standing under J.C. §101202 . See, Memorandum Decision and Order on IRMP 's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated
November 14, 2016, p. 7. (Memorandum Decision) That Statute reads:

PERSON INTERESTED OR AFFECTED MAY HAVE DECLARATION. Any person
interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract or any
oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal
ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
Plaintiff claims standing, based on the above statue, through I.C. § 12-117 that requires
local government to bear the brunt of their frivolous conduct out of their operating budget.
Plaintiff in this case, had his business interfered with to the tune of thousands of dollars by
frivolous conduct of a local government official. He seeks to challenge a practice, under§ 12117 that thwarts the legislative intent to make the local government official feel the cost he has

caused his constituents to incur. It is hard to imagine anyone who can have greater standing to
challenge ICRMP's facilitation ofa violation of§ 12-117 than Plaintiff. Again, there appears to
be no case law regarding standing and § 12-117.
The cases on which Defendant relies and that were ultimately adopted by the Court,
deal with a Plaintiff who is suing an insurance company seeking coverage under the policy and
seeking to enforce the insurance coverage under a contract with a third party. Until the decision

by this Court, Plaintiff logically took the position that those cases had scant, if any relevance to
the claims Plaintiff was pursuing.
Plaintiff is not seei-.ing to have the insurance enforced. Quite the opposite, Plaintiff

feels that ICRMP and what it is doing is illegal, and prevented him from having interaction with
2
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a local government official in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation base,d on the facts and law
and not on personality. He is not seeking to bootstrap hiroselfinto the insurance pool, but is
seeking to have it disbanded as an illegal attack of the legislation set out in LC. § 12-117. As
argued previously, it is the existence of the policy itself that is the alleged violation of§ 12-117,
Plaintiff does not seek any recovery from or under the policy. Such a claim would be improper,
but is not Plaintiff's claim in this case. ICRMP uses a '='straw man" technique to roischaracterize
Plaintiff's claims in an effort to make its standing argument stronger. In reality, Plaintiff is not
making a claim that can be accurately characterized as a "direct action claim" against the
insurance policy. Again, Plaintiff is claiming the very existence of the policy violates LC. § 12117, not that he has any right to recover anything under the policy.
While that argument ultimately failed in this Court, it was not without a factual and legal
basis and an argument that this Statute, I.C. § 12-117, needs to be analyzed by a court in this
state to determine if the activities of ICRMP interfere with the legislative intent behind that
statute.
ICRMP's argument assumes that standing is a static concept. Standing cannot be
determined by any bright line analysis. Standing cannot be used to immunize persons or entities
from the legislative will as enacted in our statutes. Standing must be evaluated in the context of
the facts of the case in order for the Court to determine whether the proponent of a legal
proposition is the proper party to assert that claim. It is not a simple proposition. The Court
must weigh all the facts and determine whether the Plaintiff is within the class that the legislature
sought to protect. 1 If he is, the inquiry ends and the Court must find standing. Even if it is not

1 It is also import.ant to note that this is not a case where the position of the Plaintiff was well founded when the case
was filed, but was pursued after it became clearly frivolous. The case was filed on June 3, 2016. Defendant's
answer was filed on June 23, 2016, Plaintiff immediately began discovery that went to the heart of Plaintiff's claims
and sought to flesh out the illegality of the ICRMP approach to local government litigation. JCRMP stonewalled

3
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clear that the legislature intended to benefit this particular Plaintiff, there may still be standing.
LC. § 10-1202 provides that a party may sue based on a violation of a statute. The

Idaho Supreme Court has held that: "When deciding whether a party has standing, we have
looked to decisions of the United States Supreme Court for guidance." Kockv. Canyon County,
177 P.3d 372, 375; 145 Idaho 158 (Idaho 2008). A party has standing to claim a statutory

violation if that party has suffered or is about to suffer an ''injury in fact" to his interests by a
violation of a statute. Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009). The
alleged injury may be as non-specific as "harm .. .that affects the recreational or even the mere
esthetic interests of the plaintiff'' to suffice as support for standing. Id. The requirement that a

party has standing assures that there is a real need to exercise the power of judicial review in
order to protect the interests of the complaining party. Jd.
In this case, Plaintiff has alleged he was damaged by a Franklin County official's illegal
act and

that ICRMP's providing of an insurance policy in violation of LC. § 12-117 had a

significant effect on both the commission of the illegal act and the County's approach to
defending Plaintiff's claims. Franklin County would have acted differently had they not been
insured by ICRMP. This firmly shows the allegation of a specific injury caused to Plaintiff in
connection with LC.§ 12-l 17.
In the cases cited by the Defendant, the insurance company will not escape the
obligations of its contract if the third party is not allowed to pursue the insurance coverage
because there is a more direct candidate for holding an insurance company liable-namely the c

Plaintiff on tJ,at discovery, and Plaintiff brought those facts to the Court's attention in conjunction with the motion
for summary judgment. The Court cited Plaintiff's failure to file !l,n affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(c), even though it
clearly appeared from the pleadings Plaintiff filed that the broader concern that summazy judgment is appropriate
only alter "sufficient time for discovery," was thwarted by the Defendant's stonewalling. Given the total failure of
any opportunity for the Plaintiff to pursue discovery it can hardly be found that the circumstances of this case
changed and Plaintiff should have recognized that fact.

4
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insured. In this case Defendant cannot point to a reason why Plaintiff cannot, nor to anybody
who will, enforce the legislative dictates of l.C. § 12-117. If Plaintiff is not allowed to do so,
who will? Franklin County obviously will not. While, this Court decided that Plaintiff could
not challenge the questionable actions of ICRMP, that decision did not make Plaintiff's attempt
to be a good citizen and bring to light a potent~ally corrupt practice frivolous.
It very well could have been proper for this Court to find that the Plaintiff had standing.
After going through the analysis, the Court might have been led to query, "if not this plaintiff
then who." If Val Westover, whose business was impacted to the tune of several thousands of
dollars by the frivolous conduct of the assessor sticking his nose into private business
transactions and getting it wrong cannot challenge a practice that shields the assessor's office
from the consequences of its actions contrary to clear legislative pronouncement, who can?
That is the essence of the standing analysis, and while Plaintiff lost at this stage, it cannot be

claimed that Plaintiff's challenge was without merit, especially when this Court found that
Plaintiff had made an "arguable" claim under'l.C. § 10-1202. ln its Memorandum Decision, at
page 7, this Court stated:
One can certainly argue that J.C. § l 0-1202 is a "statutory provision" authorizing such
an action. The prefatory phase ofl.C. § 10-1212 is "any interested person", without
limiting language in the statute; the phrase can certainly be interpreted broadly enough
to include Westover under the facts of this case. Certainly utilizing a broad definition of
"any interested person" Westover is interested in the insurance relationship between
lCRMP and Franklin County to the ex.tent outlined in his Complaint.
Even though this Court found against Plaintiff in this matter, his claims in this case are
not frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. This is especially true when one consider the
fact that Plaintiff's claims were not to enforce the insurance contract in any way, but Westover's

5
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interest in the insurance contract was a claim that the contract itself violated LC.§ 12-117.
The Motion should be denied.

DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO EXTRAORDINARY COSTS FOR HIRING A
LAWYER FROM BOISE
Defendant seeks "extraordinary costs" because its lawyer was required to come from
Boise to Franklin County to argue the motions in this case. That argument might work if there
were no lawyers competent to handle Defendant's case in this jurisdiction, but Defendant bas
not even attempted to establish such facts and the Court knows from its own experience that
there are a number of local attorneys who are competent to handle cases such as this. Smith v.
Milton, 104 P.3d 367, 376-377; 140 Idaho 893 (Idaho 2004); See, also Bailey v. Bailey, 284 P.3d

970; 975~976 (Idaho 2012) and I.R.C. P. 54 (e)(3) The rule only allows exceptional costs
where there has been a showing that the costs are necessary and exceptional, reasonably
incurred, and should in the interests of justice be assessed against the adverse party. Defendant
has wholly failed to establish any basis for extraordinary costs in this case.

CONCLUSION
JCRMP's motion for fees and costs should be denied.
DATED this 12th day of December, 2016.

Atkin Law Offices

~~---Blake S. Atkin
Attomeys for the Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

l HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 12th day of December, 2016, I caused to be served. by the
method(s) indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:

Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C.W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ldaho 83707-7426
Facsimile: (208) 334-5510
Email: pcollaer@ajhlaw.com
Hon. Mitchell W. Brown

X U.S. Mail X E-mail

_Facsimile

U.S. Mail

E-mail

X Facsimile

U.S. Mail

E-mail

X Facsimile

159 South Main
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Facsimile: (208) 547-2147
Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263
Facsimile: (208) 852-2926

Dated this .}2th day of December, 2016.
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Atkin Law Offices, P.C.
Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
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Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
)
Val D Westover,
)
)
Plaintiff
)
NOTICE OF APPEAL
)
V.

)

)
)
Idaho Counties Risk Management Program )
(ICRMP),
)
)
Defendant.
)

Case No. CV-2016-195

Judge Brown

TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS, IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (ICRMP), AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, PHILLIP
J. COLLAER, ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP, C.W. MOORE PLAZA 250
SOUTH FIFTH STREET, SUITE 700, P.O. BOX 7426, BOISE, IDAHO 83707-7426,
(208) 344-5800, PCOLLAER@AJHLAW.COM, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE
ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellant, V, AL D WESTOVER, appeals against the above-

named Respondent, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final Judgment dated
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November 15, 2016 by the Honorable Judge Mitchell W. Brown presiding. A copy of the
judgment is attached to this notice.
2.

That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the said

decision described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable decision under and pursuant to
Rule 11 I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant intends to

assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the
Appellant from asserting other issues ori appeal, are as follows:
A. Whether the District Court erred in determining that the Plaintiff, whose
rights were violated by the frivolous conduct by a local government official,
has standing to challenge the practice of ICRMP in insuring against the
assessment of attorneys' fees that should otherwise be collected against the
local government official's operating budget in contravention of LC. § 12117?
4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

The reporter's transcript has been ordered and paid for.

6.

The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's
record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: None

7.

The Appellants request that all exhibits offered or admitted at the trial be included
in the record.

8.

I certify:
a)

That a transcript has been ordered and paid for.
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b)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has

been paid.
c)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

d)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Rule 20, I.A.R.

DATED this 13th day of December, 2016.
Atkin Law Offices

4k~
Blake S. Atkin
Attorneys for the Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13 th day of December, 2016, I caused to be served, by
the method(s) indicated below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
X U.S. Mail

X E-mail

Hon. Mitchell W. Brown
159 South Main
Soda Springs, ID 83276
Facsimile: (208) 547-2147

U.S.Mail

E-mail

X Facsimile

Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263
Facsimile: (208) 852-2926

U.S. Mail

E-mail

X Facsimile

Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Facsimile: (208) 334-5510
Email: pcollaer@ajhlaw.com

_

Facsimile

Dated this 13th day of December, 2016.
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

******
VAL D. WESTOVER,

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (ICRMP)
Defendant-Respondent.
Appeal from:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Docket No.

44 7 .22

Franklin Co. Case No.: CV-2016-195

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

Sixth Judicial District, Franklin County

Honorable MitcheB W. Brown
Case number :from court: CV-20 I 6-195
Order or judgment appealed from:

Judgment filed November 15, 20 I 6

Attorney for Appellants:

Blake S. Atkin - bat;ki,n@itkinlawoffices.net
Atkin Law Office

Attorney for Respondents:

Phillip J. Collaer - pcollaer@ih,l@w.com
ANDERSON~ JULIAN & HULL~ LLP

Appealed by: Plaintiff
Appeal against: Defendant
Notice of Appeal filed: December 13, 2016
Appellate fee paid: Yes

FILED· ORIGINAL
DEC 27 2016

CLERK'S CERTJFICATE OF APPEAL - I
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•

Request fur additional (clerk's) record filed: No
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No
Was reporter's transcript requested? Yes

Name of reporter: Rodney M. Felslaaw
Dated this 23 rd day of December, 2016.

SHAUNA T. GEDDES

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL· 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN, STATE OF IDAHO
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

NOTICE OF LODGING.

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP),
Defendant/Respondent.
Franklin County No.
CV-2016-195
Supreme Court No. 44722
The following transcript(s) in the above-entitled matter were
electronically lodged with the District Court Clerk at the Franklin
County Courthouse in Preston, Idaho, on February 10, 2017.
September 29, 2016 - 56 pages.

Filed via:
(XX)
Electronic Filing with Court Clerk
(
)
U.S. Mail to Court Clerk
(XX)
Electronic Copy to ISC/ICA.
(
)
Hard copy filed with Court Clerk.

Rodney M. Felshaw, RPR, CSR
(Typed name of Reporter.)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

******
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (ICRMP),
Defendant/Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Docket No. 44722

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

I, Shauna T. Geddes, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that the following is a list of exhibits
which were offered or admitted into evidence during the hearing in this cause:

NONE
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 21 st day of February, 2017.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

******
VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (ICRMP)
Defendant/Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Docket No. 44722

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

I, Shauna T. Geddes, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record
of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I do further certify that all no exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will
be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and
Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court
at Preston, Idaho, this 21st day of February, 2017.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

******

VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (ICRMP)
Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 44722
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Shauna T. Geddes, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed,
by United States Mail, one copy of the REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S RECORD to
each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
Blake S. Atkin
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
7579 North West Side Highway
Clifton, ID 83228

Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLP
PO Box 7426
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Boise, ID 83707-7426

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 21 st day of February, 2017.
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